/ EDITORS /

Riga Shakya  
*Columbia University*

Ling-Wei Kung  
*Columbia University*

/ EDITORIAL AND PRODUCTION ASSISTANTS /

Victoria Liu  
*Columbia University*

Uudam Baoagudamu  
*Columbia University*

Celia Bui Le  
*Columbia University*

/ SPECIAL THANKS /

Michelle Wilson  
Lauran Hartley  
Pema Bhum  
H.E. Dagyab  
Rinpoche

**COVER ART**  
Nyema Droma

**DESIGN**  
Tiffany Yang
Gray Tuttle  
*Columbia University*

Lauran Hartley  
*Columbia University*

Eveline Washul  
*Columbia University*

Janet Gyatso  
*Harvard University*

Ulrike Roesler  
*Oxford University*

Nancy G. Lin  
*University of California Berkeley*

Shen Weirong  
*Tsinghua University*

Yudru Tsomo  
*Sichuan University*

Tashi Tsering  
*Amnye Machen Institute*

Tsering Shakya  
*University of British Columbia*

Pema Bhum  
*Latse Project*

Per K. Sørensen  
*Leipzig University*
editorial

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS
Ling-Wei Kung & Riga Shakya, Columbia University

STATE OF THE FIELD
Eveline Washul, Columbia University

articles

AN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY TEXTUAL LABYRINTH:
THE NATURE OF TIBETAN BUDDHIST PRINTING IN QING INNER ASIA DURING THE KANGXI PERIOD (r. 1661 - 1722)
Tenzin Yewong Dongchung, Columbia University

THE LEGACY OF BLA MA DKAR PO: AN UNSETTLED DISPUTE BETWEEN CHONE AND LABRANG ON THE INNER ASIAN FRONTIER
Marnyi Gyatso, Columbia University

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SURKHANG SICHÖ TSETEN
Yungdrung Gyurme, Independent Scholar

A STUDY OF THE FAMILY NAMES OF THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLD IN THE EARLY TIBETAN EMPIRE
Pema Dondrub, Minzu University of China

ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF THE HOR CHOS RJE AND THE THIRTEEN HOR MONASTERIES
Drolma Choekyi, Minzu University of China
111
THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRAYER FLAG POLES IN LHASA AND NGARI
甘丹才旺白桑布收复阿里与所立“经幡杆”的象征符号及蕴意
Urgyen Gyaltsen, Tibet University

book review

119
REVIEW OF FRONTIER TIBET: PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE SINO-TIBETAN BORDERLANDS
Xiaobai Hu, Nanjing University

125
REVIEW OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION ON THE TIBETAN FRONTIER
Elizabeth Reynolds, Washington University in St. Louis

exhibition review

131
COMPLEX MOTIVATIONS — REVIEW OF HUANG JIANPENG’S PHOTOGRAPHY COLLECTION OF TIBET AT THE NATIONAL ART MUSEUM OF CHINA
Victoria Liu, Columbia University

film review

140
REVIEW OF SONTCHAR GYAL’SALA CHANGSO
Palden Gyal, Columbia University

conference report

142
DECOLONIAL/ANTI-RACIST INTERVENTIONS IN TIBETAN/BUDDHIST STUDIES — AAR ROUNDTABLE, COLORADO 2019
Natalie Avalos, Matthew King, Nancy G. Lin, Dawa Lokyitsang, Karin Meyers, Annabella Pitkin, Sangseraima Ujeed, Riga Shakya

interview

151
INTERVIEW WITH NYEMA DROMA
Victoria Liu, Columbia University

translations

155
“THE NECKTIE” BY TSERING DONDRUB
Translated by Chris Peacock, Columbia University

158
“AN AMCHO’S RECITATION” BY PEMA BHUM
Translated by Tenzin Dickie, BDRC
Letter from the Editors

Waxing Moon grew out of conversations between the two of us and a number of interlocutors in Beijing, Lhasa, New York, and many other now distant international locales. In the summer of 2017 we held a seminar for young Tibetan and Inner Asian studies scholars at Renmin University where we were graciously hosted by Oyunbilig Borjigidai. The conclusion of the spirited program brought American, Mongolian, Tibetan and Chinese participants to a banquet table singing folk songs over libations. Later that year, we hosted the Beyond Empire and Borders: The 3rd International Conference on the Qing Dynasty and Inner Asia at Columbia University, where established scholars, junior faculty and graduate students participated in a truly global conversation. The spirit of intellectual exchange and camaraderie provided the seed of the project; Waxing Moon is envisioned as a platform for young and established scholars in Tibetan and Himalayan studies from both sides of the Pacific and Atlantic to share their work, with a strong commitment to diversity, multilingualism and meaningful dialogue. With guidance from Gray Tuttle and Lauran Hartley, we partnered with the Columbia University Libraries, and received endorsement from the Weatherhead East Asian Institute. Having worked closely over the past two years with the team at the Center for Digital Scholarship we are now finally able to bring this project into fruition.

We are proud that the line-up for our inaugural issue is testament to these aforementioned values. It is our pleasure to share with you the work of scholars working in English, Tibetan, and Chinese, based around the world. While the future of international research is an imperiled one, we hope that Waxing Moon will serve to fortify existing ties of community in our field and perhaps even nurture new forms of collaboration for the times ahead.

Friends and colleagues who have assisted us in our endeavor are innumerable but special thanks must be reserved for Michelle Wilson, Digital Publishing Librarian without whom this project would not have been possible. We are also most grateful for the work of our production and translation assistants; Celia Bùi Lê, our primary typesetter; and Tiffany Yang, our graphic designer who has rendered Nyema Droma’s artwork so beautifully for our cover.

Ling-Wei Kung and Riga Shakya, Editors, Columbia University
Introduction to the Issue

Eveline Washul, Columbia University

It is with great pleasure that I write for the inaugural issue of Waxing Moon. Waxing Moon, as its name so poetically illustrates, marks the coming into its own of a new direction of Tibetan studies scholarship. This new direction is one that takes steps toward the challenge of engaging the Tibetan studies community in “genuine dialogue” in spite of differences in native language, disciplinary training, or socio-political histories (Jacoby 2019). In her keynote address to the 14th International Association of Tibetan Studies Seminar in 2016, Sarah Jacoby raised a series of questions that pressed the international Tibetan studies community to consider who we engage with in dialogue and what our motivations are for doing so. She challenged us to push beyond our typical “monologue disguised as dialogue” (Buber, as cited in Jacoby 2019), in which we seek out those who are familiar and similar, and to engage in “genuine dialogue” that establishes active, mutual relations with those whom we may not otherwise easily interface due to linguistic, disciplinary, geographic, social, or other differences (Jacoby 2019).

Waxing Moon rises to this challenge with its commitment to multilingual publishing. This first issue brings together authors writing in English, Tibetan, and Chinese, from universities and academic institutions in the US, China, and the Tibetan Plateau. It is significant to note that these emerging scholars represent a new generation of Tibetan studies scholars who are fluent not only in multiple languages, but in navigating academic and social networks across Asia, Europe, and North America. Perhaps even more exciting is the fact that these authors reflect the rise of young Tibetan Tibetologists, who dominate the pages of this issue and hopefully future issues to come. Many, if not most, of the scholars represented here have spent time engaging in meaningful ways with their colleagues on both sides of the Pacific and Atlantic. Such engagements have been made possible, in pre-pandemic times, through the relatively open environment of scholarly exchange of the last several years, as well as the improvements in multilingual training of Tibetan studies students in programs in the US as well as China. International study, exchange programs, visiting scholar positions, and international research opportunities have created spaces for emerging and established scholars alike to deepen their engagements with one another through mutual dialogue, immersive studies, sharing resources, and collaborating in formal as well as informal ways. Waxing Moon brings to the fore some of the voices that have emerged from these multilingual, multicultural engagements.
It is also one of the hopes of the journal to be a platform to continue these exchanges, even in a post-pandemic world.

The contributions in this first issue take us from Tibet’s imperial period up to the present day and cover topics as varied as religio-politics, material culture and history, local and clan histories, autobiographical writings, borderland studies, photography, decolonial studies, and contemporary film and literature. A common theme running through many of the research essays in this issue is one that breaks down our modern-day notions of ethnicity, language, and statecraft to see the various cosmopolitan and complex political engagements that characterize earlier historical periods. For instance, Tenzin Yewong Dongchung and Urgyen Gyaltse each contribute close studies of 17th and 18th century material objects and their associated institutions that reveal the ways in which the Qing extended its influence in Inner Asia and the Ganden Phodrang consolidated its power in western Tibet, respectively. Meanwhile, Marnyi Gyatso and Drolma Choekyi examine local histories of regional powers that shed light on the lesser understood aspects of how secular and religious authorities negotiated their relations to lay claim to people and places in Amdo and Kham. Yungdrung Gyurme discusses an autobiography of Surkhang Sichö Tseten that has recently come to light in Amdo Trika, which highlights the dynamic relations between Tibetan, Chinese, and Muslim religious and political figures of 18th and 19th century Lhasa. Finally, Pema Dhondrup in his essay traces how royal clan and family names in the Tibetan Empire evolved from names of individual tsho ba. Each of these studies complicates our understandings of how power was negotiated and exercised between various secular and religious centers of authority from imperial metropole to the Ganden Potrang hegemony to the Sino-Tibetan borderlands.

Other contributions in this issue include Xiaobai Hu’s review of the recent publication Frontier Tibet, which collates the results of an important multi-year, international project studying the Sino-Tibetan Kham borderlands. Victoria Liu’s review of a photographic exhibition from the National Art Museum of China introduces an English-reading audience to Chinese photographers documenting eastern Tibet in the 1930s and 1940s and provides a thoughtful analysis of their works. Liu also contributes an interview with Lhasa-based contemporary artist, photographer, and entrepreneur, Nyema Droma, whose work provokes questions of self-representation, culture, and Tibetan manifestations of globalization and is featured on the cover of this issue. Contemporary Tibetan film is also represented in this issue with Palden Gyal’s insightful review of filmmaker Sonthar Gyal’s recent film, Ala Changso (2018). The conference report makes accessible to a broader audience the proceedings of a roundtable session on decolonial approaches to Tibetan/Buddhist Studies from
the 2019 meeting of the American Association of Religious Studies. Such a topic could not come at a more apt moment and provokes our field to think deeply about our own embedded practices that might perpetuate structural inequities and how to take steps to redress them. The issue closes with an example of its dedication to multilingual publishing: two pieces of Tibetan contemporary literature written by two prominent Tibetan writers, Tsering Dondrub and Pema Bhum, translated into English by Christopher Peacock and Tenzin Dickie, respectively.

Waxing Moon, with its focus on interdisciplinary and transregional engagement and dialogue, is a welcome addition to the at-present small number of journals dedicated to Tibetan studies and will broaden the scope of scholarship represented in the field. With such diverse offerings found within this first issue, Waxing Moon now challenges readers to step outside our typical zones of comfort and interest and engage in meaningful “genuine dialogue” with topics, scholars, and languages we may not otherwise easily encounter.

**Works Cited**

An Eighteenth-Century Textual Labyrinth: The Nature of Tibetan Buddhist Printing in Qing Inner Asia during the Kangxi period (r. 1661-1722)

Tenzin Yewong Dongchung, Columbia University

Introduction

Printing the Buddhist canon was a continuous imperial practice that transcended dynastic changes. As early as the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), the ruling Khans supervised the printing of Xixia canon in Hangzhou.1 Later, in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), the Yongle emperor (r.1403-1424) printed the first Tibetan-language canon in 1410. In 1606, the Wanli emperor (r.1572-1620) edited this canon and produced a new copy.2 Despite this precedence, records illustrate that it was under the Qing emperors Kangxi (r.1661-1722) and Qianlong (r. 1735-1796) that the frequency of canon printing reached its highest peak. Only under Kangxi, the canon was edited and printed five times: 1684, 1692, 1700, 1717 and 1720.3 This was followed by further editions printed in 1737 and 1765 under the Qianlong emperor. Both the emperors also wrote prefaces for the canons.4 Compelling statistics such as the one presented above have led historians to the consensus that patronage of Tibetan Buddhist printing projects under the Qing dynasty was unprecedented in its scale.

In this paper, I seek to map out the key institutions that undergirded this patronage in the form of a Tibetan Buddhist printing network. Conceptualizing the printing activities as a network allows us to see that while the imperial palace and the inner court were driving this patronage, temples in Beijing city and individual monasteries on the Inner Asian borderlands formed the main circuits through which texts were sold and distributed on a mass scale. Recognizing the role of the other institutions outside of the palace shows that the nature of Qing imperial patronage and authority was not absolute that operated solely out of a singular center. The imperial patronage created an

---

3 Hahn and Eimer, *Suhṛllekḥāḥ*, 155.
environment that was conducive to prolific publishing. Smaller institutions in Beijing were able to fill the demands for religious texts for visiting monks by opening their own bookstores. Further away, individual monasteries emulated the model of imperial patronage and independently worked with local stakeholders to start printing projects. It would therefore be more fitting to see the nature of imperial authority as fluid with multiple mobile centers in different parts of the empire.

To demonstrate the High Qing emperors’ personal interest and patronage of Tibetan Buddhism, I begin by first describing the institutional development of new workshops and printing offices that started under their reigns. I then take the case study of the 1667 Kangxi Dragon Canon to demonstrate the human and material resources such projects demanded. I will then move outside of the palace and explain how temples in Beijing and adjacent bookstores printed smaller religious texts for visiting Mongolian and Tibetan monks and nobles, who in turn took these texts home and expanded this network from Beijing to the Qing borderlands. Finally, I will touch on how local monasteries worked independently to start their own canon productions which would lead to an increasing number of permanent printing houses on the Sino-Tibetan borderlands.

Literature Overview

How did this topic of studying Tibetan Buddhism at the Qing court emerge? Broadly speaking, until the 1980s, the conventional narrative of Chinese history in the United States was told through the Sinicization thesis which assumed there was a uniform Chinese culture from time immemorial. The peripheral regions of China were assumed to have assimilated to the influence of the Imperial center. The opening of central archives of the Imperial dynasties in the late 1980s and the availability of sources other than Mandarin, such as Manchu and Mongolian, led to an approach that was popularized as New Qing History.

Calling for the importance of identity and ethnicity, these scholars saw that Qing was not just the last Chinese dynasty, rather it was a pluralistic and a multi-ethnic empire. Beginning with works that examined the Manchu identity of the Qing rulers, New Qing History

---


has expanded to include studies of borderlands and Inner Asia. It is in this context that Tibet finds an intellectual space in Chinese history, albeit through the discussion of Tibetan Buddhism. From the architecture of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in Beijing to the Qing emperor’s relation to Tibetan Buddhist hierarchs, Tibetan Buddhism became one of the topics through which the idea of a multi-ethnic Qing empire was expanded upon. The study of Tibetan Buddhist printing network falls under the purview of this topic. However, as stated in the introduction, I will seek to use the imperial patronage as a way to better understand the nature of Qing imperial authority.

Development of Printing Institutions Under the Kangxi Emperor (r.1661-1722)

Beginning with Kangxi Emperor’s reign, many new institutions and infrastructure were built to support the printing of Tibetan Buddhist works. By printing activities, I refer to three specific forms: carving, printing and dissemination. The first phase is most labor intensive for it is in this initial stage that wood is procured, artisans are recruited and then carving commences. Once the woodblocks are ready, the second stage involves the production of xylograph copies that are formed by pressing sheets of paper on the inked woodblock. In the final stage, compiled Buddhist texts circulate, either in the form of imperial gifts by the court or through purchases by monks for their monasteries. What these three stages demonstrate is the need for both material and human resources to complete such projects. Some of the texts such as Kangyur (Wylie: Bka’ ‘gyur) and Tengyur (Wylie: Bstan ‘gyur) were each 108 and 226 volumes respectively and therefore would require significant investment.

The diagram below is a simplified form of Qing governance in which I have highlighted and categorized three main forms of institutions that were involved in the printing activities. First is the Imperial household department (Chin: Neiwufu) which was part of the palace and separate from the state. The palace usually comprises “the emperor, his immediate family, his empress and consorts, eunuchs and personal advisors.” Second is the state bureaucracy which contains six formal ministries. Based on the original bureaucratic framework from

---

the Han dynasty, the ministries were sometimes known as Boards during the Qing. The ministries were involved in appointments of staff and division of revenue as required under their jurisdiction. The last category includes semi-independent offices such as Censorate or the Court of Colonial Affairs.

Figure 1: Three forms of Qing institutions

Figure 2 & 3: Six Ministries based on Jianze Song and Christine Moll-Murata’s work cited below.

10 Wilkinson, 273.
One of the main shifts that occurred during the transition from Ming to Qing was the transference of religious work from the state to the Imperial palace. Under the Ming, religious rituals inside the Forbidden City were handled by eunuchs attached to three Scripture Printing Workshops, which was under the Ministry of Rites.\textsuperscript{11} By Qing, the responsibility shifted to the Imperial Household department.\textsuperscript{12} Primarily responsible for manufacture of goods for palace use, the Imperial Household department was created in 1661. Using rents from court’s own estates and tribute gifts as their income, the household probably spent at least 15,000 ounces of silver every year on regular religious expenses.\textsuperscript{13} It was one of the most significant imperial infrastructures that facilitated the printing projects. Kangxi was initially a minor in the first five of his reign but beginning in 1667, he reordered and expanded the organization of the Imperial Household Department. Between 1662 and 1722, the total number of officials at the Imperial Household Department increased from 402 to 939.\textsuperscript{14}

Under the Imperial household department, there were seven main sections. Guangchusi, which was the Section of Supply, administered craftsmen who manufactured goods for court use. Inspired by Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730) who was one of the six Jesuit

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.png}
\caption{Based on The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department: A Study of Its Organization and Principal Functions, 1662-1796 / by Preston M. Torbert, P30-37.}
\end{figure}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Department of Privy Purse: has storehouses for goods received presents to be send.
\item 2. Palace Stud
\item 3. Section of Supply
\item 4. Department of coordinating office to handle employee administration
\item 5. The Imperial Armory
\item 6. Department of works also known as board of works - store for lumber, iron, charcoal, firewood. Did repair and construction work.
\item 7. Chancery of the Imperial Household for juridical and other services.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{11} Naquin, \textit{Peking}, 54.
\textsuperscript{12} Naquin, \textit{Peking}, 51.
\textsuperscript{13} Naquin, \textit{Peking}, 332.
sent by the King of France and a member of the Académie Royale des Sciences, Kangxi began establishing workshops in 1693 under the administration of the office of manufacture, Zaobanchu. He had craftsmen from all over China be brought to the capital to staff these factories. The workshops were based on a number of buildings across western section of the forbidden city. One was Yangxindian which had 3,279 craftsmen/workers and 196 artisans. The second location was Wuyingdian, which Kangxi established around 1680 in the southwestern section of the forbidden city. Wuyingdian also housed the Imperial Household Department printing office, book binding office, storehouses and the imperial library Yushuchu. These offices were famed for publishing the finest editions of scholarly works. For instance, the Imperial manuscript library had 36,000 volumes of Siku quanshu.

The creation of these new workshops such as Wuyingdian was important because beginning in 1645, the system of hereditary artisan households was reported as abolished. During the Ming dynasty, the construction trades were under government control. Workers were registered as artisan households in the population registers and were obliged to do labor service. However, in the course of Ming, most artisans were relieved of their core obligations, and service was replaced by tax payment. All construction work for the dynasty was assigned by contract to private workshops and enterprises. This meant that the ministries no longer had access to artisans who could be recruited to work on printing projects. The creation of palace workshops fulfilled the vacuum created by lack of skilled laborers in the government registry.

At the same time, this is not to delineate a clean separation between the state bureaucracy and the Imperial palace/court. For instance, the Ministry of Works, which was one of the main ministries under the state bureaucracy and thus used the fiscal budget of the Qing state, was in charge of buying up materials and objects for the use of the Imperial palace. Their works also include management of state-owned agricultural lands as well as exploitation of mountains and lakes. For huge woodblock printing, there is a possibility that the

16 Torbert, 32.
17 Torbert, *The Ch‘ing Imperial Household Department.*, 39.
18 Song and Moll-Murata, “Notes On Qing Dynasty ‘Handicraft Regulations and Precedents’ (Jiangzuo Zeli), with Special Focus on Regulations on Materials, Working Time, Prices, and Wages,” 102-103.
ministry was involved. In fact, in the “Technical Instruction for Handicrafts” which was compiled by Yunli (1697-1738), the 17th son of Kangxi, the team listed wages for different works. The report has 74 chapters, 27 of which focuses on different types of wood constructions. In the gonggong zhenben congkan, different types of wood such as pine timber, wei timber and pine timber are listed.20

Production Cost of Printing a Canon

Indeed, the first canon produced under Kangxi’s reign exemplifies the involvement of multiple departments. Although Kangxi was only 14 in 1667, his grandmother, Borjigit Bumbutai (1613-1688), also known as Empress Dowager Xiaozhuang, ordered the production of what would later be known as the Kangxi Canon or the Tibetan Dragon Canon.21 Below is the instruction that Empress Dowager gave on the Tibetan Dragon canon.

“The Grand Empress Dowager Xiaozhuang gave imperial orders that it be produced; that it be inlaid with pearls and gems, be done on midnight-blue paper, be written in gold ink, and have the Tibetan Dragon Canon in western Tibetan script, making for a total of 108 volumes, including various scriptures orally transmitted by Buddha Shakyamuni.”

- First Edition of the Palace Collection of Religious Works (Juan 24)22

Of the 108 volumes, each volume had pages ranging from 300 to 500 leaves. This would be 50,000 leaves in 108 volumes. Moreover, each of the volumes would also have cover plans that were exquisitely designed with Buddhist miniature paintings.23 The working team was divided into two groups. First was the lama team, who handled the scripture transcription. The three lamas at Imperial court: Emci, Mergen Corji and Coinpul Gelung led a group of 171 lamas. The laymen were high officials such as Imperial managers who instructed bureau directors and vice-directors of the Ministry of Works, supplies

---

20 Jianze Song and Christine Moll-Murata, “Notes On Qing Dynasty ‘Handicraft Regulations and Precedents’ (Jiangzuo Zeli), with Special Focus on Regulations on Materials, Working Time, Prices, and Wages,” 92-93.
22 馮明珠 and 盧雪燕, 6.
23 馮明珠 and 盧雪燕, 9.
office and palace storehouses. As the Empress Dowager decreed, the canon was to be written on blue paper with gold ink. Therefore, the monks had to first write on white paper with regular ink and only then could copy it on the blue paper. Records show that they took one meal and two tea breaks. The Ministry also had to arrange for food and drinks of monks on a daily basis. Another less obvious cost of the canon came from clothing that would be used as a protective wrap for the canon. Empress Dowager instructed the Imperial manager Bake and Tuba to use gold and velvet thread to weave the silk wrappings. In total, 1080 curtains of fabric were sourced from Jiangnan. The satin curtains had flower patterns with Sanskrit script in gold thread.

Perhaps, the most expensive part of Imperial canon production was the use of expensive raw materials. In the memorial submitted by Imperial manager Misihan on December 12, 1667, he estimated that the sum of gold powder required for the canon cost 371,175 taels (forty grams) and 5 mace (four grams). This calculation was based on the number of flying gold pieces, which was a thin gold foil mixed with glue to make gold ink.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pieces</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>108 pieces of front cover plank</td>
<td>540 pieces of flying gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,3000 pieces of paper</td>
<td>37,725 pieces of flying gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>756 Buddhist miniature on the cover plank</td>
<td>1,782 pieces of flying gold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Breakdown of flying gold cost

The Tibetan canon was produced three more times by the imperial court: 1684, 1692 and 1700. Given the huge scale of each canon production, these projects also led to more infrastructure and institutional changes. For instance, between 1684 and 1692, a new set of wooden blocks were carved in Beijing for Kangyur. This could either signify that the earlier wood blocks were well used or that the new blocks would allow for multiple productions to commence simultaneously. In 1690, Imperial Household Department created a new office called the Sutra Recitation office in Zhongzheng Dian, a

24 The Imperial managers were named as Misihan, Baka, Tuba, and Hailasun. 馮明珠 and 盧雪燕, 8.
25 馮明珠 and 盧雪燕, 8.
hall in the northwestern corner of Forbidden city. The office became the emperor's primary office for dealing with Tibetan Buddhist matters. One name that was featured in the directory of this office was Gombojab, a polyglot who was born to a Mongol noble family in southern Mongolia and is known for writing a book on the spread of Buddhism in Mongolia. He headed the Tibetan language school under the Court of Colonial Affairs. He was one of the officials who supervised the Beijing edition of Tibetan Buddhist canon translation.  

It is possible that similar to the 1669 Kangyur, there were other court lamas actively involved in transcribing the scriptures. Susan Naquin writes that there were six Buddhist halls in the Imperial palace, six in the Imperial city and seven in suburban villas. The growth of Buddhist institutions signifies that there were plenty of lamas that the court could recruit for the projects.

The Role of Temples and Monasteries in Printing:

The printing of Tibetan Buddhist texts also occurred in languages other than Tibetan. One prime example is the Mongolian canon that Kangxi produced between 1718 and 1720. It was originally translated from Tibetan in the seventeenth century and the main sponsor was Emperor Ligdan. In 1718, the Kangxi emperor decided to revise and edit it. The text was first collated in Dolonor in Mongolia, which was the seat of Lcang skya reincarnation line. Kangxi is believed to have recruited a commission of scholars from all the banners. Banners were the main socio-political unit created by the Qing to rule over Mongols, which was led by a “Jasagh,” a title given to Mongol nobles who had surrendered to the Manchus. In terms of the wood blocks required to print the copies, this occurred in Beijing at the famous Miaoying Si or the White Stupa. Kangxi wrote the preface for the Kanjur. Once the 108 volumes of Kangyur were printed in the Imperial city, it was stored at Songzhu Si.

---

27 Wu, 157.
30 Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva in The Governance of The Ch’ing Empire,” 17.
What the Mongolian Kangyur demonstrates is that apart from the Imperial Household Department and the Ministry of Works, temples and monasteries also played a key role in the printing process. This was even more common for smaller texts that would not require extensive budgets. For instance, a new version of a Buddhist guidebook to Mount Wutai and its temples was edited by Blo bzang bstan pa in 1701. The blocks were cut at a government financed monastery at Mount Wutai, the Pusating and later carried to Beijing. At the same time, the use of temples as printing workshops does not appear to be a new phenomenon. In fact, the site of the Songzhushi Temple had been the location of printing workshops in Ming dynasty, called Hanjing Chang (Chin.: 漢經廠) (Eng: Han canon) and Fanjing Chang (Chin.: 番經廠) (Eng: Barbarian, Tibetan canons).

One of the main differences between canon and other Buddhist production was also in terms of its dissemination. Given the scale of the project, the canons were usually printed by the Imperial printing center at Wuyingdian or by big monasteries such as Derge, Narthang or Chone. The books on the other hand were often made at smaller temples and monasteries. Vladimir Uspensky has written that while the temple bookstores in Beijing had a strong market in Mongolia, the copies of the Buddhist canon were not for sale and were only distributed as imperial gifts. Although the canon was fewer in number and not sold, it does not necessarily imply that it did not travel widely. Using the Emperors’ wide network, copies of the canon were distributed throughout its geographical reach and also reached Central Tibet. For instance, two editions of 1410 Yongle canon was given to Chos rje Kun dga’ bkra shis (1349-1425), head of lha khang of Sakya in 1414 and Byams chen chos rje shkya ye shes (1325/54-1435), founder of Sera monastery in 1416. Evelyn Rawski had found through a twentieth century survey that Tibetan, Mongolian and Manchu Tripitakas were present at eight great temples built by the Qianlong emperor at Rehe. The survey also found Narthang imprints of Kangyur and Tengyur at Chengde. This points to the active gift making of canon that was happening across the Inner Asian network and also possibly points to the political currency of canon as gift making among powerful stakeholders.

---

34 Farquhar, “Emperor as Bodhisattva in The Governance of The Ch’ing Empire,” 30.
37 Silk, [Sahrlekhāḥ](https://lamas-and-emperors.wikischolars.columbia.edu/Canon+Printing), 156.
38 Rawski, 7.
The Tibetan Buddhist book market, on the other hand, functioned as a market in its original sense. Expansion of Tibetan Buddhism had already led to a demand for religious works. As Mongol groups were incorporated into the Qing banner system, schools were established in each jasagh, the administrative banner unit and in centers such as Beijing, Urga, Uliastai and Kobdo, students learned to read and write Mongolian and Manchu. The Mongolians learned Tibetan during their schooling at Tibetan Buddhist monasteries. Given that there were more than 2,000 monasteries and temples in Mongolia and Qinghai province, the audience for religious books was vast to say the least. With 221 Mongol language books published, Beijing was the center of Mongol language publishing. The books printed in Songzhushi Temple also had an adjacent bookstore called Tianqi. The Mahakala miao also printed religious texts. Mongolian books, along with Manchu and Chinese were also sold at Longfusi and Huguosi. As the temples and their book stores played a pivotal role in the distribution and sale of these books, they were often bought by either visiting Mongolian lamas for their home monasteries or by Mongol nobles.

**Moving Beyond the Center: Printing outside of Imperial involvement**

In studying the Inner Asian printing network, Beijing was undoubtedly an important center. However, not all religious works coming out of Beijing were directly related to the imperial court. Some of the texts found from Tianqi bookstore or the Mahakala miao had individual carver names written on them. Similarly, Lan Wu has shown that important Buddhist texts were also printed in Inner Asian centers farther from Beijing. For instance, in 1721, a monk called Jingjue, who came from a Tusi family in Gansu called the Yang was the abbot of Chone (Chin: Chanding) monastery. During his abbotsipship, he ordered the production of Kangyur from engraving to final printing. He employed 100 Buddhist scholars, craftsmen, painters and staff. The Chone Kangyur took ten years to complete.

Similarly, in Mongolia, Charles Bawden has shown that many monastic printing houses developed that functioned without the patronage of Qing emperors. In fact, just as the rich Mongol men and nobles bought the books in Beijing, they were the ones who also

---

39 Rawski, “Book Culture in Qing Inner Asia,” 304-305.
40 Rawski, 305.
41 Rawski, 5.
42 Rawski, “Book Culture in Qing Inner Asia,” 221.
43 Wu, 156.
44 Bawden, Modern History Mongolia, 23.
patronized local printing. For instance, between 1779 and 1783, Khorchin noblemens raised 140 taels of silver to pay for woodblocks of 130 texts of the collected works of the 18th century cleric called Mergen Gegen.\textsuperscript{45}

As historical evidence clearly demonstrates the role of monasteries and temples in facilitating the Inner Asian printing network, it also helps us to reconsider these institutions and shift our perspectives on monasteries, which as Weiwei Luo articulately states, are not merely public spaces and recipients of patronage but also “active agents with political and social power.”\textsuperscript{46} They had their own bookstores, their workshops and often found local sponsors to build their influence as independent institutions. If the monasteries could exercise a certain degree of freedom and power, it also helps us to evaluate the implication of Qing sponsored Buddhist institutions and their impact on imperial authority. While this paper does not focus on construction of monasteries or conversion of existing institutions into Tibetan Buddhist sites, as briefly mentioned in the beginning, the sponsorship of monasteries was another important form of Imperial patronage. Of the 57 Imperial founded monasteries, 25 were of Tibetan Buddhists. The Kangxi emperor built monasteries in Wutaishan, Dolonor and Jehol.\textsuperscript{47} Before him, Hong Taiji had built temples for Mahakala and Kalachakra in Shenyang. After him, Qianlong would build replicas of Potala and Tashilhunpo at Rehe.\textsuperscript{48}

Sabine Daringhuas has argued that building of Tibetan monasteries was a way of turning Tibetan eyes towards China by symbolically transgressing cultural boundaries between Inner Asia and China.\textsuperscript{49} Pamela Crossley, on the other hand, has written of imperial sponsorship and regulation as a political strategy to neutralize institutions that could challenge “the ideological, political, or financial preeminence of the court.”\textsuperscript{50} Crossley argument rests on the rationale that imperial institution opposed any formation of solidarities based on common features which she lists as below:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \cite{Bawden} \cite{WeiweiLuo} \cite{Xiangyun} \cite{Hevia} \cite{Dabringhaus} \cite{Crossley}
\end{itemize}
“common descent, common age, common gender, common status, common habitat, common religion, common proximity, common skills, common pastimes, common occupation, common avarice, common security, common recreation, common indebtedness, or common dissoluteness.”

However, in studying the printing activities of monasteries and temples, it in fact shows that the Qing while sponsoring some of these monasteries did not have direct influence on them all the time. Thus, Jonathan Hay’s description of Qing imperial authority fits better with the findings of this research. Hay writes that beginning from Kangxi, “imperial authority was reinvested in a mobile center, responsive to emperor’s movements and to contingent political needs. Power was free flowing, crystallizing in specific places around the emperor’s physical present.” His research is based on the emergence of multiple palace centers or the use of garden complexes as alternative seats of government. Emergence of printing centers outside of the imperial palace in Beijing and in Inner Asian capital illustrate a wide and a complex network. This network was undoubtedly supported by the Qing emperors and spurred by their financial contribution but also had spaces and layers where smaller local powers could engage in printing activities independently.

Works Cited


Chayet, Anne, Mark C. Elliott, Philippe Foret, and James A. Millward. “Architectural Wonderland: An Empire of Fictions.” In New

51 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror [Electronic Resource], 228.


The Legacy of Bla ma dkar po: An Unsettled Dispute between Chone and Labrang on the Inner Asian Frontier

Gyatso Marnyi, Columbia University

Introduction

Mdo smad is a massive geographic region straddling Central Tibet and China proper. From the tenth century onward, the steppes, alpine meadows and valley alluviums nourished several powerful polities that took place through political, military and religious reconfigurations of hundreds of Tibetan tsbo ba (group, clan or tribe). Historical accounts concerning such phenomenal powers are found rather scattered. Tibetan monastic narrative usually focuses on the history of eminent dharma and patron lineages instead of local political conflict and social change. Tibetan genealogical records construct idealized spiritual and secular lineages instead of reflecting the exercise of authority in reality. Chinese sources emphasize the Sino-centric political-cultural order on this frontier while paying little attention to the Tibetan management of community and the Tibetan principle of rulership on the ground. Hence, few available works in the academic literature on Mdo smad delve into the interactions between the coexisting regional polities and their respective control of tsbo ba.

However, a confrontation between the Chone Kingdom (1418–1950) and the regional authority centered in Labrang (1709–1950) showcases the complex politico-religious intercourse traversing tsbo ba and the two polities’ central administrations.

After decades of expansion, the religious influence of Labrang had infiltrated into Chone’s jurisdictional borderland by the late nineteenth century. Although the two Tibetan powers abutted each other and maintained an amicable relationship, the death of a lama, who was born in the Chone-Labrang borderland and spectacularly ascended to power in Xinjiang, brought his hometown and the two regimes into an intricate contestation over his material and immaterial legacies. The dispute, which was concealed and reinterpreted by local Tibetan communities, was witnessed by several Gospel missionaries. Their accounts, in addition to diverse genres of historical document,

---

illuminat[e] an inter-polity struggle for managing a federation and a monastery caught in-between Chone and Labrang, reveal the initiative of *tsho ba* against temporal and ecclesiastic authorities, and imply the social, political and religious rationales behind the scenario. This article draws attention to the dynamic relations between the politico-religious centers, namely Chone and Labrang, and the eighteen *tsho ba* in the lama’s hometown. It examines how an influential religious authority came into being in local society, how the lay and religious rulers exerted control over a place, how the confrontation between Chone and Labrang was constrained in a covert and indirect way, and how *tsho ba* as agents of social-political changes navigated themselves on the turbulent Sino-Tibetan frontier from the late Qing to early Republican period.

**Politico-Religious Structures of Chone and Labrang**

From the eighteenth century onward, Chone and Labrang were the most dominant Tibetan political-religious-trading centers in Mdo smad. The two regimes managed over 1,200 *tsho ba* that neighbored the diverse Han Chinese, Mongol and Hui Muslim groups in the borderland of today’s Gansu, Qinghai and Sichuan. Although Chone Monastery (*Ggon chen dga’ ldan bshad grub gling*, Ch. Chanding si 禪定寺) and Labrang Monastery (*Gge ldan bshad sgrub dar rgyas bkra shis gyas su ’khyil ba’i gling*) were considered institutional extensions of the Lhasa Dge lugs monastic universities, the Lhasa government had no control of the two religious institutions and local Tibetans. The hierarchical governmental structure in China proper also reached the limit here. Although Chone and Labrang fell under the nominal jurisdictions of Taozhou 洮州 and Xunhua 循化 subprefectures (Ch. *ting 督*), which were respectively administered by Lanzhou 蘭州 and Xining 西寧 prefectures (Ch. *fu 府*), the Chinese administration staffed by circulated officials (Ch. *liuguan 流官*) was never established in either places before the late 1920s. The Qing and Republican political influences became even weaker westward. For centuries the region was

---

2 Ma Dengkun and Wanma Duoji, *Kan lho’i bod kyi tsho shog lo rgyus mdor bdus* (Hezuo: Gannan baoshe, 1994).
3 Tibetan settlements ruled by the Chone kings were under the nominal jurisdiction of Taozhou Garrison 洮州衛 (Sub-prefecture since 1748) from 1418 onward. Tibetan groups in the realm of Labrang were managed by Hezhou 河州 (present-day Linxia 臨夏) in name only. In 1762, the Qing set up Xunhua Subprefecture to govern this region as it was too far away from Hezhou. From 1823, Xunhua was subordinated to Xining. Zhang Yandu, *Taozhou tingzhi* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1970), 838, 842. Gong Jinghan, *Xunhua tingzhi* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), 20–1.
governed by local Tibetan lay and religious authorities with various titles.⁴

Undeniably, the official recognitions from Lhasa and Beijing were crucial for frontier rulers to accumulate politico-religious capital. It is also noteworthy that secular and ecclesiastic powers were often associated with each other and not strictly distinguished by Tibetans.⁵ Both regimes promoted the centralized Dge lugs monastic education, institutionalized the hierarchical relation between central and communal monasteries with the prime-subordinate/mother-son monastic system (ma bu dgon gyi 'brel ba), and constructed the charismatic lineage to consolidate temporal and spiritual rule. Hence, Chone and Labrang are typically considered theocracies (chos srid zung 'brel) differing only in that Chone’s secular power outshined its religious authority, while Labrang’s religious power was absolutely dominant.⁶ This observative assessment, however, is quite overgeneralized. As this article will illustrate, the nature of the power held by the Chone and Labrang ruling lineages, respectively, differed in nature. They rose to power in disparate circumstances and set up dissimilar political infrastructures. Even though Buddhism was inseparable from the formation of local authorities, monastic leaders possessed varying political statuses and worked with lay officials differently. In contrast to what has been identified by Yudru Tsomu as the three categories of Kham polities, namely, the merging of religion with politics, the alliance between secular and religious powers, and the share of authority by secular ruler and monastic institution, Chone and Labrang offer two additional types of political structures in the eastern Tibetan Plateau.⁷

---


⁵ Joseph Fletcher suggested that “religion in Tibetan eyes was not clearly distinguishable from political allegiances.” Based on this point, Paul Nietupski elaborates how the Qing-Labrang relation was perceived by Tibetans. See Labrang Monastery: A Tibetan Buddhist Community on the Inner Asian Borderlands, 1709–1958 (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011), xvi–xvii.


⁷ Yudru Tsomu categorizes the Kham political systems into three precise types whereby the ultimate power respectively lay in the hands of a religious leader, secular ruler, or both. See The Rise of Gönpo Namgyel in Kham: The Blind Warrior of Nyarong (New York, London: Lexington Books, 2015), 8–9.
By obtaining ratification from the Ming-Qing emperors, sponsoring eminent lamas, expanding Chone Monastery and founding the Chone mkhan po lineage, the Chone kings (mgon po rgyal po) or Yang chieftains (Ch. Yang tusi 楊土司) steadily ascended to power in the Klu chu (Ch. Taohe 洮河) and 'Brug chu (Ch. Bailongjiang 白龍江) valleys. From the 1680s, they superposed a central political structure upon a layer of local authorities and exerted control over six hundred tsho ba in the present-day southern Gansu. This system had a secular government comprising the yongs 'dus Palace, also known as Chone chieftain yamen (Ch. tusi yamen 土司衙門), twelve inner base-villages (nang grangs ka bcu gnyis), four outer base-villages (phyi grangs ka bzhi) and forty-eight banners (dmag ru, Ch. qi 旗). The royal lineage’s estates were concentrated in the base-villages. A banner comprised six to twenty-five settlements known by locals as village (sde ba) or tsho ba. It consisted of one, two or three sub-units. Local Tibetans used different names, which combined kbag, tsho ba or sde ba with number, to call their sub-units. In addition, the lay power was secured by a religious administration constituted of the Senggang yamen (lhag gi nang), Parish-Assembly Office (spyi khang, Ch. shangshulou 尚書樓) and estates (nang chen or bla brang) of eighteen reincarnations (sprul sku) in Chone Monastery. The abbot or mkhan po position at the apex of the religious administration was held by either the king or his younger brother who utterly appointed the dharma throne holders (kbri pa) to communal monasteries. The abbot managed four colleges (grwa tshang), seventeen religiously affiliated communities (chos sde), fifty-four son/subordinate monasteries (bu dgon) and several dozens of hermitages (ri khor). This political structure is characterized as the merging of politics with religion in which the royal family held the ultimate secular power and relatively dynamic authority in the religious domain. It had a centralized secular government and a loose religious administration, supervising and working with tsho ba leaders.

---

8 Each banner roughly coincides, in terms of its population and territory, with what are today recognized as town (Ch. xiang).

9 Brag dgon pa dkon mchog bstan pa rab rgyas, Mdo smad choi ‘byung (Lanzhou, Kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1982), 660–66; Ma and Wanma, Kan lho’i bod kyi tsho shog lo rgyus sdeor bskal, 265–314. For a description of Chone’s politico-religious system, see Marnyi Gyatso, “Home on the Margins,” 81–95.
Map 1. Chone and Labrang in Cultural Tibet

In Labrang, the reincarnation lineage of the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa received recognition from the Dalai and Panchen lamas and gained political and financial support from the Manchu emperors. With the patronage of Henan Mongol princes and Tibetan local chiefs, the First 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa rdo rje (1642–1721) built a monastery on the northern bank of the Bsang chu River (Ch. Daxiahe 大夏河). A monastic bureaucracy on the model of monastic universities in Lhasa was adopted at the outset for the purpose of internal governance. From the mid-eighteenth century on, the 'Jam dbyangs lineage allied with hundreds of tsho ba between the Dgu chu (Ch. Longwuhe) valley and northern Rnga ba (Ch. Aba 阿壩) grassland, forming a religious realm with over a hundred subordinate monasteries and thirty reincarnations’ estates. According to Paul Nietupski and others’ investigation, these tsho ba, which formed villages or larger federative units/military alliances (shog pa or shog kha, nomadic in most cases),
were arranged into divine communities (lha sde), human communities (mi sde) and religiously affiliated communities based on their relations with Labrang Monastery. The religious, political and military affairs of a divine community were managed by a Labrang-appointed administrator (sku tshab). A human community usually had its own lay or religious leader, and managed local affairs without direct interference of Labrang. The community occasionally donated money and goods to Labrang. For a religiously affiliated community, its communal monastery was often a subordinate/son institute of Labrang, the prime/mother monastery (ma dgon) that supervised local monastic education and religious affairs. Up to the 1890s, the monastic bureaucracy had evolved into a complex administrative body that managed the monastery’s estates, arranged regional Buddhist education, designated dharma throne holders, maintained reincarnation lineages and exercise authority over lay people. Labrang’s political system was based on the alliance between local secular and religious powers, which was supervised by the 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. It was an ecclesiastic polity resembling a mandala structure.

Speaking of the governmental systems, Chone and Labrang had few similarities. The Chone king inherited his official title and held a military position in the Qing bureaucracy. The yongs 'dus Palace was designed like a Chinese sub-prefectural yamen. The bureaucratic apparatus consisted of the secretariat, revenue and administrative departments that were respectively in charge of 1) advisory and clerical works, 2) revenue management, 3) and tax collection, militia conscription and judicial issue. The advisor (Ch. shiye 師爺), the head of the secretariat department, was a reputable Chinese intellectual from a near county. He and his clerks were responsible for drafting official documents. The revenue department was staffed by the superior manager (Ch. da zongguan 大總管), second manager or treasurer (Ch. er zongguan 二總管) and third manager or chamberlain (Ch. san zongguan 三總管). They decided issues concerning fiscal, trade and the royal revenue. Employees in the administrative department were in five ranks. A superior headman (Ch. da toumu 大頭目) and a vice superior headman (Ch. fu toumu 副頭目) in the highest two ranks took charge of most administrative and judicial issues in the kingdom. The third-rank official was a chief messenger (Ch. chuanhao toumu 傳號頭目) who

supervised three messengers to deliver messages, collect information and issue orders on behalf of the king, and administered two wardens (Ch. bantou 班頭) to manage the yamen prison with ten jailers (Ch. banyi 班役). The fourth-rank officials consisted of thirty-two accountants (grangs sbes). They were also called banner-chiefs (Ch. qizhang 旗長) and had the power to handle taxation, lawsuit and militia affairs for the forty-eight banners. The sixteen minor headmen (Ch. xiaotou 小頭) of base-villages were the fifth-rank officials. They dealt with communal affairs and assisted the five branches of royal lineage to run estates in the base-villages. All Tibetan officials were selected by the king from capable men of the twelve inner-base villages. In addition, there were seventy-two local managers (tsung gon, Ch. zongguan 總管), who were originally local leaders and recognized by the king, worked for banner-chiefs to manage affairs of the seventy-two sub-units in the forty-eight banners. Local managers, who did not receive any forms of salary from the king, were regarded as local representatives instead of yamen officials.12

The situation was more complicated in Labrang, as Li Anzhai, Ma Dengkun, Wanma Duoji and Paul Nietupski illustrate in detail, the political structures were dynamic and full of local variations across the expanding ecclesiastic realm of the ´Jam dbyangs lineage. Labrang exerted power in cases of religious affair, legal disputation, tax collection, corvée levying and militia enlistment primarily through the Central Office (yig tshang) of the aforementioned complex administrative body. The main estate of the ´Jam dbyangs was managed by his chief attendant (sku bcar mkhan po), treasure (phya g mdzod), internal affairs manager (nang mdzod) and tutor (yongs ’dzin). Under them were the representatives (sku tshab) nominated from the eighty monk-attendants (zhabs phyi) and assigned for three-year to manage divine communities. In addition, reincarnate lamas at Labrang were arranged into four ranks based on their achievements and influences. They were known as golden throne reincarnations (gser khri), teacher/vows-giver reincarnations (mkhan po), abbot reincarnations (dgon bdag bla ma) and normal reincarnations (sprul sku). With few exceptions, they owned estates (nang chen) at Labrang and properties elsewhere. According to the monastic regulation, these estates were managed by varying numbers of attendant of the sprul sku without any interference by the main estate. In each divine community, the representative assigned by

12 Although messengers were likely unranked officials, they were considered more powerful than banner-chiefs by local people. The forty-eight banners were “eighteen banners within the pass” (og sgang mar nang dmag ru bcu bryad), “twelve banners beyond the pass” (og sgang mar nang dmag ru bcu gnyis), “Brug chu four banners” (rol bad mag ru bzhi), “Upper The bo six banners” (the bo stod ma dmag ru drug) and “Lower The bo eight banners” (the bo smad ma dmag ru bryad). See Zhuoni wenshi ziliao, vol.1, 4–6; vol.3, 32–5; Zhang Yandu, Taozhou tingzhi, 273, 943–51.
Labrang managed most communal affairs for three years. In human communities, *tsho ba* were the noncompulsory sponsors of Labrang and its lamas. Local secular authorities held substantial power. Labrang might ratify hereditary headmen or *gowa* (’go pa or ’go ba) in human communities but did not appoint representatives to directly handle local affairs. The religiously affiliated communities sent local reincarnations and monks to study at Labrang and accepted the throne holders assigned by the ’Jam dbyangs.\(^\text{13}\)

Apart from the central administrations, the mandala-like structures of local politico-religious authorities were identical in Chone and Labrang. On the one hand, for the physical distances between the central administration and different *tsho ba*, the direct and systematic control was largely restrained within a day’s horse-riding radius. *Tsho ba* in this category were the base-villages of Chone or divine communities of Labrang. They were bonded to the lay or monastic estates. On the other hand, in areas reckoned as a three-day to one-week horse-riding trip, local leaders and communal councils either managed their *tsho ba* independently, or cooperated with expatriate officials such as Chone banner-chiefs and Labrang representatives. Local leaders obtained power through inheritance, election and selection. They were either nobles, hereditary leaders, elected prestigious figures or appointed and served in rotation. Normally, the mandala-like structure of authorities consisted of chiefs (*dbon po*) and minor chiefs (*dbon phran*, nomadic *gur gang bo* and sedentary *ming btags*) of *tsho ba*, religious mediators and lords (*mgon po*) of larger units, elder (*rgan po*) councils of temporary or fixed federative units such as *shog pa* and *shog kha*, as well as leaders of seasonal organizations like the encampment-circle (*rn skor*) and mutually obligated communal helping (*u lag*) group. They practically coped with various local matters.\(^\text{14}\)

**Tsho ba and Regional Rulers**

Systematic research on *tsho ba* is scarce in comparison with its significance to understand Mdo smad Tibetan societies. Limited historical references and ethnographic data obstructs contemporary scholars from precisely examining this organization. The scattered

---


\(^{14}\) Based on field research in Taozhou and near Amdo Tibetan areas during 1923–1927 and 1929–1935, the pioneering missionary anthropologist Robert Ekvall depicted the social organizations and political structures of the Tibetan communities in the Gansu-Amdo borderland during the 1920s and early 1930s in detail. See *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), 4–82. For a survey on Amdo nomadic social organization, see Matthias Hermanns, *Die Nomaden von Tibet* (Wien: Verlag Herold, 1949), 231.
accounts up to date depict an oversimplified, idealized and inconsistent picture of tsho ba. What is tsho ba? When non-Tibetan anthropologists and historians raise this question, their informants often give descriptive answers mixing with the origin legends, migration histories and functions of tsho ba. These responses corroborate neither pre-modern Tibetan accounts nor historical works produced in the twentieth century. It is not easy to find written records showing that tsho ba comprised related patriarchal/matriarchal lineages, or households shared same founding ancestor. Few ethnographic data conform to the Tibetan conclusion that tsho ba is clan and the membership is primarily assigned through kinship.

In general, historians and anthropologists translate tsho ba loosely as lineage and clan, or cautiously as political unit, social group and territorial division. As some scholars notice that the Tibetan communitarian base of territory and practices of intimate relation in Mdo smad resemble a tribal society, they regard tsho ba as tribe. Since


the twentieth century, Chinese scholars under the influences of social Darwinism and Marxism replaced the terms clan (Ch. zu 族) and federation (Ch. bu 部) with tribe (Ch. buluo 部落). The term connotes a strong sense of primitiveness and backwardness in the Chinese ethnopolitical context. Some Tibetan scholars in China also use “buluo” to translate tsho ba, tsho sbog and tsho khag. In addition, Langelaar employs Lévi-Strauss’ concept of “house society” (société à maisons) to analyze the internal structures and relations of Reb gong Tibetan tsho ba. Focusing on household (khang), the most basic social unit, Langelaar demonstrates that tsho ba is social networks overarching households. In short, the overall academic debate is about the presentation of tsho ba as a unilineal descent-based unit, territorially defined unit or village intra-network centered unit.

Based on my fieldwork in Kan lho (Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, it seems that unilineal descent group(s) formed the base of tsho ba. A tsho ba consisted of several to around thirty households (tentholds in nomadic area). The households identified themselves as being descended from a legendary ancestor or brothers serving as frontier soldiers of the Tibetan Empire. Aside from such fictious kinship, within a tsho ba, there is a full category of terms for inter-household relation to explain Tibetan epistemologies of inclusion and exclusion. It is evident for all members that agnatic sibling (sha nye, sha khrag, spun mched and gnyen nye) and reciprocal assistant (u lag) relations among households played a crucial role in forming sub-tsho ba organization—group of related houses (tshang). The subgroup was critical for related households to organize agricultural or pastoral production. Households of a subgroup usually shared the same bone-lineage (rus pa) and bore the same lineage name (rus ming). They worshipped the same protector deity (srung lha) and the same mountain gods (yul lha). The lineage origin, mostly idealized, is typically traced back to the oldest four/six ancestral clans and their branches as referenced in Tibetan imperial histories from the seventh to ninth centuries. Keeping these mundane and divine relations alive was extremely important to define tsho ba membership.

17 See Chen Qingying ed., Zangzu buluo zhidu yanjiu (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2002), 1–21. For a brief comment on the Chinese translation of tsho ba, see Marnyi Gyatso, “Home on the Margins,” 29–36. The two well-known books about tsho ba in Mdo smad and particularly Kan lho by Zhouta (‘Brug thar) are mainly based on the accounts of Ma Dengkun and Wanma Duoji. The authors also consider Tibetan local communities as tribes. See Zhouta, Mdo smad Rma khug tsha ’gyn rong ‘brug yul gru’i stong byung mrs pa’i mrog gi lo rgyas deb thes len mo zhes bya ba bzhugs so (Pe cing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2005); Gannan zangzu buluo shesri ltsi yi wenbu yanjin (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2013).


kinship, marriage, religion, political alliance and other strategies for resource management and self-preservation, subgroups were overarched by the tsho ba. When it comes to inter-tsho ba feuds, political matters and religious affairs, tsho ba served as a basic organization. In the moment of a regional war, the shog pa of several tsho ba became a basic fighting unit.20

Although territoriality was significant for tsho ba, the relationship between tsho ba and territory was not unalterable. Social unrest and natural catastrophe oftentimes disturbed the stability of the tie between tsho ba and land. A tsho ba could move to a new place, recruit new households and even restructure (merging or dividing) itself after conquering adjacent tsho ba or being defeated in feud. This practice of changing alliance from one tsho ba or shog pa to another also applied to subgroup and single household. Turbulent nature of the Sino-Tibetan-Muslim-Mongol frontier led to the fluid relation between tsho ba and land. As Hans Stübel found in Dme bo, which was common across Mdo smad, “often a certain family strives to shift from a less influential group to a more influential one; they can do this by presenting the group leader and several respected members of the group with a sheep and several chin (jin 斤) of wine and inviting them to a meal.”21 In general, tsho ba in agricultural area was more stable than those in pastoral area. External causes such as a regional ruler’s suppression, Mongol invasion, Manchu incorporation, Tibetan-Muslim conflict and Chinese integration all triggered territorial changes and internal reconfigurations of tsho ba in Mdo smad. Territory was defined by not only the practical management of land, water, forest and pasture, but also the relations with territorial deities who were relevant to the communal good. Consequently, reserving the average number of households and maintaining diverse relations with the immaterial

---


world were crucial for a *tsho ba* to bond with new land and reestablish territoriality after relocation.\(^{22}\)

The notion that territory belonging to a regional ruler such as the Chone king or the *`Jam dbyangs bzhad pa*, which was an assumption of Chinese frontier officials and gazetteer compilers, was uncommon among Tibetans. Similar to other Tibetan frontier polities, the political sway of Chone and Labrang was defined by a center instead of a fixed border. Spatial distance and mountainous topology were the major obstacles for the development of systematic and centralized control. The power of a ruler was based on his governance of, or broadly speaking, relationship with *tsho ba* rather than the size of territory. The ruler’s influence on the number of *tsho ba* was pivotal to determine the scale of his realm.\(^{23}\) To be specific, the relation between regional politico-religious center and *tsho ba* in Chone and Labrang was usually fourfold. First, *tsho ba* accepted the control of a regional ruler to receive military or political protection against Mongol raiders and other Tibetan marauders, as well as ward off Manchu, Chinese and Muslim integrations. Second, *tsho ba* joined the Chone banner system/Labrang alliance to benefit from trade that was managed by the ruler. Market activity was organized outside Chone and Labrang monasteries, Tibetans also combined trade with religious purposes. Third, *tsho ba* often forged ties with the ruler through patronizing a prestigious lama and branch monastery to fulfill the pragmatic and karma-oriented needs of rituals. Fourth, some *tsho ba* were absorbed into the regional polity through military conquest. The establishment of these relations were on the basis of Tibetan social, political and religious norms, historical precedents and local practices. Both regional rulers and *tsho ba* acknowledged certain rules. Leaving communal affairs in the hands of *tsho ba* leaders and elder councils was the principal base for regional authorities to exercise rulership. With the exception of large-scale range wars, open challenge to Chone/Labrang regime or revolts against Manchu-Chinese authorities, the regional rulers would not directly meddle in *tsho ba* matters. Even in extreme cases, the highest rulers more often than not were mediators instead of arbitrators.\(^{24}\)

---

\(^{22}\) For specific cases, see Marnyi Gyaltsó, “Home on the Margins,” chapter 2–4.


The relation of regional ruler and *tsho ba* was conditioned by the long self-ruled character of *tsho ba* and federative units in Mdo smad. Since households of a *tsho ba* had more or less equal social, economic and political status, in spite of the regional variations, the ruler had to pay attention to the self-managing power of *tsho ba* members as a whole. The collective will and action of a *tsho ba* or federative unit were not neglectable. Serious conflict between local alliance and regional ruler was not rare. Thus, the ruler-*tsho ba* relation was not necessarily unilateral and dominated by regional ruler. A *tsho ba* could separate itself from a military alliance, political federation, religious sovereign and kingdom according to the traditional norm and communal decision. To sum up, *tsho ba* was the basic Tibetan social, religious, political, economic and territorial organization in Mdo smad. It affected the formation of societal structure, political system and local polities on the Tibetan frontier. It was a non-negligible agent of local social and political change.

1. **The Rise of Bla ma dkar po Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan**

   Bla ma dkar po Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1835–95) was born into a household of Zhing kham, one of the eighteen *tsho ba* along Chas pa valley (Chas dpal zhih or Chab bu gshis, Ch. Chebagou 車巴溝) in the northwestern corner of the Chone Kingdom. The eighteen *tsho ba* constituted two semi-pastoral federative units: Ya ’gag and Ma ’gag. Like elsewhere in Mdo smad, such units co-organized militias in moments of crisis and collaborated to tackle religious affairs. Meanwhile, inter-*tsho ba* friction was quite common. Around the 1700s, the eleventh Chone ruler Dmag zor mgon po (Yang Rusong 杨汝松, b. 1686) incorporated these *tsho ba* into Chone and organized them into one of the forty-eight banners. Chas pa Tibetans became the king’s subjects (*mi ser*, Ch. baixing 百姓). In *Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan gyi rnam thar*, the hagiography of Bla ma dkar po justified by Tibetan Buddhist values, the author Skal bzang legs bshad indicates that Bla ma dkar po’s parents, who were devout Dge lugs pa followers, sent him to Chone Monastery in 1843. A local tale suggests that he ran away from his home after injuring a neighbor’s yak with a spear. As the case was implicated in a three-year feud, he hid at Yid dga’ chos gling Hermitage to avoid punishment. Afterwards, he became a disciple of Dge shes

---


26 The eighteen *tsho ba* were Brgya chad, Rme ru rin pa, Rme ru srib pa, Dga’ tshang, Ske rgas and Yul dza tsho in Ya ’gag unit, and Dgon pa, Rgod tsang, Zhing kham, Gong gcod, Brag rtsha, Mra rtsha, Lung mdo, Mdo khog, Bya bug, Phan khyim, A rgyu nang and Stag ’gag in Ma ’gag unit.
Ngag dbang bstan ’dzin and received elementary monastic training at the hermitage.  

At that time, Chone Monastery’s Eighty-eighth khri pa Mkhyen rab bstan pa, who was later recognized as the First Dbyi li tshang, established the patron-priest relation with Oirats Mongols in Dzungaria 淨噶爾, or Lower Mongol (smad phyogs sog yul). He made routine trips to preach and collect donations in northwestern Xinjiang (Lower Mongol). In 1847, Bla ma dkar po was selected as an attendant to the aged Dbyi li tshang and to visit Hoboksar (Ch. Huoboksa 博克賽里). In contrast to the time-consuming trip, his stay in Lower Mongol was brief. He returned to Chone and started to learn Tibetan medicine and healing rituals. At this point, the Second Tshe smon gling bo thog thu 呼圖克圖 Ngag dbang ’jam dpal tshul khrims rgya mtsho (1792–1860), who was then serving as the Seventy-first Dga’ ldan khri pa and the regent of Tibet, was deposed from all of his positions by the Daoguang 道光 Emperor (1782–1850). He was ordered to spend the rest of his life under surveillance in Chone. Bla ma dkar po did not have any meaningful contact with the Second Tshe smon gling yet. In 1852, he embarked on the long journey again and travelled extensively in today’s Ili 伊犁 and Altai 阿爾泰. He received abundant alms from two Uriankhai 烏梁海 Mongol banners and became known for magical rituals and efficacious Avalokiteshvara pills (mani rilbu). The healing skills brought him great fame after he stemmed the plague in Tarbagatai (Ch. Tacheng 塔城), the treaty port opened for Russia at the western edge of Qing China. The local jasagh (Ch. zhasake 扎薩克) became his sponsor and Mongols referred to him as the “White Master” (Tsha gan dge rgyan). However, because of the

27 Based on Rje btsun byams pa mthu stobs kun dga’ rgyal mtshan gi rnam thar, Lobsang Yongdan gives a detailed chronological description on his life experience and the invention of a new reincarnation lineage by war. Here I use, in addition to the hagiographic account, Qing official documents and various local records to supplement Lobsang Yongdan’s paper, illustrate his life experience in Mdo smad and introduce the legacy he left to his hometown. See Lobsang Yongdan, “The Invention of a Tibetan Lama General: a Biographical Account of Bla ma dkar po (1835–1895),” 67–92.

28 Skal bzang legs bshad, Rje btsun Byams pa mthu stobs Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan gi rnam thar (hereafter Rnam thar; Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 1994), 249–268. Ganman zhou wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, Rje btsun byams pa mthu stobs kun dga’ rgyal mtshan dpa’ bo thog po’i rnam thar nor bu’i ’khris shing las mdo’i bdus khrigs chags su bsadubs pa bzangs so (hereafter Rnam thar nor bu), 7–8; Lama garao huofo zhuanlüe, 4. This version of Bla ma dkar po’s biography is extracted from Rnam thar, and trimmed by the wenibi ziliao committee. For a brief account on the Dbyi li tshang, see Danqu, Zhibi zangshuan fujiao lishi wenhua (Lanzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 2007), 197, 227. His source is from the co-authored book of Luosang Dunzhu and Bingjue Ciren, Anduo gucha chandingsi (Lanzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 1995).

29 Qingshilu (QSL), Xuanzong, j410.5a–7a; j414.2a; Wenzong, j142.13a–b; j154.6b.
Khoja Wali Khan’s attack of Kashgar 喀什 (1851) and the increasingly strong presence of the Russian Empire along the border, tensions were high among the Manchu officials, Mongols, Russians and Kazakhs in Dzungaria in the early 1850s. Bla ma dkar po returned to Chone again for safety consideration.30

Neither the hagiography nor Chas pa oral history gives too much detail about his experience in Chone, where his reputation among Mongols could easily incur critics from the local sangha with respect to his poor monastic training. Bla ma dkar po tried to elevate his position in the monastic community, as his biography shows, by building personal connections with famous lamas in Mdo smad. The narrow path for him to elevate his religious status was through advanced training, which required a series of ordinations.31 He managed to take the full vows of bhikkhu (dge slong) from the Second Tshe smon gling. Afterwards, he spent near ten years in Chone Monastery and a Chas pa hermitage, and joined Medical College (sman pa grwa tshang) of Labrang. He seemed to be uninterested in scholastic, philosophical or esoteric training. Whilst, he was incredibly sensitive to regional political circumstances.32

In 1862, the Old Teaching (Gedium, Ch. laojiao 老教) and New Teaching (Jahriyya, Ch. xinjiao 新教) Muslim groups clashed in Xunhua (Ya rdzi), a subprefecture to the north of Labrang. As the Qing officials juristically discriminated against the Jahriyya followers and suppressed them with a joint force of official troops, Tibetan cavalries and Chinese militias (Ch. mintuan 民團), the Salar 撒拉 and Huasi menbuan 華寺門宦 Muslims began to massacre their non-Muslim neighbors. Worse yet, the Shaanxi Hui revolt quickly spread to Gansu. Rumors poured into the Sino-Tibetan borderland and caused extreme social anxiety. The interethnic tension simmering in Minzhou 岷州 (Minxian 岷縣), Taozhou, Lintao 臨洮 (Didao 狄道) and Hezhou soon evolved into vengeful reciprocal massacres. Nonetheless, in Xinjiang, the three assaults of the Khoja Wali Khan against Kashgar were defeated by the Qing force. Bla ma dkar po thereupon took up a mission to seek patrons for Labrang in Dzungaria and departed for the seemingly peaceful Xinjiang on the third time. In late 1863, he arrived at Tarbagatai and ushered his spectacular military-

31 In Dge lugs monasteries, the basic requirement of each stage of monastic training strictly corresponds to the specific stage of one’s ordination.
32 In accordance with his letter, Lobsang Yongd 措 suggests that Bla ma dkar po was a good writer. See “The Invention of a Tibetan Lama General,” 72.
political ascendency along with the full eruption of the Dungan (Hui-Muslim) Revolt.\textsuperscript{33}

In 1864, Hui refugees who fled from Shaan-Gan brought Hui-elimination (Ch. \textit{miehui} 滅回) stories to their Xinjiang compatriots. Many believed that the Qing court instructed Xinjiang officials to massacre Hui people as a precautionary measure. Their panic rapidly flared up revolts to forestall Qing garrisons across southern Xinjiang. Being provoked by the Islam-extinction (Ch. \textit{miejiao} 滅教) tales, the Turkish-speaking Muslims of Kuqa 庫車, Urumqi 烏魯木齊, Aksu 阿克蘇, Kashgar and Yarkant 莎車 strengthened local Hui insurrections. Meanwhile, the situation in northern Xinjiang was at stake. On the excuse of the ineptitude of the Qing in suppressing rebellion and protecting foreign traders, a Russian force attacked the Qing army in Dzungaria, looted Tarbagatai and sequentially besieged Ili. When the Qing and Russian plenipotentiaries finalized the Treaty of Tarbagatai 塔城議定書, local Muslims were bracing for revolt.\textsuperscript{34}

In the Chinese New Year of 1865, Tarbagatai Muslims killed the Manchu amban, looted the weapon depot and besieged the Qing garrison soldiers and non-Muslim civilians within the city. Witnessing ruinous battle scenes, Bla ma dkar po gave up the bhikkhu vows in front of the Maitreya statue at Zh‘i ne yang Monastery (possibly a Chinese Buddhist temple) and organized a militia to counterattack the insurgents. Due to the long distance between Xinjiang and Beijing, the court confirmed the siege of Tarbagatai three months later. By then, Bla ma dkar po had raised the siege and rescued the garrison troop. Learning his success in battle, the emperor entitled him “\textit{bo thog thu}.” Considering the Qing force in Xinjiang almost collapsed, the court instructed him to command non-Muslim militias. The court may be unclear about the secular identity of Bla ma dkar po since the \textit{bo thug thu} title was only granted to the most outstanding Tibetan and Mongolian reincarnate lamas. This unusual reward likely followed the precedent of the Dbyi li tshang, who shortly acted as the leading commander when the Ili general 伊犁將軍 died in the critical moment of the War of the Seven Khojas 七和卓之亂 three decades ago.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} Yang Yuxiu et al., \textit{Pinghui zhi} (Guangxu jichou edition, 1889), j3, 1a–2b. \textit{QSL}, Wenzong, j347.15a–2; Muzong, j16.11b–12b; for local officials’ “faults”, see j18.32a–34a.
\textsuperscript{34} Skal bzang legs bshad, \textit{Rnam thar}, 284–334. Ming Xu, “Zoubao hasake defang 奏報哈薩克地方,” 4 June 1863, National Palace Museum (hereafter NPM), Taiwan, 090528; “Zhao lu ji e guo zhao hui kanding liang guo bian jie shi 照錄給俄國照會勘定兩國邊界事,” 29 July 1863, NPM, 090228.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{QSL}, Muzong, j134.14a–b; Skal bzang legs bshad, \textit{Rnam thar} 281–82; \textit{Rnam thar nor lu}, 11–2; \textit{Lama garao hufo zhuanli}, 7–8.
However, the situation continuously deteriorated as Yaqub Beg (Agubai 阿古柏, 1820–77) unified the revolting forces in Khashgar, Khotan 和田 and Urumqi and established the emirate to replace the Qing control of Muslims in Xinjiang. In the second month of 1866, the Hui and Kazakh insurgents besieged Tarbagatai again.36 The remaining Qing troops and local militias in Ili and Tarbagatai withdrew to Uriankhai, Kobdo 科布多 and Uliyasutai 烏里雅蘇台, the only region in Xinjiang that was under the Qing control. The following years observed that Bla ma dkar po’s influence on Mongols became irreplaceable. He was concerned with the conservative strategy adopted by Uliyasutai General and Temporary Ili General 署伊犁將軍 Li Yunlin 李雲麟 (1834–97). The relationship between Bla ma dkar po and this Han Plain White Banner 漢軍正白旗 official worsened when they had divergent opinions over the recapture of northern Xinjiang, the reinforcement of Bayandai 巴顏岱, and the acceptance of Daur (Suolun 索倫), Sibe (Xibo 錫伯) and Kazakh refugees from the Russia occupied areas. After Bla ma dkar po accepted these refugees without any imperial permission, the Ili general reported in the fifth month of 1867 to the emperor that the bo thog thu had centralized power for his own sake. To weaken Bla ma dkar po, Li suggested endowing the lama with Eleuths (Oirats) 厄魯特 Mongols and instructing him to resettle the Eleuths and Torghut 土爾扈特 Mongols along the Irtysh River 額爾齊斯河, the Qing-Russian borderland. Ideally, the Mongols would form a defensive line between Russia and Uliyasutai. The emperor turned down Li’s suggestion while assuring him that the employment of Bla ma dkar po was an expedient.37

From 1868 to 1871, the bo thog thu’s militia of several thousand horsemen was repeatedly recruited to the battlefields in Tarbagatai and Bayandai. He also fought against the Muslim insurgents in Uliyasutai and the mutinied Chinese garrison soldiers in Burultokai 布魯爾托海. The war seemed not to cease in a short time. To settle his nomadic followers and ensure them pasture to herd, Bla ma dkar po obtained an Uriankhai grassland from the Qing court in the name of building monasteries. In the 1870s, he restored two monasteries known as Bkra shis chos ’khor gling and Bshad grub dar rgyas gling, where were named as Chenghua si 承化寺 and Puqing si 普慶寺 respectively by the Tongzhi 同治 Emperor (1856–75) and the Guangxu 光緒 Emperor (1871–1908). He invited religious teachers from Labrang to establish complete monastic curriculums. As he became the most influential figure among Eleuths and Torghut Mongols as well as Daur

36 QSL, Muzong, j177.1b–3b.
37 QSL, Muzong, j196.42a–b; j197.10b–12b; j201.9b–11b; j203.22a–b; j209.21a–22a.
and Sibe refugees, he controlled a huge military force in Dzungaria. Xinjiang officials regarded him as a threat to Qing control of northern Xinjiang. Consequently, Bla ma dkar po confronted the escalating political exclusion of Manchu and Chinese authorities. His reputation soared but his political career went nowhere. 38

Meanwhile, the Qing court preoccupied by the multifocal revolts across China proper finally arranged the expedition to recapture Xinjiang. By 1873, Zuo Zongtang 左宗棠 (1812–85) suppressed the Shaan-Gan Muslim revolts in multiple locales. Due to Russia reoccupied Ili and overtly penetrated into Tarbagatai and Altai, Zuo was concerned by the Russian Empire in the western borderland. He insisted on “inland frontier defense” (Ch. saifang 塞防) and debated with Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823–1901) who tended to pour resources into “sea defense” (Ch. haifang 海防). Wining the court debate and gaining the support of the Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧太后 (1835–1908), Zuo directed the expeditionary force to pacify Xinjiang unrest in 1876. Bla ma dkar po was required to contribute provisions to the Qing army. His militia was dismissed for “wasting grains without merits” in the course of Zuo’s campaign against the emirate of Yaqub Beg. After the Qing force seized Xinjiang by 1878, the lama general’s political career and even personal safety faced more serious risk. Especially when the Qing government tackled the Russian occupation of Ili through diplomatic means, he was caught in the swirl of the Qing-Russian negotiation. 39

In the midst of treaty negotiation with Russia to return Ili, the Russian government demanded the Qing representatives in Livadia to investigate a dusted incident. Two years ago, the Russian officer Potanin 坡塔甯 led an armed delegation to investigate the issue of Kazakh residents who fled from Russia to Altai. Because these Kazakhs were received by Bla ma dkar po, Potanin urged him to return the Russian residents. The delegation entered Chenghua si without dismounting from the horse in sign of respect. Such behavior was considered violating the basic etiquette to visit monastery. The offended disciples incited a fight. Two companions of Potanin were killed in a brief exchange of fire. Potanin was arrested and unarmed, then, expelled by Bla ma dkar po. Later, Tarbagatai Councilor Minister 參贊大臣 Yinglian 英廉 appointed the translator Bugai 布該 to assist

38 QSL, Muzong, j249.17b; j269.17a–19a; j232.19b–20b; j316.13a–14a; j348.12a–13b; j366.24a–b.
39 Zuo Zongtang, Zuo wenxiang gong zoudu xubian (Guxiangge, 1902), j74.1a–4a; j75.1b–5b; j76.3b–6a, 8b–10a. For using Chenghua si as a case to examine the Qing politics in this period and the relation between the lama and Xinjiang officials, see Ma Yun, “Chenghua si sengzhong qianxi shulun,” Journal of Xinjiang Normal University 29:3 (2008):26–9.
Russian official Wulasufu 烏拉索付 (Vlasov?) to investigate the case. Wulasufu arrived at Chenghua si earlier than Bugai and experienced a similar hostile treatment. As the Qing was busy in seizing Xinjiang, the case was shelved. In 1878, Russian officials intended to use this incident to bargain for the best political and economic interests with the Qing government. The Russian government urged the Zongli Yamen 總理衙門 (Office in Charge of Affairs of All Nations) to investigate the case and punish the leader who insulted Russian officials and detained their weapons.40

The Qing court was quite cautious in dealing with this issue. As Xilun 錫綸 (d. 1886) was Bla ma dkar po’s old acquaintance, the court appointed him as the new councilor minister of Tarbagatai to inquire into the case and seek a proper solution. The investigation was completed by the sixth month of 1878. The case was clear from the Qing court’s point of view. It was the fault of the “vulgar and reckless” Bla ma dkar po, whose well-known anti-Russian attitude and actions gave Russia a vantage point to bargain in the treaty negotiation. He should be better ousted from Xinjiang. However, it was a difficult matter for Xilun to handle, for, the lama was honored by several hundred thousand of Dzungaria inhabitants. To prevent the imperial opinion from causing estrangement and enmity among the lama’s followers, Zuo Zongtang, Jinshun 金順 (1831–85) and Xilun came up with a sophisticated solution. They implicitly persuaded Bla ma dkar po to petition the emperor for permission to leave Xinjiang and offer tea in Tibet. In the eleventh month of 1879, the Guangxu Emperor granted the lama general a three-year leave to visit Lhasa.41

It seems that an exchange of political interests was involved as well. In 1866, the religious authorities of Chone and officials of the Tshe smon gling estate in Lhasa identified Ngag dbang blo bzang bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan (1861–1919), a five-year-old boy from Zho tshang village near Chone town, as the Third Tshe smon gling.42 They petitioned the emperors time and again via the Lhasa amban and influential Ü-Tsang religious leaders for restoring the Tshe smon gling.43

---

40 QSL, Dezong, j60.22a–23a.
41 QSL, Dezong, j104.13a. For the imperial order to instruct Bla ma dkar po to offer tea in Tibet, see “Gunga Zhalecan fengzhi ruzang aocha 棍噶札勒參奉旨入藏熬茶,” 1883, Qingdai gongzhong dang zouzhe ji junjichu dang zhe jian 清代宮中檔奏及軍機處檔摺件, NPM, 408010038. For a similar account in the lama’s biography, see Skal bzang legs bshad, Rnam thar, 330. This record is not included in the shorter version of the biography.
42 The Second Tshe smon gling was prohibited from rebirth by the Qing government and his property was confiscated by the bKa’ ’shag in 1845. Utilizing the religious connection with Torghut princes, the Chone monastic authorities attempted to extricate the Second from custody, relocate him to Dzungaria and restore his position in 1860. However, the lama passed away before making the move.
lineage and his 拿門罕 nominhan status. Repeatedly declined by the Imperial Household Department 内務府 (dorgi yamen), they secretly enthroned Ngag dbang blo bzang at Chone Monastery. Since Bla ma dkar po was ordained by the Second Tshe smon gling and cherished this momentous relationship defined by the sangha tradition, he coordinated a petition from Xinjiang in 1879. The imperial memorial of Jinshun and Xilun indicate that Torghut Mongol princes contributed 1,000 horses and requested an imperial permit for Ngag dbang blo bzang to study in Lhasa. Although a similar petition sent through Lhasa Amban Songgül 松溎 (1833–1907) was just turned down by the dorgi yamen, surprisingly, the request from Xinjiang was approved by the emperor.43

In 1881, Bla ma dkar po departed for Tibet with a huge fortune. He generously donated cash and religious objects to famous Buddhist sites along his slow pilgrimage journey en route to Lhasa from Lanzhou, Xi’an and Chengdu. He spent over 100,000 taels of silver on gilding the brass roof of an assembly hall and several hundred religious artifacts to Labrang Monastery. The story of his wealth had circulated among Lhasa residents before his arrival by the New Year of 1883. As he would deliver an imperial edict to the Dailai Lama on behalf of the emperor, the Bka’ shag officials welcomed him with a high-standard protocol despite the fact that the basis for his official rank as bo thog thu was unclear. Having considerable political importance, Bla ma dkar po was immediately involved in Lhasa politics.44

In the second month, a quarrel between a Nepalese jewelry dealer and two Tibetan women evolved into a Tibetan riot against all Nepalese traders in Lhasa, ending up with the destruction of their stores. The traders requested for the intervention of the Gurkha army. When the Nepalese king planned for an attack, the Bka’ shag authorities consulted Bla ma dkar po about a solution. Learning the traders’ demand of economic compensation, he suggested to pay off the Nepalis and contributed his own silver. His biography indicates that the lama borrowed 80,000 taels from the Sichuan general governor to settle the incident, and clarified that the compensation was paid by those who damaged Nepalese stores.45 The Qing record suggests that the traders demanded for 183,000 taels. Sichuan Province paid 80,000 taels.46 To reward his contribution to the resolution of the Tibetan-

---

43 QSL, Dezong, j206.6a.
44 Skal bzang legs bshad, Rnam thar, 334–49.
45 Skal bzang legs bshad, Rnam thar, 376–78; Rnam thar nor bu, 31–2; Lama garao lung bo zhuangzhixue, 23–5. For a more detailed record of this event, see the imperial memorial of Amban Selenge 色楞額 in Guangxu chao zupi zouzhe vol.111 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 404–5.
46 QSL, Dezong, j186.13b–14a.
Nepali dispute, the Guangxu Emperor bestowed him the title of Devout Chan Preceptor (Ch. duxin chanshi 篤信禪師). Around the same time, Bla ma dkar po met the Third Tshe smon gling Ngag dbang blo bzang in Lhasa. In the principle of exchanging favors, he urged the Bka’ shag government to return the Second Tshe smon gling’s estate to the successor, the future Dga’ ldan khri pa and regent of Tibet.47

The pilgrimage of Bla ma dkar po was fruitful as well. The Rnam thar portrays him as a humble and devoted Buddhist. With the witness of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama (1876–1933), he took the bhikkhu vows and rejoined the monastic community. He patronized famous incarnations and reputable scholars, and even made the jeweled crown (jo bo o rgyan) to the precious statue of Jowo Shakyamuni at Jokhang Monastery. Yet, his stay in Lhasa was costly. He donated over 210,000 tael of silver in various occasions. A Lhasa complimentary saying highlights his presence in Central Tibet:

The ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa satisfied Lhasans’ need of dharma.  
The Khalkha Rje btsun dam pa satisfied Lhasans’ need of silver.  
The Chone Nomen khan satisfied Lhasans’ need of justice. Bla ma dkar po satisfied Lhasans’ need of dharma, silver and justice.48

In 1885, the lama general left Lhasa and travelled across southern China to Beijing. He met provincial governors, powerful Chinese officials and eventually had an audience with the emperor in 1886. A clear image of the collapsing Qing Empire emerged in his vision. For almost two years, he visited the central yamens from one to another and waited endlessly for the imperial appointment. The court was unwilling to give Bla ma dkar po a formal official position in Xinjiang. His political status was not decided even when he was permitted to return to Dzungaria in 1888. Yet, the journey to Xinjiang was suspended for another year because of the British campaign on the southern border of Tibet. Two years previously, Sichuan Governor General Liu Bingzhang 劉秉璋 (1826–1905) and his predecessor Ding Baozhen 丁寶楨 (1820–86) had suggested the emperor to assign Bla ma dkar po to deal with the Tibetan-British issue. Now, the lama general was recommended to serve as the regent of Tibet. Nevertheless, on the basis of the imperial bureaucratic evaluation that lasted for several months, it was decided the ho thog thu was not qualified. The Zongli yamen officials asserted that he was reckless and war-oriented, and therefore could spark trouble in Tibet. In spring 1890, Bla ma dkar po embarked on a trip across China from end to

47 Dung dkar blo bzang ’phrin las, Dung dkar tshig mdzod chen mo (Beijing: Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, 2002), 1707–08.  
48 Rnam thar nor bu, 35–6; Lama garao luofa zhuanlue, 28.
end. En route to Altai, he planned to return to the homeland that he had left nearly thirty years ago.\footnote{QSL, Dezong, j235.6b–7b; j240.13b; j.261.17a–b. Skal bzang legs bshad, Rnam thar, 348–60; 455–59.}

2. The Legacy of Bla ma dkar po

At this point, Bla ma dkar po’s economic wealth, political achievement and religious reputation were well known by fellow-townsmen and religious authorities in Mdo smad. In the fourth month of 1890, he arrived at Lanzhou, where two opposite attitudes awaited him. On the one hand, the Fourth 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Skal bzang thub bstan dbang phyug (1856–1916), an enthusiastic traveler and progressive leader who had rapidly expanded the ecclesiastical realm of Labrang, dispatched a huge escort cavalry to greet the lama general. On the other hand, the Eighteenth King Tshe dbang bsod nams stobs rgyal (Ch. Yang Zuolin 楊作霖, d. 1902) was the least interested in this religious figure. Bla ma dkar po was a mi ser in his Chas pa Banner, registered as a monk in one of the seventeen parish residences (khang tshan), and ordained at Chone Monastery. Expecting recognition from his home institute, the lama general declined Labrang’s protocol escort. Instead of using the northern road from Lanzhou to Labrang via Hezhou, he took the southern route and returned to Chone via Minzhou, where the etiquette team of forty-eight banners customarily welcomed prestigious religious teachers to visit Chone. Nonetheless, he was disappointed again. Only the escort cavalry of Labrang was in Minzhou.

Bla ma dkar po abided by traditional norms to visit the Chone king. The politico-religious atmosphere was intense in Chone. In 1880, the Eighteenth King, a complete layman, obtained the ratification of senggang from the Qing government. His predecessor was the founder of several colleges and monasteries in Chone. In contrast to this established monastic scholar, the new mkhan po barely spoke Tibetan language. He was cultivated into a Confucian scholar-official. His pose writing shows a sophisticated Chinese taste. He favored Chinese culture but condemned Tibetan tradition. His enthronement thus was strongly opposed by the local sangha, which was reputed to value systematic training over fancy titles. Yet, Tshe dbang bsod nams inherited the position of abbot anyway, which caused the segregation of the ecclesiastic power at Chone Monastery. The seven major and ten minor reincarnations organized themselves into five factions. Inter-faction quarrels and feuds erupted frequently. Without any prestige in the monastic community, the king scarcely ran Senggang yamen and mediated conflicts.\footnote{Based on the conventional inheritance law, the king’s elder son held the secular authority and his younger son joined Chone Monastery to become the mkhan po. See} Therefore, Bla ma dkar po stayed...
briefly at the yongs 'dus Palace. The king and religious authorities did not attach him enough importance. They treated him as a Chone lama working among the Dzungaria patrons of the Dbyi li tshang. They were unsatisfied with his association with the 'Jam dbyangs and his decision to transform Chenghua siand Puqing si in Xinjiang into the subordinate institutes of Labrang Monastery. Bla ma dkar po left Chone town for his tibo ba with disappointment. In a causal conversation with his disciples later, he clearly belittled Chone as a small place without foresight and erudite people. He further commented that Chone Monastery had no well-educated lama to properly teach the king so that Tshe dbang bsod nams simply gave up learning Tibetan texts.51

In the six month of 1890, Bla ma dkar po sojourned to Labrang and received a ceremonious welcome. The Fourth 'Jam dbyangs requested him to reside at Labrang and endowed him with a second-rank nang chen. Bla ma dkar po accepted the offer and sponsored the construction of a Shakyamuni hall. In the following year, the 'Jam dbyangs surveyed geomancy and chose a site inside the monastery to construct the residence for Bla ma dkar po. From the viewpoint of Labrang authorities, Bla ma dkar po studied in its Medical College, became a leading authority below the rank of the four gser khri lineages and naturally belonged to its monastic community. It was a de facto practice for some Chone monks to study at Labrang in this period. Although advanced monks of Chone traditionally pursued higher degrees in Lhasa, joining Labrang was an understandable personal choice. However, being a bo thog thu from the parish of Chone, Bla ma dkar po’s choice inevitably created regional political consequences. Tension between Chone and Labrang had risen in the religious domain.52

In years when Bla ma dkar po was away from Xinjiang, local officials considered the lama as a political opponent and strived for weakening his influence in the Altai region. They reported to the court that Bla ma dkar po’s followers concentrated around Chenghua si would eventually be in conflict with local Kazakhs. The Uriankhai leaders intended to take back their grassland and expel the Tarbagatai nomads. This event coincided with the power struggle between the Ili general (Manchu) and the newly installed Xinjiang governor (Chinese) in the course of the establishment of Xinjiang Province in the late 1880s. The demarcation of the administrative boundaries in Ili and Tarbagatai also made the Qing implementation of many policies

---

51 Skal bzang legs bshad, Rnam thar, 649–54; Rnam thar nor bu, 107; Lama garao huofo zhuanlüe, 81.
52 Zhazha, Labulengsi huofo shixi (Lanzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 2000), 240–43.
inefficient in northern Xinjiang. Hence, the Qing court designated him to resolve the brewing grassland dispute between the lama’s Tarbagata followers and the Uriankhai and Kobdo Mongols and Kazakhs. In the ninth month of 1890, Bla ma dkar po left Gansu for Urumqi to carry on the imperial mission. He commanded Tarbagatai Mongols to be resettled. His monastery was relocated to Bayingou/Bayinggou 八音/英溝 that was subordinated to the Kharasus 庫爾喀喇烏蘇 Subprefecture. Bla ma dkar po lived among the Mongol patrons and followers as an eminent lama, a ritual master and a Buddhist teacher.53

In the sixth month of 1894, he departed for his new monastery in Chone, which was given the name Bkra shis chos ’khor gling by the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. He had first started planning for this monastery ten years earlier during his stay in Lhasa. At that time, his fellow townsman, a dge shes who studied in Lhasa, informed him that Chas pa Monastery built and expanded since the fifteenth century was burned to the ground by Hui insurgents in the 1860s. This monastery had belonged to the Chas pa monk preceptor vested by the Ming and Qing governments. As the Muslim revolt severely disrupted the society and economy in Chone like elsewhere, neither the preceptor nor the local tsho ba could afford to rebuild the monastery. The dge shes requested a donation from the bo thog thu, who immediately made the decision to sponsor the construction. Bla ma dkar po conducted a fasting ritual at Pha bong kha Hermitage and consulted the highest religious authorities in Lhasa about the location and building protocol in the spring of 1884. He envisioned it as a Dge lugs university with four colleges and complete training systems. The Dalai Lama and the Oracle Gnas chung chose a site on the geomantic map of Chas pa valley and suggested to build the Kālacakravajra College (sa ris grwa tshang) first. Later that year, Bla ma dkar po gave the certificate letter and the authenticating objects of the Dalai Lama and “greet three monasteries” to his elder brother Dkon mchog bstan ’dzin, and entrusted him with the task to construct the Kālacakravajra College. In Chas pa, local monastic representatives, elder councils, tsho ba headmen and two Labrang reincarnated lamas organized the communal meeting to decide the building materials and labor to be apportioned for each tsho ba. In the eighth month of 1885, Chas pa people started the construction.54

When the bo thog thu traveled across China, he sent funds time and again to support the construction. However, a shortage of funds occurred in 1888. With the completion of Kālacakravajra College, he planned to unify all hermitages along Chas pa valley, and established the other three colleges. After this plan was revealed to the public, it

53 QSL, Dezong, j267.8a–9b. Skal bzang legs bshad, Rnam thar, 550–68.
54 Rnam thar nor bu, 57–66; Lama garao huofo zhuanlüe, 47–53.
was immediately challenged by tsbo ba leaders and local monks of different hermitages. Since Chas pa was located among three huge university monasteries, namely, Chone, Labrang and Lhamo, the necessity of a new central monastery was questionable. The villagers were also concerned that the plan would move their hereditary religious objects and monks the new monastery in the territory of Dgon pa tsbo ba. The countless inter-tsbo ba feuds and enduring mutual hostilities impeded the formation of a religious unity on such a scale. At this time, Bla ma dkar po could not secure a stable income in Beijing. Because the construction stopped, he requested the Qing royal family to offer alms by stating that the monastery under construction was for the celebration of the sixtieth birthday of the Empress Dowager Cixi. The emperor assigned Encheng 恩承 (1820–92) to inquiry into the matter. The investigation report from Taozhou confirmed that the monastery was being built in Chas pa Banner under the jurisdiction of Chone Chieftrain Yang Zuolin. The bo thog thu thereby was bestowed with long-life tablets (Ch. changsheng paiwei 長生牌位) of Guangxu and Cixi, a plaque with “Longevity Monastery” (Ch. wanshousi 萬壽寺) in the emperor’s handwriting, and 7,000 taels of silver. The dissenting voices of some tsbo ba were silenced. The project was carried on with the imperial funds flowing in. In the early 1890s, Bla ma dkar po also send the donations of the Mongol patrons back to hometown. By 1895, the construction of the exoteric, esoteric and medicine colleges were all completed.55

In the tenth month of 1894, the bo thog thu returned to Chone and waited at the newly established Bkra shis chos 'khor gling for the coming sixtieth birthday of Cixi. He held a huge ceremony for the Empress Dowager and performed Buddhist initiation rituals in the eleventh month. Afterwards, he fell ill and anticipated recovery. In the fifth month of 1895, the Qing court instructed him to return to Xinjiang. Coincidently, a sectarian conflict between the Yihewani and Khafiya orders led to a massive Muslim revolt in Xining and Hezhou. The Gansu-Xinjiang transportation was paralyzed. The Chinese, Tibetan and Muslim groups were coerced into revengeful killings again in Gansu and Qinghai.56 Bla ma dkar po waited for a clear situation. A month later, however, the emperor ordered him to handle the issue concerning British trade with Tibet. At this point, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama assumed complete ruling power. The enmity between the amban and the Bka’ shag officials became irreconcilable. Lhasa authorities largely ignored the imperial instructions. As Qing China’s sway over Tibet declined sharply, the court needed a reliable Tibetan middleman. The “recklessness” of the lama general seemed no longer relevant for

55 QSL, Dezong, j254.9b–10a. Rnam thar nor bu, 57–66; Lama garao huofo zhuanglue, 47–53.
the Qing government. From the seventh month to the tenth month, the Guangxu Emperor sent telegrams frequently to urge Bla ma dkar po to depart for Lhasa. The latter was prepared to make the long trek when his illness lightened. Unfortunately, his condition deteriorated again. He died on the thirtieth day of the tenth month, leaving behind the bo thog chos title, Bkra shis chos ’khor gling and a series of unsettled matters as his legacy.57

3. Dilemma of the Chas pa Eighteen Tsho ba

The Glu shod eight-tsho ba, A la five-tsog pa and Zam tsha six-tsbo ba neighboring Chas pa were all subdued and donated to Lhamo Monastery (dga’ ldan bshad sgrub pad dkar gro lha ‘bras, Ch. Langmu si 郎木寺) by the Chone kings in the eighteenth century. These tsho ba used to be a buffer zone between Chone and Labrang. From the early nineteenth century onward, Labrang swayed religious opinion and waged wars to integrate Tibetan tsho ba and federative units across Mdo smad. After Lhamo Monastery was incorporated into Labrang’s prime-subordinate monastic system, local tsho ba became the religious communities of Labrang Monastery.58 Hence, Chone and Labrang shared a jurisdictional border drawing from the Dme bo pasture to upper Klu chu valley. The borderline was superposed on many controversial territorial boundaries of the tsho ba separately ruled by Chone and Labrang. Owing to the seasonal mobility, land dispute and robbery/theft/raid practice of the pastoral and semi-sedentary tsho ba in this region, inter-tsho ba feuds often broke out along the border. Peculiarly, no direct confrontation erupted between the two centers. As the Chone kings patronized every ’Jam dbyangs in the past two centuries, Chone yamen never meddled in local conflicts. In contrast to its aggressive incorporations elsewhere, Labrang also did not launch military campaign to capture the tsho ba along the outskirt of the Chone Kingdom. Most disputes were mediated by esteemed local leaders and lamas, and settled by involved tsho ba in accordance with traditional customs.59

57 QSL, Dezong, j368.12b; j372.8b; j375.12a; j376.2b–3a. Skal bzang legs bshad, Rnam thar, 568–683; Rnam thar nor bu, 100–126; Lama gansu huofu zhuanlu, 76–103.
58 In 1747, the Chone king donated these tsho ba to the First Lha mo Gser khrim rgyal mshan seng ge (1678–1756) when he founded Stag tshang lha mo Monastery. See Grags pa mkhas grub, Khrim dbyod dang nga gyur pa khrim chen rgyal mshan seng ge’i rnam thar in Dga’ ldan khrim rnu rnam thar, 1–7b; Dkon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, Co ne’ bstan ’gyur gi dkar chok yi bzhin nor bu’i phreng ba (Lanzhou: Lanzhou guji chubanshe, 1990), 233, 240; Mgon po dhang rgyal, Co ne sa skyong gi lo rgyus klu chu sngon mo’i ’gyur dbyang ba (Lanzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 1990), 43–6; Xiahe xianzhi (Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua chubanshe, 1999), 38–54.
59 Ma and Wama, Kan bu’i bod kyi tsho thog lo rgyus m dor bradas, 120–24; Zhongi xianzhi (Lanzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 1994), 158–61.
Yet, Labrang was the most attractive monastic university, pilgrim destination and market in the nineteenth century Mdo smad. By this time, the religious dominance of Chone had declined considerably. In the Chone-Labrang borderland, a shift of religious identity affiliation occurred among tsbo ba under the jurisdiction of the Chone king. Tibetan householders and communal monasteries in 'Brug chu, The bo, Gzhong pa and Chas pa preferred to send pupils and advanced students to Labrang. Conventionally, prospective Dge lugs students in the Chone Kingdom furthered their studies at Chone Monastery and obtained the highest Buddhist degrees at the central monastic universities in Lhasa. The Parish-Assembly Office and the seventeen parish residences managed pupil monks from different chos sde across the kingdom. As receiving ritual and scholastic trainings at which institute was a personal choice, the Chone Parish-Assembly Office did not interfere with the decision of local monks like Bla ma dkar po. Although Labrang absorbed Chone monks, it never announced any subordination of Chone communal monasteries. There was never a problem as long as Labrang did not designate abbots to manage religious affairs in Chone. However, the spectacular ascendency of Bla ma dkar po and the establishment of Bkra shis chos 'khor gling altered the policies of Chone and Labrang towards Chas pa.60

Within three decades, the lama general accumulated remarkable military merit, economic wealth, political power and religious capital. In 1865, the Qing government conferred the bo thog thu title on Bla ma dkar po for his defense of Tarbagatai. The title was designed by the Qing to be bestowed only on the highest rank Buddhist sprul sku. Being confused by the imperial award, Bla ma dkar po sent an attendant to consult Labrang authorities about the unprecedented case. The 'Jam dbyangs confirmed that Bla ma dkar po was a reincarnation of the sde srid Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1653-1705), the regent of the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617–82). Thereby, the Thorgut and Eleuth Mongols revered the lama general as a sprul sku. In tales about his life experience, the line between legends and believed facts is unclear. He is usually portrayed as a spiritual figure with supernatural power. Following his death, the Mongol followers requested the Qing to ratify the search of an incarnation in 1896. The Shan-Gan governor-general forwarded their petition to the emperor, who issued an edict that approved the lama to reincarnate as the bo thog thu of Chenghua si in Xinjiang.61 The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama performed rituals to supplicate an early rebirth of Bla ma dkar po and predicted that the birthplace would be in Mdo smad. In the process of legitimizing the reincarnate lineage,

---

60 For the cases of changing religious identity affiliation in the Chone Kingdom, see Marnyi Gyatso, “Home on the Margins,” 139–51, 184–94
61 The attendant was sent to Labrang from Xinjiang much later mainly because the Hui Islam Revolt was fully repressed in Gansu in 1872. Skal bzang legs bshad, Ruam thar, 322.
twenty-eight famous kings and saints were identified as the previous lives of Bla ma dkar po. Hence, as Lobsang Yongdan concludes, a sprul sku lineage was invented.62

A new spiritual lineage meant the inflow of political, religious and economic capitals and the reconfiguration of local human, material and immaterial resources. In such a border area, the situation was more complicated and sensitive. Chone authorities were long dissatisfied with the lama general for his generous donation of statues, silver, bronze roof and the construction cost of the Sakyamuni hall to Labrang while offering nothing to Chone.63 After all, he was from Chas pa, a parish and a banner of Chone. Religious influence could easily turn into political power in the Tibetan areas. When Labrang led the construction of the new monastery in Chas pa, the lay and the ecclesiastic authorities in the Klu chu valley were alarmed. They were concerned with the interference of Labrang in all matters regarding Bla ma dkar po. Notwithstanding, the King Tshe dbang bsod nams could administer neither the reincarnation estates nor the Parish-Assembly Office. The brutality of factional feuds escalated time and again at Chone Monastery. The five factions also had no intention to contend with the issue and offend the Fourth 'Jam dbyangs. As a result, Chone authorities were discontented with Labrang while tolerating its religious infiltration.64

In 1895, the concealed Chone-Labrang friction evolved into a multifaceted contention. The lama general never explicitly indicated the ownership of Bkra shis chos 'khor gling. In an official meeting with the bo thog thu, Encheng asserted that the emperor sponsored the construction and the monastery belonged to the Great Qing. He instructed the lama to treat it as a project of the state, build an enormous compact of halls and temples, and recruit all yellow-hat monks of the region to recite sutras for the emperor and empress dowager. What was being articulated by Encheng was the bureaucratic and euphonic cliché, but it seems that Bla ma dkar po took these words seriously. He was inclined to create another regional university rather than a monastery affiliated to Chone or Labrang.65

However, local reality was complex. Driven by intricate rationales, Chone authorities, Labrang Monastery and the Chas pa eighteen tsho ba all seized some space to interpret the status of Bkra shis chos 'khor gling. The eighteen tsho ba and their Buddhist priests

63 Zhazha, Labulengsi buofo shicci, 240.
65 Skal bzang legs bshad, Rnam thar, 423–25.
insisted that the monastery was their communal monastery. They contributed land, material and labor to build the monastery and dedicated it to the bo thog thu. The monastery was not a reconstruction of the old Chas pa dgon pa previously owned by the Chas pa senggang and subordinated to Chone Monastery. It was a regional Buddhist institute sponsored by the Qing emperor. For Labrang authorities, the bo thog thu was a second-rank reincarnation. The new monastery adopted the educational system, curriculums and monastic regulations of Labrang. It was established as a branch institute and managed by Labrang reincarnate lamas and religious teachers. Therefore, the 'Jam dbyangs assigned a dharma throne holder to Bkra shis chos 'khor gling after Bla ma dkar po passed away.66 The appointment of the khri pa would transform the Chas pa eighteen tsbo ba into a religiously affiliated community of Labrang, effectively dissociating them from the banner system of Chone. Chas pa monks and villagers welcomed the decision of Labrang. Because the Chone king fielded militia time and again to assist the Qing army to repress the Muslim revolts, the eighteen tsbo ba like elsewhere in Chone, lost many fathers and sons in battle and suffered miserably in the aftermath of the war. They wished to exempt themselves from the militia corvée by altering the religious identity affiliation.67

The king and ecclesiastic authorities in Chone were alerted by the allied action of Chas pa Tibetans and Labrang leaders. The eighteen tsbo ba were the subjects of the king and the chos sde of Chone Monastery, which granted the Senggang yamen unquestionable right to administer the communal monastery of Chas pa Banner as a subordinate institute. Moreover, the emperor granted an annual supply of 600 dan ¹ of grain to Bkra shis chos 'khor gling from 1897 onward. Given that the grain was provided by Taozhou Subprefecture, the monastery became a registered monastery in Taozhou. It was a long tradition that Chone managed the Qing-vested Tibetan monasteries in Taozhou, not to mention that the dgon pa was built by congregating the hermitages managed by Chone Monastery. Chone authorities believed that the Fourth 'Jam dbyangs broke the oral assent on politico-religious boundaries agreed by his predecessor and the sixteenth king in the 1840s. Even though the contemporary Chone king barely maintained the patron-priest relation with the 'Jam dbyangs lineage, Labrang authorities could not tread on this agreement and transgress the politico-religious border. Thus, the khri pa sent by Labrang retired from the contest. Chone appointed a throne holder straightaway in the

66 Zhazha, Jiayang butuketu shixi, 243.
67 QSL, Muzong, j109.25b–26a, j137.15b; j138.23a–b, j145.38a–40a, j153.8b–9a, j213.15a–16b; Pinghui zhi, j3.7a, j3.7a, 10a–b, 21a–b, 24a–b, 27b–28a, j4.2a; j5.7b, 21a; Zhang Yandu, Taozhou tingzhi, 985–86; Zhuoni wenshi ziliao, vol.7, 130.
The dispute was far from any foreseeable solution. Because the direct incorporation of Bkra shis chos 'khor gling was not an option, Labrang authorities tended to employ the Bla ma dkar po lineage to control the monastery and the eighteen tsho ba. Three years after the ho thog thu’s funeral, the 'Jam dbyangs divined that the reincarnation was born in the Datong River valley. He urged the lama general’s estate officials to seek the new reincarnation. In 1901, Skal bzang tshul khrims bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan (1896–1911) from Xining was recognized as the Second Bla ma dkar po and enthroned in Chone. However, the monks and Mongols in Tarbagatai learnt the news and requested the reincarnation to ascend the dharma throne at Chenghua si in accordance with the imperial edict. Urged by Gansu officials, the young sprul sku had to depart for Xinjiang in spite of Labrang’s unwillingness to let him go. The influence of the imperial government was not absent from this frontier. Chas pa community and local monks could not count on Labrang to settle the case. They turned to Taozhou officials for help. Nonetheless, the Taozhou magistrate acquired plentiful gifts from the Chone king and dismissed the petition of the Chas pa eighteen tsho ba.69

Opportunity knocked for Bkra shis chos 'khor gling when the first Gospel Church was erected in Taozhou by 1905. In order to free themselves from the Chone rule, the eighteen tsho ba sought help from the Gospel missionaries. In the local context, these foreign priests were clearly respected by the king and Chinese officials. Chas pa monks reached out to the church. David Ekvall commented on this bold move with a boastful tone:

A bitter animosity has for years existed between the lamaseries of Chone and Cheh pah kuh [Chaspa valley], for the heads of the former insist on exercising temporal power over the latter, which is the smaller Gomba [dGon pa]. This feeling was intensified when Chone Gomba authorities attempted to appoint the religious heads of Cheh pah kuh Gomba. Such authority was stoutly denied and resisted, and rather than yield to numbers and monies influence, Cheh pah kuh appointed a delegation to wait upon the missionaries at Tao cheo [Taozhou], for the purpose of offering, with properly drawn up deeds, the lamasery and all the property connected with it, to the Fuh yin Tang [Gospel Hall].70

68 David Ekvall, Outposts or Tibetan Border Sketches, 188–93.
70 David Ekvall, Outposts or Tibetan Border Sketches, 148–49.
Nonetheless, Ekvall and his colleagues knew the covert wrestling between the two predominant Tibetan political powers in this new horizon of evangelism. Another intention of Chas pa monks was to disgust and threaten Chone Buddhist authorities, who were antagonistic to the church and its workers. As the Tibetan mission relied on the acquiescence of the Chone king and the 'Jam dbyangs, the missionaries could not risk their Tibetan outposts to help Chas pa Tibetans. They turned down the delegation’s request despite it being a dreamy opportunity for them to set up a station in the Tibetan hinterland beyond the Gansu-Amdo border.71

The case remained unsettled until a new twist emerged in 1911. On the one hand, the Second Bla ma dkar po died of an unclear cause in Ili (a source indicates in Xining).72 Following another round of divination, the Fourth 'Jam dbyangs engaged in the search of the sprul sku again. In 1915, Skal bzang 'phrin las lhun 'grub chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1911–1954) from Gla le'u khog of Chone was identified as the Third Bla ma dkar po. By then, the Manchu Empire had come to an end. Seeing no obligation to abide an order of the former dynasty, the Chas pa eighteen tsho ba never let the ho thog thu return to Tarbagatai. Local tsho ba monastic leaders needed the incarnation to manage the precarious situation of the valley, which was still caught in the midst of a covert conflict between Chone and Labrang. They enthroned the Third Bla ma dkar po as a local sprul sku at Bkra shis chos 'khor gling, and immediately escorted him to study at Labrang Monastery. They appropriated the Bla ma dkar po lineage of Chenghua si and expected the new incarnation to bargain with Chone authorities in the future.73

On the other hand, the Chone King Tshe dbang bsod nams died without a male heir in 1902. Embracing the Chinese advisor’s suggestion, he had utilized the Chinese inheritance rule and chose Blo bzang bstan ’dzin rnam rgyal ’phrin las rdo rje (Ch. Yang Jiqing 楊積慶, 1889–1937) of the royal lineage’s third branch to be his successor in both political and religious titles. O rgyan rnying ma (Ch. Yang Ying 楊英) of the fourth branch, who was the nephew of the previous king and the uncle of Blo bzang bstan ’dzin, was dissatisfied with this testament. Based on Tibetan inheritance rule, he was the rightful successor. Meanwhile, as the nineteenth king was still a child, Consort Yang, Tshe dbang bsod nams’ wife from a wealthy Chinese gentry family in Lintao, acted as the regent of the kingdom. She trusted the Chinese advisor and restrained the political influence of Chone Monastery. Abiding the official instruction to protect missionaries, she

71 David Ekvall, Outposts or Tibetan Border Sketches, 149.
72 Danqu, Zhuoni zangchuan fojiao lishi wenhua, 194; Lobsang Yongdan, “The Invention of a Tibetan Lama General,” 89.
73 Danqu, Zhuoni zangchuan fojiao lishi wenhua, 195.
allowed the evangelists to establish a Gospel outpost at the foot of Chone Monastery in 1905. The consort infuriated religious leaders in Chone. Their divergence became so extreme that some monastic factions supported O rgyan rnying ma to seize the throne.74 The fourth branch thus provoked fights within the royal lineage and reported the arrogation of Blo bzang bstan ’dzin to Gansu officials. The report was ignored by the Taozhou magistrate who favored the first branch for gifts. After the Qing collapsed and the local official was displaced, O rgyan rnying ma requested the Republican government of Gansu to appoint him as the chieftain and depose his nephew in 1913. He went to Lanzhou and appealed for an investigation. Yet, his request was declined again. The provincial government did not wish to change the status quo and instigate chaos in the border region.75

Already preoccupied by the discord concerning a legitimate successor, Consort Yang and the adopted heir also encountered other internal challenges. Over two hundred tsho ba of the The bo Eighteen Banners often organized themselves into small looting parties to raid caravans, travelers and Chinese villages. When the White Wolf (Ch. Bailang 白狼) insurgents swept across Shann-Gan and devastated the Klu chu valley in 1914, the ’Brug chu Four Banners were also in trouble with Xigu 西固 officials and Western botanists.76 In 1915, The bo Tibetans clashed with the missionaries of the Christian and Missionary Alliance, China Inland Mission, Swedish Pentecostal and Assemblies of God at Ta rge dgon pa (Ch. Luba si 錄巴寺). The king and his militia were preoccupied with these events, which often turned into external troubles and led to the interference of Chinese officials.

[Thus] in recent years the neighboring Chinese mandarins have been unmercifully bleeding the present chief of Chone, who is but an unprincipled boy. The constant troubles between Chinese and Tibetans give the former many occasions, when hard up for money, to supply themselves from this never-failing source, and a systematic method of squeezing, facilitated by means of intimidation, is the result.77

Hence, Chas pa Banner faced less strict control from Chone. Under the pressure of the Labrang reincarnations who closely worked with Bla ma dkar po, the khri pa assigned by Chone was elbowed out of

---

74 Robert Ekvall, Gateway to Tibet, 54; Dyck, William Christie, 64–7.
75 Zhuoni wenshi ziliao vol.4, 5; Taozhou tingzhi, 841; Yang Shihong, Zhuoni Yang tusi zhuanlüe, 82–8.
77 David Ekvall, Outposts or Tibetan Border Sketches, 125.
Chas pa. Local monastic leaders even thwarted the banner-chief who was appointed by the king to collect tax. The Labrang regime slid into Chas pa valley again. The Fourth 'Jam dbyangs designated the second throne holder for a three-year term to Bkra shis chos 'khor gling. The eighteen tsho ba became de facto religious communities of Labrang.\(^78\)

Coincidently, the Ma family warlords 馬家軍閥 dominated northwestern China at this point. To expand territory and increase revenue, they initiated the integration of Tibetan and Mongol areas in Gansu and Qinghai. After the Fourth 'Jam dbyangs passed away in 1916, a dispute between the Labrang Regent, who was the Third Dhal mang tshang (1854–1918), and Treasurer Li Zongzhe 李宗哲 gave Xining-based Muslim warlord Ma Qi 馬麒 (1869–1931) an excuse to seize this political center and regional market. His interference was strongly opposed by Labrang monks and the family of the Fifth 'Jam dbyangs 'Blo bzang 'jam dbyangs ye shes bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan (1916–47). Labrang authorities had been busy organizing a pan-Amdo Tibetan alliance to fight against Ma Qi for a decade. At the same time, Consort Yang transferred the official seals of the Chone chieftain and senggang to Blo bzang bstan 'dzin. In his early 20s, the nineteenth Chone potentate increasingly accumulated power to hold together the collapsing kingdom. The young ruler upgraded the cruel methods of punishment and intimidation to consolidate control over his subjects. He launched punitive campaigns against the disobedient tsho ba on the margins of his realm. The narrow Chone dungeon imprisoned Tibetans (including monks) who troubled the king by attempting to change religious affiliation. Prisoners were physically abused, sometimes crippled or beheaded. In doing so, he sustained considerable deterrence against troublesome tsho ba and defecting monasteries.\(^79\)

The Fifth 'Jam dbyangs' family (also known as the Huang 黃 family) was from Kham and thus new to the region and unfamiliar with the intricate politico-religious relationship between Chone and Labrang. With the Labrang militias being vanquished by Muslim troops several times, the 'Jam dbyangs' family requested the Chone ruler for military support. Knowing the political circumstances on the Sino-Tibetan frontier very well, and because of the religious incursion of Labrang, the nineteenth king refused to assist Labrang. He treated Labrang as a rival and a powder keg. Nonetheless, he was expected to respect the patron-priest relationship between his lineage and the 'Jam dbyangs bzhas pa. Similar to the retreat of Labrang from Chas pa in

---

\(^78\) Dyck, William Christie, 90–5; Robert Ekvall, Gateway to Tibet, 58–66.

the late 1890s, polite gesture was shown by the king in 1925. When the Fifth 'Jam dbyangs’ family was under the tight pursuit of Ma Qi, Blo bzang bstan ’dzin allowed them to take refuge in northern Chone. Yet, the king did not meet the ‘Jam dbyangs in person nor offered further help. To avoid souring relations between Chone and the Ma family warlords, he deployed all yamen officials and local managers to arrest whoever among his subjects were fighting for Labrang. Peculiarly, the Chas pa eighteenth tsbo ba who had strived for the exemption from militia corvée were conscripted by the banner-chief and local manager to stop any The bo Tibetans from joining the war.80

4. Further Remark: Unsettling as a Solution

To conclude, the ascendency of Bla ma dkar po created a hot spot of local politics. His legacy was a pool of resource for Labrang to continue its politico-religious expansion, for Chone to maintain the hereditary control of a banner, and for the Chas pa eighteen tsbo ba to obtain better religious support and resist the military corvée. The situation showcases the ways in which local authority took shape, local politics functioned and local tsbo ba navigated themselves. The development of this case was conditioned by the politico-religious structures of Chone and Labrang, the dynamics of the changing regional ruler-subject relations, and the ebb and flow of powers in northwestern China. In years when the kingdom was disturbed by internal and external unrests, Chas pa monks succeeded in warding off Chone religious authorities. When Labrang was invaded by Muslim troops, Chas pa Tibetans failed to avoid the king’s recruitment although they had a Labrang khri pa in residence. When the eighteen tsbo ba were caught between Chone and Labrang, they sought solution from external authorities. The Qing magistrates, Republican officials and missionaries, instead of being frontier passengers, were never absent from local politics in Mdo smad.

Even though the dispute remained unsettled, like many unsolved local dissensions, an expedient practice was carried on until it became a tradition-wise solution. It is hard to know whether Chone and Labrang reached any new agreement prior to the 1950s. Neither side ever raked up the issue of Chas pa valley. Although Labrang Monastery appointed dharma throne holder to Bkra shis chos ’khor gling and recognized it as a subordinated institute, it never openly claimed that Chas pa Banner was its chos sde. Meanwhile, Chone yamen kept levying tax and corvée on the Chas pa eighteen tsbo ba. This arrangement seemingly conformed to the needs of Chone and Labrang. Perhaps it has also served the needs of these two communities to avoid any mention of their awkward relations during this period in local history.

80 Li Zhenyi, Gannan zhi (Hezuo: Gannan ribao, 1986), 139.
Buddhist records, as usual, omitted the intertwined violent scenario, social-political struggle and long-lasting resentment in local society. Oral accounts, despite containing profound social and cultural meanings of the event, deep memory of the communal feeling, judgement based on the reinterpretation of the past, and justification of the present, often obscured and reconstructed the “historical fact.” As a result, the contest has been concealed from the outside world. The eighteen tsho ba no longer regard it as a dispute. The latter generations have a new interpretation. Chas pa Tibetans nowadays assert with pride that they receive “Buddhist teachings from Labrang, political administration from Chone, and grain from Taozhou (chos ‘go blab rang, srid ‘go co ne, ’bru 'go the rgyu).”

Works Cited

Archives, National Palace Museum (NPM), Taiwan.


*Qingshilü* 清實錄 [The Qing Veritable Records]. Taipei: Taiwan zhongyang lishi yuyan yanjiusuo.


Zuo Zongtang, Zuo wenxiang gong zoudu xubian 左文襄公奏牘續編
[The Continuation of Zuo Wengxiang gong’s Imperial Memorials]. Guxiangge, 190
༄༅། པསར་དུ་རྙེད་པའི་བིས་དཔེ་བཀའ་བློན་ཟུར་ཁང་སིད་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་གི་རྣམ་ཐར

《བཀའི་གུང་བློན་གི་འཁུར་འཛིན་པའི་རྟློགས་བརློད་བུང་བའི་མགིན་གླུ་ཞེས་པར་དཔྱད་པ།
ཅོག་རོ་གཡུང་དྲུང་འགྱུར་མེད།

ངོ་དོན་གསང་སིད་གཞུང་གི་བཀའ་བོན་ཟུར་ཁང་སིད་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་གི་རང་རྣམ་འཁྲུལ་མེད་ཅིག་ཡིན་ཞིང་།

འདིར་ཡིག་ཚང་ཞིབ་འཇུག་དང་ལོ་རྒྱུས་རིག་པའི་སོ་ནས་མ་དཔེའི་བིས་རྒྱུན་རྣམ་པ་དང་རོམ་རིག་ཁྱད་ཆོས། ལོ་རྒྱུས་རིན་ཐང་སོགས་ལ་དབེ་ཞིབ་བགིས་ཁུལ་དང་།

དེ་མིན་འབེལ་ཡོད་ལོ་རྒྱུས་གནད་དོན་འགའ་དང་།

སྐབས་དེའི་ཆོས་སིད་མི་སྣ་ཁག་དང་ཨམ་བན།

ཁ་ཆེའི་ཆོས་དཔོན་སོགས་ཀི་གནས་ཚུལ་འཁོད་པར་ངོ་སོད་དང་དཔྱད་གེང་ཞུས་ཡོད།

༄༅། རྒྱལ་མཆོག་སྐུ་ཕེང་བརྒྱད་པ་འཇམ་དཔལ་རྒྱ་མཚོ་དང་དགུ་པ་ལུང་རྟོགས་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་སྐབས་ལ།

བོད་ས་གནས་སིད་གཞུང་གི་བཀའ་བོན་གི་གོ་ས་བཞེས་མོང་བའི་ཟུར་ཁང་སི་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་(1766-1820)

རོལ་བོད་རིག་པའི་ཞིབ་འཇུག་པ་ཚེ་རིང་བསམ་གྲུབ་དང་དཔལ་མགོན་ཐར་གཉིས་ཀིས་ཡུལ་དངོས་ནས་པར་བཤུ་བརྒྱབ་ཡོད།

དེ་རེས་འབེལ་ཡོད་ཞིབ་འཇུག་པ་རེ་ཟུང་ལ་མཁོ་སོད་བས་ཡོད་ཀང་།

དེ་ཙམ་གི་ཁྱབ་རྒྱ་མ་བྱུང་སྟེ་རྒྱ་ཆེའི་རིག་གཞུང་ཞིབ་འཇུག་པ་དང་བོད་ཡིག་འཛད་སོད་པ་རོམས་རང་

དེ་རེས་འབེལ་ཡོད་ཞིབ་འཇུག་པ་རེ་ཟུང་ལ་མཁོ་སོད་བས་ཡོད་ཀང་།

དེ་ཙམ་གི་ཁྱབ་རྒྱ་མ་བྱུང་སྟེ་རྒྱ་ཆེའི་རིག་གཞུང་ཞིབ་འཇུག་པ་དང་བོད་ཡིག་འཛད་སོད་པ་རོམས་རང་

དེ་རེས་འབེལ་ཡོད་ཞིབ་འཇུག་པ་རེ་ཟུང་ལ་མཁོ་སོད་བས་ཡོད་ཀང་།

དེ་ཙམ་གི་ཁྱབ་རྒྱ་མ་བྱུང་སྟེ་རྒྱ་ཆེའི་རིག་གཞུང་ཞིབ་འཇུག་པ་དང་བོད་ཡིག་འཛད་སོད་པ་རོམས་རང་
ཀི་ལོངས་སོད་དུ་མ་གྱུར། 2017
ལོར་རིག་དགའ་ཤཱཀས་གོག་རྡུལ་རྣམ་ཐར་དེ་ཁོ་བོར་ཞིབ་འཇུག་གི་ཚུལ་དུ་མཁོ་སོད་བས་བྱུང་།
དེ་རེས་ངེད་གཉིས་ཀིས་རྣམ་ཐར་འདིའི་རིན་ཐང་ཆེ་བར་མཐོང་ནས་ཞིབ་འཇུག་དང་གོག་ཀླད་དུ་ཕབ་པའི་སྟ་གོན་ཚུགས།
སྐྲུན་ཁང་ནས་དངོས་སུ་པར་སྐྲུན་བས།
དངོས་པོ་རྣམ་ཐར་མདོ་དཔེ་དེར་རྣམ་ཐར་སྟོད་སྨད་གཉིས་དང་མཇུག་ཏུ་འཇམ་དབངས་བསྟོད་པ་བཅས་པའི་དོན་ཚན་གསུམ་ལས་གྲུབ་ཡོད།
ཡིག་གཟུགས་ཁྱོན་ཡོངས་དཔེ་ཚུགས་ལམ་ནས་བིས་པ་དང་།
སྣག་ཚའི་སོད་སྟངས་ཐད་གཞུང་ཡོངས་ཁ་མདོག་ནག་པོ་ཡིན་ཡང་།
ཆོས་ཕོགས་ཐ་སྙད་གལ་འགངས་ཆེ་བ་དང་།
ཞར་འདེན་ཡིག་སྐུར་ནང་དོན།
ཡིག་མགོ། ཀ་བཤད་ཡིག་འབྲུ་བཅས་སྣག་ཚ་དམར་པོས་བིས་ཡོད།
དེ་མིན་བོད་བརྒྱུད་ནང་བསྟན་དང་འབེལ་བའི་བ་མ་མཁས་གྲུབ་དང་།
སེས་ཆེན་དམ་པ།
ཆོས་སོང་སྲུང་མ།
དེ་བཞིན་ས་གནས་ཡུལ་མིང་དང་དགོན་སེ་ལྷ་ཁང་།
ལས་ཁུངས་ཚན་པའི་མིང་སོགས་སྣག་ཚ་སེར་སྨུག་གིས་བིས་ཡོད།
འོན་ཀང་སྐབས་རེ་སྣག་ཚ་སེར་དམར་གི་ནང་དོན་དང་འད་ཤས་ཆེ།
ཡིག་གཟུགས་ཆེ་ཆུང་ཐད་གཞུང་དངོས་གཅིག་མཚུངས་ཡིན་ཡང་།
ཐོལ་བྱུང་ཚིག་བཅད་དང་ཞར་འདེན་ཡིག་སྐུར་གི་གསལ་བཤད་དང་།
མཇུག་བསྡུའི་མཛད་བང་རྣམས་ཡིག་ཆུང་ཐོག་ནས་བིས་ཡོད།
རྣམ་ཐར་སྟོད་ཆ། 《བཀའི་གུང་བོན་གི་འཁུར་འཛིན་པའི་རྟོགས་བརོད་བུང་བའི་མགིན་གླུ་ལ་ལེབ་གངས་150བོད། དཔེ་ཆའི་མཚན་བང་མཛེས་རིས་ཀིས་ལེགས་པར་བརྒྱན་ཡོད་། འཛིན་པོ། འཆི་བོ་ལྡན་གཞི་་ཤིང་། མཐའ་འཁོར་དུ་བུརྟུརྱ་དང་ཙི་པ་ཊ་བཅས་པའི་དར་འཕན་དང་དོ་ཤལ་རི་མོས་བརྒྱན།
གཙོ་བོ་ཟུར་ཆོས་དད་པའི་མིང་བོའི་ལེབ་ལེགས་པའི་སྟབས་ཐུབ་པར་སྐུང་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པའི་ཁབ་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་གཏོགས་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པའི་ཁབ་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་གཏོགས་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་བཤད་པ་ཐུབ་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་བཤད་པ་ཐུབ་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པཐུན་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་གཏོགས་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པཐུན་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པཐུན་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པཐུན་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པཐུན་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པཐུན་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པཐུན་ལེབ་ལ་བོས་པའི་བོད་ཀྱི་ཡིག་ལུང་བཐུབ་བཤད་པཐུན་ལེབ
ཁང་ཁྱིམ་རྒྱུད་ཀི་འཕེལ་རིམ་དང་བཀའ་བོན་རང་ཉིད་ཀི་མི་ཚེའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས།

དེ་བཞིན་སྐབས་དེའི་ཆོས་སིད་མི་སྣ་བར་བྱུང་བའི་ཡིག་སྐུར་འབེལ་འདིས་དང་།

སེར་ངོས་ཀི་ཕག་མཆོད་ཉམས་ལེན་སོགས་ཡིན་ལ།

མཇུག་ཏུ་ཤོག་ལྷེ་གཉིས་ཀི་ཞབས་བང་ལྷ་སྐུར་དཔལ་མགོན་བམ་ཟེ།

དཔལ་ལན་ལྷ་མོ།

དམ་ཅན།

བཀྲ་ཤིས་ཚེ་རིང་མ་བཅས་འཁོད་འདུག

འོན་ཀང་མཇུག་གི་ཤོག་ལྷེ་

གཅིག་གི་ནང་དོན་གོང་དང་གཅིག་མཚུངས་ཡིན་ཡང་ལེབ་གངས་བཀོད་མེད་པར་རང་སོར་བཞག་འདུག

གོང་འོག་ཡིག

གཟུགས་ལ་བརྟགས་ན་དེ་ནི་རྣམ་ཐར་གོང་དང་ཡིག་མཁན་གཅིག་ཡིན་འདུག་ཀང་།

ཕིས་སུ་ཞབས་བང་ལྷ་སྐུ་གསར་སྣོན་བས་པའི་ཤོག་ལྷེ་དེས་བརེས་ཡོད་པར་རྟོགས་ཐུབ།

རྣམ་ཐར་སྨད་ཆ

《བཀའ་ཟུར་ཟུར་ཁང་པ་བོ་བཟང་ཆོས་འབོར་བསྟན་འཛིན་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་རྣམ་ཐར་སྨད་ཆ་སོབ་བུ་རོ་བཙུན་འཇམ་དབངས་ལ་བསྟོད་པ་དད་པའི་གེ་གསར་མངོན་པར་འཛུམ་པའི་པད་དཀར་ཆུན་འཕངས།》ཞེས་པ་ཤོ་ལོ་ཀ་བཅུ་དྲུག་ཅན་གི་ཤོག་ལྷེ་གསུམ་ཞིག་བསྣན་ཡོད།

དེའི་གོང་གི་ཤོ་ལོ་ཀ་བརྒྱད་ནི་ཟུར་སས་པདྨ་དབང་ཆེན(1917-1940)གིས 1940ལོར་བིས་པ་དང་། ལོ་དེར་ཁོ་རང་གཤེགས་རེས་དབང་ཆེན་ཚེ་བརྟན(1891-1953)གི་མཇུག་གི་ཤོ་ལོ་ཀ་བརྒྱད་དེ་ཁ་སྐོང་བས་ཡོད།

①རྣམ་ཐར་མ་དཔེ་སྨད་ཆ།
རྣམ་ཐར་འདིར་འཁོད་པར་གཞིགས་ན། ཟུར་ཁང་མི་རྒྱུད་ནི་ལྷ་བ་མ་བང་ཆུབ་འོད་ནས་ཉེ་བར་བརྒྱུད་པའི་མངའ་རིས་གུ་ཁེ་ཆོས་རྒྱལ་གི་རིགས་ལས་ཟུར་དུ་ཆད་པས་ན་འཕེང་སོ་ཟུར་ཁང་པ་ཞེས་མིང་དུ་ཆགས་ཟེར་བ་དང་། འདོད་ཀི་ཚུལ་དུ་སྨརས་པ་ཡིན་ནམ་ཡང་ན་དངོས་སུ་དེའི་མཆེད་རྒྱུད་ཡིན་མིན་བཤད་པར་དཀའ། ལེགས་པའི་མིང་ཡང་བཤད་ཚུལ་གཞན་ཞིག་ལ་ལྷ་སའི་ཟུར་ཁང་གཟིམས་ཤག་ནི་བར་སྐོར་ཤར་ལྷོའི་མཚམས་སུ་ཡོད་པས་ན་ཟུར་ཁང་ཞེས་མིང་ཐོགས་སོ་ཟེར། 1993ལོར་བར་སྐོར་གི་ཁང་པ་དེ་བཤིགས་ནས་གསེར་ཁང་ཁོམ་རབྲག་གསེར་ཁང་ཞེས་པའི་མིང་ཡངསྐབས་དེའི་ཟུར་ཁང་གི་ས་ཟུར་འཛིན་ཡོད་སྐད། དེའི་ཤར་ངོས་ཀི་བརིགས་པའི་མཚམས་སུ་ལོ་མོ་ལོ་གོན་མའི་སཙྣ་ཁང་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ད་ལྟ་ཡང་མཇལ་རྒྱུ་ཡོད། འདོད་ཀི་ཚུལ་དུ་སྨད་པ་ཡིན་ནམ་ཡང་ན་དངོས་སུ་དེའི་མཆེད་རྒྱུད་ཡིན་མིན་བཤད་པར་དཀའ། ①

དེ་ནི་ཆེའདོད་ཀི་ཚུལ་དུ་སྨད་པ་ཡིན་ནམ་ཡང་ན་དངོས་སུ་དེའི་མཆེད་རྒྱུད་ཡིན་མིན་བཤད་པར་དཀའ། ②

ཡི་གེའི་ནང་དུ་འཁོད་པ་ལྟར། ཟུར་ཁུང་གུ་ཡང་ཁ་ཤ་ཁ་ཟེར་བ་ཞིག་ཕོ་ལྷ་ཐའི་ཇི་དང་བཱ་རིང་ཐའི་ཇི། མདོ་མཁར་བ། འབུམ་ཐང་པ་དང་མཉམ་དུ་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལྷ་བཟང་ཧན་གི་བཀའ་མངགས་འོག་བོད་འབྲུག་དམག་འཁྲུག

1. 毕戴克著，沈卫荣、宋黎明译，邓瑞玲校：《1728-1959 西藏的贵族和政府》，中国藏学出版社，1990（12），第二章注释608条，152页。
2. 1714ལོའི་བོད་འབྲུག་དམག་འཁྲུག ③
3. འདོད། འབྲུག་དམགདེག རྒྱལ་པོ། འབྲུག་དམགདེག རྒྱལ་པོ། འབྲུག་དམགདེག རྒྱལ་པོ། ④
4. འབྲུག་དམགདེག ⑤
5. 毕戴克著，沈卫荣、宋黎明译，邓瑞玲校：《1728-1959 西藏的贵族和政府》，中国藏学出版社，1990（12），第二章注释608条，152页。
ཟུར་ཁང་གུ་ཡང་ཁ་ཤ་ཁའི་མིང་ཐེངས་གཅིག་ལས་མི་གསལ།

དེར་བརྟེན།  སྐབས་དེར་རིམ་པ་དམའ་བའི་འགོ་པ་ཞིག་ཡིན་

ཤས་ཆེ།

དེ་ཕུད་ཟུར་ཁང་པའི་རབ་བྱུང་བ་ཞིག་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་ལེ་བ་ཆེན་མོའི་མགོན་གཉེར་མི་ཐོབ་པ་དང་ཁུར་མཛད་དེ་མཁར་ཐོག་སས་མོ་ཚེ་དབང་

ལྷ་མོ་ཞེས་པ་ཁབ་ཏུ་བཞེས་ནས་སི་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་གི་ཡབ་ལྷ་རྒྱལ་རབ་བརྟན་འཁྲུངས།

①

སི་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་གི་ཡུམ་གི་མཚན་ལ་བསོད་ནམས་དཔལ་འཛོམ་ཞུ་ཞིང་།

ཡོང་ཁུངས་ནི་མཁས་པ་ཡེ་བཟང་རེ་

②

ཉེ་ བརྒྱུད་རེ་མཆོད་མཆོད་དཔོན་ངག་དབང་ཤེས་རབ་བ་བ་ནས་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་ལེ་བ་ཆེན་པོ་རང་ཉིད་ས་ཚ་འདུག་

སའི་བསྟི་གནས་ཤིག་གསར་དུ་བསྐྲུན་འདོད་ཀི་རེ་ཞུ་ལྟར་བཀའ་འཁོལ་དང་རབ་གནས་ཐོབ་པའི་ཁེ་གསུམ་གཞིས་ཀ་ནས་

ཡིན་པ་དང་།

③

རྣམ་ཐར་ནང་ཡུམ་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་སོག་རིགས་འདེས་ཚུལ་འཁོད་ཡོད་ཅིང་།

གོང་མ་ཁཱང་ཞི་སྐབས་སོག་པོའི་ཅང་

ཇུན་ཆེན་མོ་ཨེ་བུས་པ་ལི(额驸阿宝)

④

ཡར་ངང་དུ་གནས་སྐོར་ལ་སོད་སྐབས་ཁེ་གསུམ་པའི་བུ་མོ་ཕུན་ཚོགས་སོལ་མ་

དང་བཟའ་ཚོར་གྱར་ནས་སས་མོ་རྡོ་རེ་རྒྱལ་མོ་འཁྲུངས།

དེ་དང་ཕིས་སུ་རི་བོ་ཆོས་གིང་གི་གྲྭ་པ་བོ་བཟང་འཕིན་ལས་མཐུན་

རེས་སི་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་གི་ཡུམ་བསོད་ནམས་དཔལ་འཛོམས་སོགས་འཁྲུངས།

འོན་ཀང་སྐབས་དེར་ཁེ་གསུམ་པར་གཞིས་

འཛིན་སེས་པའི་རིགས་མེད་རེན་ཟུར་ཁང་པ་དང་གཉེན་སིག་རེས་གཞིས་ཀ་གཉིས་གཅིག་ལོགས་སུ་གཉེར།

⑤

① རྣམ་ཐར་མ་དཔེ་སྨད་ཆ། 7

② (1392-1481) ཨོོ་ོོོ་ོོོ་ོོོ་ རྡོ་རེ་རྒྱལ་མོ་འཁྲུངས།

③ རྣམ་ཐར་མ་དཔེ་སྟོད་ཆ། 8

④ ཆིང་གོང་མ་ཆེན་མོ་ཁཱང་ཞི་མཆོག་ནས 1721 ཡོང་ཁུངས་ནི་མཁས་པ་ཡེ་བཟང་རེ་

(策旺诺尔布) ཨོོོོོོོོ༔ རྡོ་རེ་དང་ཡུམ་སི་ཐར་སིད་

གཉིས་ཀི་སས་སུ་སྐུ་འཁྲུངས།

⑤ རྣམ་ཐར་མ་དཔེ་སྟོད་ཆ། 9

① རྣམ་ཐར་མ་དཔེ་སྟོད་ཆ། 10, 11
ཟུར་ཁང་གི་ཁྱིམ་གཞིས་འཕེང་སོ་དགའ་ལན་གཞིས་ཀའི་ཆགས་ཡུལ་ནི་དེང་དུས་སྣིད་རོང་འཕེང་སོ་ཤང་
འཕེང་སོ་གོང་ཚོར་ཡིན།
ད་ཆ་ཟུར་ཁང་གཞིས་ཀའི་ཤུལ་ཙམ་ཡང་བསད་མེད་ལ།
ཡུལ་མི་རྣམས་ཀིས་ཕལ་ཆེར་ས་ཚོད་བེད་
རྒྱུ་ལས་མ་འདས།
ཁེ་གསུམ་གཞིས་ཀའི་ཆགས་ཡུལ་ནི་སྣེ་གདོང་རོང་ཁ་འབྲུག་གོང་བརྡལ་ཁེ་གསུམ་གོང་ཚོའི་མི་དམངས
ཐང་ཆེན་དུ་ཡིན།
ཁེ་གསུམ་གོང་ཚོར་བོད་ཀི་དམངས་གཙོ་བཅོས་བསྒྱུར་གོང་ཚོ་དང་པོ་བ་བའི་འགེམ་སྟོན་ཁང་ཞིག
བཙུགས་ཡོད་པ་དང་།
དེའི་རྒྱབ་ལོགས་སུ་སྔར་གི་གཞིས་ཀའི་གང་ཤུལ་ཁ་ཤས་ཀང་ད་ཆ་མཐོང་རྒྱུ་ཡོད།

རྒྱལ་མཆོག་ལྔ་པའི་སྐབས་ཀི་ཟུར་ཁང་གུ་ཡང་ཁ་ཤ་ཁ་ནས་ཟུར་ཁང་དབང་ཆེན་དགེ་ལེགས་བར་བརིས་པའི་ལོ་
ངོ
245ཡི་ནང་ཟུར་ཁང་ཁྱིམ་རྒྱུད་ཀིས་གཞུང་སའི་ཞབས་པད་ཤ་སྟག་བགིས་ཡོད་ལ།
པཱ་ཐེ་ཁེ་ཡི་ཞིབ་འཇུག་ལྟར་གཞིགས་ན་
ཁྱིམ་རྒྱུད་ནང་བཀའ་བོན་གི་གོ་ས་ཐོབ་པའི་མི་སྣ་བཞི་བྱུང་ཡོད།
ཟུར་ཁང་ཚེ་བརྟན་རྡོ་རེ། (1766-1820)
དང་།
ཟུར་ཁང་བསོད་ནམས་དབང་ཆེན། (?-1844)
ཟུར་ཁང་དབང་ཆེན་དགེ་ལེགས། (1910-1977)

གཟུགས་ཟུར་ཁང་བསོད་ནམས།

(1) སྐད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཟུར་ཁང་བསོད་ནམས། 1829-1832 ིི་ལོག 11 བོད་རང་སོང་ལོངས་པ་བསྟོད་པ་གཉིས་པའི་སྐད་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ལྟེ་བུ། 1918 ིི་ལོག 1829 ིི་ལོག 1832 ིི་ལོག 11 བོད་རང་སོང་ལོངས་པ་བསྟོད་པའི་སྐད་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ལྟེ་བུ། 1829 ིི་ལོག 1832 ིི་ལོག 11 བོད་རང་སོང་ལོངས་པ་བསྟོད་པའི་
(2) སྐད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཟུར་ཁང་བསོད་ནམས། 1893 ིི་ལོག 2016 ིི་ལོག 260
(3) སྐད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཟུར་ཁང་བསོད་ནམས། 1943 ིི་ལོག 2016 ིི་ལོག 260

(1) སྐད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཟུར་ཁང་བསོད་ནམས། 1829-1832 ིི་ལོག 11 བོད་རང་སོང་ལོངས་པ་བསྟོད་པ་གཉིས་པའི་སྐད་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ལྟེ་བུ། 1918 ིི་ལོག 1829 ིི་ལོག 1832 ིི་ལོག 11 བོད་རང་སོང་ལོངས་པ་བསྟོད་པའི་སྐད་ཀྱི་ཐོག་ལྟེ་བུ། 1829 ིི་ལོག 1832 ིི་ལོག 11 བོད་རང་སོང་ལོངས་པ་བསྟོད་པའི་
(2) སྐད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཟུར་ཁང་བསོད་ནམས། 1893 ིི་ལོག 2016 ིི་ལོག 260
(3) སྐད་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་ཟུར་ཁང་བསོད་ནམས། 1943 ིི་ལོག 2016 ིི་ལོག 260

1943 ིི་ལོག 2016 ིི་ལོག 260
ལུའུ་སི་ཡི་ནོ་པཱ་ཐེ་ཁེ (Luciano Petech, 1914-2010) ཇི་ཁྱབ་གྱུར་ངན་ཤེས་པའི་སྐོར་རྩ་ཆེའི་དབང་ཆེན་དགེ་ལེགས་ཀིས་ ལེགས་ཀིས་སྐུ་དག་ཞིབ་འཇུག་ནང་སི་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་གི་ལོ་རང་གུ་རབ་རིབ་ཙམ་ལས་འཁོད་མེད། ① ད་དུང་ཁོང་གིས་སིད་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་གི་མིང་ནི་དབང་ཆེན་དགེ་ལེགས་ཀིས་ ལས་པའི་ཡི་གེའི་ནང་མ་གཏོགས་ད་ཡོད་དཔྱད་གཞིའི་ནང་མ་མཇལ་ཞེས་སྨྲས་ཡོད། འོན་ཀང་རྣམ་ཐར་འདིར་གསལ་བར། ཟུར་ཁང་སི་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་ནི 1766ལོར་བལྟམས་པ་དང་། ལོ་བརྒྱད་དགུར་སོན་སྐབས་ལྷ་ལན་དུ་ཁེ་གསུམ་པའི་དྲུང་ཡིག་ཚེ་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོགས་དགེ་རྒན་ལ་བསྟེན། ལོ་བཅུ་བདུན་སྐབས་ཤག་བང་བུ་མོ་བརྒྱ་བིན་མདུན་ཐབས་སུ་བསུས། ཐོག་མར་གཞུང་སར་བཞུགས་རེས་རོང་ཁག་ལ་ཁལ་སྡུད་བཀར་རྒྱའི་ལས་ཀར་བསོད། ས་སེལ(1788)ལོར་འཕོངས་རྒྱས་འཕིང་བ་སྟག་རེའི་ཡོང་སྡུད་དུ་བསོད། ས་བ 1789ལོའི་ཟླ་བཅུ་པའི་ནང་བོད་བཞུགས་ཨམ་བན་གི་བཀའ་བཞིན་བག་གཡབ་དུ་གོང་མའི་དངུལ་དོས་གཡོར་ཆེན་པོའི་གདོང་བསུར་བསོད། བས་སེལ(1790)ལོར་འཕོངས་རྒྱས་འཕིང་བ་སྟག ② 1794ལོ་རང་འབྲི་དཔོན་གི་གོ་སར་གནས་འཕར་བྱུང་། ལགས་བ་ལོར (1802) རུ་དཔོན་གི་གནས་འཕར་ཏེ་དྲུང་དག་གི་དས་སུ་ཚུད། འདིར་ཞུ་དགོས་པ་ཞིག་ལ་སི་བཅོད་ཚེ་བརྟན་བཅོ་ཆེན་ཁི་བཞུགས་བདུན་པའི་ཟླ་གཉིས་པའི ③ 1797ལོ་ཆུང་སུ་སྐལ་བཟང་རབ་བརྟན་མཆོག་ནས་དཀའ་ཤག་མགོན་གཉེར་གི་གོ་ས་ཞུ་རིས་བས་ཀང་། ཆོས་སོང་མདུན་དུ་མོ་ལུང་ཞུས་པ་ལྟར་དམག་གི་འགོ་བེད་ལས་སྣེར་ཞུགས། བདེ་རེས་ལགས་སེལ་ལོར (1800)བརྒྱ་དཔོན་གི་གོ་སར་གནས་འཕར་བྱུང་། ཞོལ་བཟང(1802)ནུབ་ཡུལ་ བིསྟོན་ནས་ཅི་དྲུང་གི་དུས་པའི་ཟླ་གཉིས་པར་འཁོད་ཡོད། ① ② ③。
བསྐོས། ① བསྐོས་ཆེན་ཁི་ལོར་བཅུ་དྲུག་སྐབས་རྟ་ཚག་ཧོ་ཐོག་ཐུ་དགོངས་པ་རོགས་རེས་རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ཏུ་བསྐོས།

1804 སྨོན་ཚིགས་ལོ་དེའི་ཟླ་བ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ནང་བཞུགས་ཁིན་ལོ་དེའི་ཟླ་བ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ནང་བཞུགས་ཁིན་ བཀའ་བོན་གི་གོ་ས་ཐོབ། ལོ་དེའི་ཟླ་བ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ནང་བཞུགས་ཁིན་ལོ་དེའི་ཟླ་བ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ནང་བཞུགས་ཁིན་

སྐུ་ཞབས་ཁི་སྨོན་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།

མཆོག་སྤྲུལ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།

སེམས་དཔའ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་བོ་བཟང་བཤེས་གཉེན་གགས་པ།

དངོས་སིང་མཚམས་པ་ཀུན་དགའ་ཚེ་མགོན།

ཚངས་སོད་དགེ་བསྙེན་རྡོ་རེ་རྣམ་རྒྱལ།

འབྲུག་སོན་བསྟན་འཛིན་འབྲུག་རྒྱལ་སོགས་དང་།

བོད་རང་སོང་ལོངས་ཡིག་ཚགས་ཁང་གིས་བསིགས།

1808 དེའི་དག་ནི་ཞབས་དཀར་ཚོགས་དྲུག་རང་གོལ་དང་ཀློང་རྡོལ་བ་མ་ངག་དབང་བོ་བཟང་།

2016(11)ཤོག་ངོས།

② ཁམ་མ་ཧོ་ཐོག་ཐུ་སྐུ་ཕེང་བདུན་པ་ངག་དབང་བོ་བཟང་ཐུབ་བསྟན་འཇིགས་མེད་རྒྱ་མཚོ(177-18819)དེ་དག་ནི་ཞབས་དཀར་ཚོགས་དྲུག་རང་གོལ་དང་ཀློང་རྡོལ་བ་མ་ངག་དབང་བོ་བཟང་།

20180808 0800 སྨོན་ཚིགས་ལོ་དེའི་ཟླ་བ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ནང་བཞུགས་ཁིན་ལོ་དེའི་ཟླ་བ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ནང་བཞུགས་ཁིན་

བོད་ལོངས་མི་དམངས་དཔེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་།

2016(11)ཤོག་ངོས།

③ བསྐོས་ཆེན་ཁི་ལོར་བཅུ་དྲུག་སྐབས་རྟ་ཚག་ཧོ་ཐོག་ཐུ་དགོངས་པ་རོགས་རེས་རྒྱལ་ཚབ་ཏུ་བསྐོས།
དེ་མིན་རྒྱལ་མཆོག་སྐུ་ཕེང་བརྒྱད་པ་དང་པན་ཆེན་སྐུ་ཕེང་དྲུག་པ།

dེ་མོ་ཧོ་ཐོག་ཐུ་བཅས་ཀི་གམ་ནས་ཞར་ཞོར་ལ་ཆོས་ཀི་བཀའ་སོབ་ཞུས་ཡོད།

dེའི་ནང་ནས་པན་ཆེན་སྐུ་ཕེང་དྲུག་པར་བསྟོད་བསྔགས་ཡང་ཡང་ཕུལ་ཡོད་དེ།

ཆོས་དང་འཇིག་རྟེན་གང་ལའང་སན་རས་ཀི་གཟིགས་པ་ཡངས་ཤིང་།

སྐུ་འད་དང་རོལ་ཆའི་རིགས།

གོས་དར།

dག་ཆས།

རྟ་དང་སོག་ཆགས་ཀི་རིགས་ཚང་མའི་དཔྱད་པ་ལ་ཤིན་ཏུ་ནས་ཐུགས་སུ་མངའ་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་འདུག

ཅེས་པ་དང་།

རྣམ་ཐར་མ་དཔེ་སྨད་ཆ།

ཤོག་ངོས།

82

②“དཎྡའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་རྒྱ་མཚོར་བཞུགས་པ་ལ། དངོས་སང་ཐེག་ཆེན་གྲུ་གཟིངས་ཁྱེད་ཙམ་དཀོན། འཁོད་པར།

③ ཞེས་རྡོ་རིང་པཎི་ཏའི་ཟབ་ཡངས་ཡོན་ཏན་ལ་མངོན་པར་བསྟོད་ཡོད།

དེ་ནི་སྐབས་དེའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་དོན་རེན་གནད་འགག་ཆེ་བ་འགའ།

① ལྟོག་པའི་དུས་སྤྱོད་ཤེས་62

② ལྟོག་པའི་དུས་སྤྱོད་ཤེས་(1760-1806)བཤད་པའི་དུས་སྤྱོད་ཤེས་1808ལའི་དུས་སྤྱོད་ཤེས་(1760-1806)བཤད་པའི་དུས་སྤྱོད་ཤེས་བཤད་པའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་རྒྱ་མཚོར་བཞུགས་པ་ལ། དངོས་སང་ཐེག་ཆེན་གྲུ་གཟིངས་ཁྱེད་ཙམ་དཀོན།

③ ལྟོག་པའི་དུས་སྤྱོད་ཤེས་58-59

④ ལྟོག་པའི་དུས་སྤྱོད་ཤེས་58-59

[意] 毕戴克 著，沈卫荣、宋黎明译，邓瑞玲校 《1728-1959 西藏的贵族和政府》中国藏学出版社 1990(12)，49页。引自《九世达赖传》，103b, 107b页。
1. རྒྱལ་དབང་སྐུ་ཕེང་བརྒྱད་པ་ཞིང་ལ་ཕེབས་པའི་གནས་ཚུལ་དང་སྐུ་གདུང་གི་རེས་འཇུག་སྟེ། ཐོག་མར་རྒྱལ་
དབང་ཉིད་ཆམ་ནད་ཕོག་སྟེ་བཀའ་བོན་ཟུར་ཁང་དང་བཅས་འཚམས་ཞུར་བསོད།
དེ་རེས་ཤིང་བ་ལོ་སྟེ་1804ལོའི་ཟླ10པའི་ཚེས18ཉིན་དངོས་སུ་དགོངས་པ་རོགས།
དེ་ནས་རིམ་གོ་རྒྱ་ཆེར་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཕུད།
སྐུ་གདུང་རིལ་པོར་བཞུགས་པའམ་ཞུགས་འབུལ་
གི་ཐད་ཐག་མ་ཆོད་པར་གོས་གེང་མང་ཙམ་བྱུང་བ་མ་ཟད།
དཔལ་ལན་ལྷ་མོའི་མདུན་དུ་ཐུགས་རྟགས་ཞུ་རིས་བས་ཀང་།
མཐར་སེ་འབས་ཀི་དགོངས་འདོད་ལྟར་སྐུ་གདུང་རིལ་པོར་བཞུགས།
འདི་ནས་རྟོགས་ཐུབ་པ་ཞིག་ལ།
སྐབས་དེར་རྒྱལ་དབང་
མཆོག་གི་སྐུ་གདུང་རེས་འཇུག་ཐད་རིལ་པོར་བཞུགས་པའམ་ཞུགས་འབུལ་
གི་ཐད་གཏན་འཇགས་ལམ་ལུགས་ཆགས་མེད་
པར་སྣང་།
2. རྒྱལ་ཚབ་སིད་སོང་ཐད་རྟ་ཚགས་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་བསྐོས་ཡོད་པ་སྟེ། སྔར་དུས་ལོ་ངོ་བཅུ་བཞི་ཙམ་
གི་སིད་སོང་ཉམས་མོང་ཡོད་རེན་བཀའ་བོན་རྣམས་ཀི་རེ་ཞུ་ལྟར། གོང་མའི་བཀའ་ལུང་
འབོར་ནས་རྟ་ཚགས་སྐུ་ཕེང་བརྒྱད་པ་ཡེ་ཤེས་བོ་བཟང་
བསྟན་པའི་མགོན་པོར(1759-1810)ཆོས་སིད་ཀི་འགན་སྩལ།
དེའི་རིང་གོས་ཥས་འབས་ལོངས་སུ་བཙན་འཛུལ་
བས་པ་
རྣམ་ཐར་ནང་ཅུང་ཙམ་གསལ།
དེ་རེས 1810ལོའི་ཟླ12པའི་ཚེས30ཉིན་རྟ་ཚགས་རིན་པོ་ཆེ་
དགོངས་པ་རོགས།
དེ 1811ལོའི་ཟླ3པའི་ཚེས16ཉིན་རྟ་ཚགས་
པོང་པོ་་བཏོང་བུའི་ཞུས་ཤུགས་
མེ་ལ་མི་མཚོང་བ་
3. ངི་ག་བཟང་ཆ་ཚིགས་སུ་ཐོད་དུ་(1805-1815)ནི་ཐེན་ཆེད་ཀྱི་ཡམ་གུན་ལྡན་དང་
དེར་
ཞེས་བ་ལྟ་བུ་ལས། སྐབས་དེའི་ཨམ་བན་

d) 4. དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་
དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་དུ་དེ་
“བོ་བོ་བོ་བོ་བོ་བོ་བོ་

d) 42
དང་བམས་བརེའི་རང་བཞིན་གིས་བཀའ་བོན་གི་ཡིད་སེམས་འགུལ་བར་གྱུར་ཞིང་།

ལྔཔཀའ་བོན་ཁོང་ཉིན་ལྟར་ཁ་ཆེའི་བ་མའི་དྲུང་དུ་ཕིན་ཏེ་རྒྱ་གར་གི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཁྱད་མཚར་བའི་རིགས་ལ་ཉན་པ་དང་།

ཁ་ཆེའི་བ་མས་འཁོར་བའི་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་མེ་ཏོག་དང་འད།

སེམས་ཉིད་འདི་མེ་ཏོག་གི་དི་མ་དང་འད་ཞེས་མི་རྟག་པའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་བཤད་པས།

རང་རེའི་ནང་ཆོས་ཀི་ལྟ་བ་དང་མཚུངས་ཤས་ཆེ་བ་མཐོང་ནས་བཀའ་བོན་ལ་དད་སྣང་སེས་ཏེ།

1. རོམ་པ་པོས་བཟའ་བཏུང་སྟོན་མོའི་ལུགས་སོལ་ཐད་རང་རེ་བོད་དང་བསྡུར་ནས་སེར་ངོས་ཀི་བག་ཆགས་རྣམས་ཇི་བཞིན་སོང་པོར་བིས་འདུག་སྟེ། དུས་ད་ལྟའང་ཕན་ལྟ་བུཪ་དེ་ནི་ཅི་མི་བདེན་ཨང་སྙམ་པའི་ཡིད་རྟོན་འཕེལ་བའི་གནས་སོ།

ཁ་ཆེའི་མགོན་འབོད་སྐབས་སུ་འདི་ལྟར་འཁོད་འདུག་སྟེ། བཀའ་བོན་ཁོང་ཉིན་ལྟར་ཁ་ཆེའི་བ་མའི་དྲུང་དུ་ཕིན་ཏེ་ཁོ་ཚོ་ནི་བཟའ་བཏུང་དུས་ཚོད་ལ་བསྟུན་པ་ལས་རང་རེ་བོད་ལུགས་ལྟ་བུར་མངར་སྐྱུར་སྣ་ཚོགས་འཕོ་བར་མི་འཇུ་བར་ནན་ཏན་ཆེན་པོས་ཨུ་ཚུགས་བེད་པ་སོགས་གཏན་ནས་མེད་པས།

ཁ་ཆེའི་མགོན་འབོད་སྐབས་སུ་འདི་ལྟར་འཁོད་འདུག་སྟེ། བཀའ་བོན་ཡ་མཚན་སེས་ནས་ཁྱེད་རང་ཁ་འདོན་ཡང་མི་བེད།

འ་ཐོག་ངོས། 114

① རྣམ་ཐར་མ་དཔེ་སྨད་ཆ།
དངོས་ཡོད་དངོས་མེད་ཅི་ཞིག་ལ་ངོས་འཛིན་བེད་དགོས་པར་སྐད་ཆ་དིས། ①

དེ་རེས་ཁ་ཆེའི་བ་མས་ཆོས་ཟབ་པ་མང་པོ་ཁ་

ནས་ཤོད་མི་ཤེས་ཀང་ང་ཚོར་སྒྲུང་འདི་འད་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཅེས་ཚོང་པ་དང་ནེའུ་ཙོའི་སྒྲུང་ཞིག་བཤད་ཡོད།

①

དེ་ནི་པར་སིག་གི་སྙན་ངག་པ་གགས་ཅན་འཇཱ་ལར་ཨ་ཏ་ཏིང་རུའུ་སྨི (Jalāl ad-Dīn Rūmī, 1207-1273) ཛྷུམ་ཐོག་ལོ་ཐོག་《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ ལི》(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི》(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི》(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ས་ནཱ་ལི།(Masnavi) ལོ་གླིང་སོགས་གི་སྟེ། གི་སྙན་ངག་སྒྲུང་རོམ《མཱ་ altro 115

②
རང་རེའི་བོད་ལ་རྒྱ་གར་གི་སེས་རབས་རོམ་རིག་དང་རྟོགས་བརོད་རོམ་རིག་གི་ཤན་ཞུགས་ཆེ་ཞིང་། སི་ལོའི་དུས་རབས་བཅུ་གཅིག་ཙམ་ནས་རྣམ་ཐར་འབི་བའི་རྒྱུན་དར་ཡོད་ལ།

①
dགེ་ནས་དགའ་ལན་ཕོ་བང་སྐབས་ས་བོ་གཞུང་ཞབས་པའི་རྟོགས་བརོད་འབི་སོལ་དར་ཡོད།

ད་ལམ་ཡོངས་གགས་སུ་མཇལ་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་པ་ནི་མདོ་མཁར་ཞབས་དྲུང་ཚེ་རིང་དབང་རྒྱལ(1697-1763) དེ《མི་དབང་རྟོགས་བརོད》དང《བཀའ་བོན་རྟོགས་བརོད།》དོར་རིང་བསྟན་འཛིན་དཔལ་འབོར(1760-?)དེ《དགའ་བཞི་བའི་བྱུང་བ་བརོད་པ་ཟོལ་མེད་གཏམ་གི་རོལ་མོ》ལས་མེད།

མདོ་མཁར་ཞབས་དྲུང་ཚེ་རིང་དབང་ནིས་ས་བོའི་རྟོགས་བརོད་ཀི་དང་པོར་གྱུར་ཡོད་ཅིང་། ཟུར་ཁང་དང་རྡོ་རིང་སོགས་ལ་ཤུགས་རེན་ཆེན་པོ་ཐེབས་ནས་རྣམ་ཐར་འབི་བའི་བོ་སོ་ཕེ་བ་ལྟ་བུར་སྣང་།

②

རྣམ་ཐར་ནང་ཟུར་ཁང་པས་བྱུང་བ་བརོད་པ་དང་རིགས་རུས་ཆོ་འབང་འབི་བའི་ཀུན་སོང་ནི་རང་གི་རིགས་ཀི་མྱུ་གུར་གྱུར་པ་རྣམས་ལ་འདི་དང་འདི་བགིས་སོ་ཞེས་ཕ་མེས་ཀི་བས་པ་བརོད་ན་སིར་མ་རབས་ངན་པའི་མིག་འགན་གིས་སད་མི་ནུས་ཤིང་།

ཁྱད་པར་དུའང་འདབ་ཆགས་ལྟུང་བར་སོད་པའི་འདེན་བེད་ཡར་འདེགས་སུ་གྱུར་པ་ཞིག་མི་འགྱུར་རམ་སྙམ་ནས་རགས་བསྡུས་སུ་བཀོད་ཅེས་པ་དང་།

གཞན་ཡང་། རང་ཅག་འཁོར་བ་པ་ཡི་ཀུན་རྟོག་ནི།

①

འཚོལ་ཞིབ་དང་གསར་གཏོད།

མདོ་མཁར་ཞབས་དྲུང་ཚེ་རིང་དབང་རྒྱལ་དང་ཁོང་གི་གསར་རོམ་གི་ཕག་རེས་སྐོར་གེང་བ།

2018(10) རོག་ངོས། 138

②

བོད་ལོངས་བོད་ཡིག་དཔེ་རིང་དཔེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་།

2013(2) རོག་ངོས། 7
འཛེམས་སྣང་གི་བརྟུལ་ཞུགས་བཟུང་ནས་བིས་ཡོད་ཅིང་།
སེར་མོ་བའི་རིག་གནས་རྔམས་ཁ་མཐུག་པའི་ཁོར་ཡུག་དེར་བཀའ་
བོན་གི་འཁུར་འཛིན་པའི་ས་བོ་རྣམས་ཀིས་རྣམ་ཐར་འབི་བར་ཟབ་ནན་ངང་བསྟུན་དགོས་པའི་ཆ་མང་པོ་ཡོད་པ་ཤེས་ཐུབ།
རྣམ་ཐར་ཁྱོན་ཡོངས་བཅད་ལྷུག་སྤེལ་མའི་ཐོག་ནས་བིས་ཡོད།
ལྷག་ཏུ་ཉམས་མགུར་དང་ཐོལ་བྱུང་འབོལ་རོམ།
མན ལ་བཤད་པ།
ཡིག་སྐུར་ནང་དོན་སོགས་འཁོད་པ་རྣམས་བརོད་བའི་དོན་ཟབ་ལ་རོད་བེད་ཚིག་སོར་བབ་ཆགས་པ་ཤ་སྟག་
སྣང་།
དེ་མིན་རྣམ་ཐར་ནང་གཞུང་ཆེན་མདོ་ལུང་ཕུད་《
སྙན་ངག་མེ་ལོང》《
ས་ས་ལེགས་བཤད》《
བཀའ་གདམས་ཕ་
ཆས་བུ་ཆོས》《
འབྲུག་སོན་ཀུན་དགའ་ལེགས་པའི་རྣམས་ཐར》《
མི་དབང་རྟོགས་བརོད》སོགས་ཀི་ནང་དོན་ལུང་
འདེན་བས་ཡོད།
དེ་ཐོག་ནས་བཀའ་བོན་ཉིད་གཞུང་ལུགས་མང་ལ་གསན་བསམ་ཡོད་པའི་རིག་གཞུང་རྒྱབ་ལོངས་མངོན་
ཡོད་སྙམ།
ད་དུང་གེ་སར་རྟ་རྒྱུག་གི་དཔེ་ཆའི་མཇུག་འཕོ་ལུས་ཡོད་པ་ཞིག་བཀའ་བོན་རང་གིས་འཕོ་མཐུད་ནས་བརམས་
པའི་སྐོར་འཁོད་ཡོད།
དེ་ལས་བཀའ་བོན་གི་རོམ་རིག་སོ་སྣང་མཚོན་པར་མཟད།
དགུན་དུས་ཀི་བུང་བ་དང་ཟབ་མགུར་སྣ་
ཚོགས་ལེན་པའི་རྟོག་བཟོའི་རྣམ་པས།  འཆར་ཡན་གི་ཉམས་སྣང་མང་དུ་བརོད་པ་སོགས་རིག་གི་སྒྱུ་རལ་ལ་མི་དམན་
པའི་བང་པ་མཆིས།

དུས་རབས་བཅོ་བརྒྱད་ནས་
བཅུ་དགུའི་གཡས་གཡོན་དུ་ཆོས་སིད་ཟུང་འབེལ་གི་དམིགས་བསལ་རྒྱབ་ལོངས་འོག་ས་བོ་གཞུང་ཞབས་པའི་མི་ཚེའི་ནང་
ཆོས་ལུགས་ཉམས་ལེན་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་གལ་འགངས་ཆེ་བའི་གནས་བབ་ཟིན་ཡོད་ལ།
དུས་དེར་སེར་མོ་བས་འཇིག་རྟེན་སིད་དོན་
ལ་ཞུགས་པ་དང་།
ས་བོ་གཞུང་ཞབས་པས་ཆོས་ཕོགས་སི་ཞུ་དང་ཉམས་ལེན་ལེགས་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་སོགས་ཀི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ཡང་ལན།

འདོད་བར་སྐད་བཞིན་

དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པའི་མི་ཕྱོགས་པའི་གནས་
དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པའི་མི་ཕྱོགས་པའི་གནས་
དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པའི་མི་ཕྱོགས་པའི་གནས་
དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པའི་མི་ཕྱོགས་པའི་གནས་
དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པའི་མི་ཕྱོགས་པ་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་
དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པའི་མི་ཕྱོགས་པ་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་
དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པ་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་
དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པ་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་
དུས་པར་ཅི་མེད་པར་རབ་དང་སོགས་བཅུ་སྐད་བཞིན་པ་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་
དུས་བཞིན་ཐུབ་པ།

[1] སཱ་བོ་ཟླ་བཞིན་བརྒོད། སྐད་དགའ་འཁུར་འཛིན་འབོད་པ་ཞེ་བསྐྲིས་པ་བྱ།

[2] འོང་པོའི་དབྱིང་གནས་ཀི་གོ་རིམ་དེབ་ཐེར་རིན་ཆེན་ཕེང་བ་ཞེས་བ་བཞུགས་སོ།

[3] སི་ཁོན་མི་དམངས་དཔེ་ཞབས་དྲུང་ཚེ་རིང་དབང་རྒྱལ།

[4] མཐོ་མཁར་ཞབས་དྲུང་ཚེ་རིང་དབང་རྒྱལ་དང་ཁོང་གི་གསར་རོམ་གི་ཕག་རེས་སྐོར་གེང་བ།

[5] སུང་ཀྲོའོ་ལིན། རུའུ་སྨི་ཡི་སྙན་ངག་འདམས་བསྒྱུར།
དུས་རབས་༧-༩བའི་བར་གི་རྒྱལ་བློན་ཁིམ་རྒྱུད་ཀི་རུས་མིང་གི་བྱུང་འཕེལ་ལ་ཅུང་ཙམ་དཔྱད་པ།

བད་མ་དོན་གྲུབ།

ནང་དན་གན་

དཔྱད་རོམ་འདིར་བོད་མིའི་བླའི་འདུ་ཤེས་ཁོད་རུས་དང་མིང་གི་བྱུང་འཕེལ་བརོད་པ་དང་། སླར་ཡང་རུས་དང་མིང་དེ་ཚོ་བ་ག་གེ་མོ་ནས་མི་སེར་གི་མིང་དུ་གྱུར་ཚུལ། སོས་སུ་དུས་རབས་བདུན་པ་ནས་དགུ་པའི་བར་བོད་བཙན་པོའི་རྒྱལ་བློན་བཙུན་མོ་དག་གི་མིང་འདོགས་སྟངས་དང་། སྐབས་དེར་དགོས་པ་ག་འདྲ་ཞིག་གི་འོག་ཞང་སྐད་ཀི་མཚན་གསོལ་ཚུལ་སོགས་ལ་དཔྱད་པ་ཕྲན་ཙམ་བཏང་ཡོད།

མིའི་ཤེས་རིག་གོང་དུ་འཕེལ་བས་ཚོ་བ་དང་ཚོགས་པ་ལ་བརེན་ཏེ་རང་བྱུང་ཁམས་ཀི་འཇིག་པ་ལས་བགློད་པར་ཐུན་མློང་གི་སློབས་ཤུགས་འློག་རང་སྐྱ་འཕེལ་བའི་འཚོ་བ་རློལ་འགློ་ཚུགས།

དེ་ནས་རིམ་བཞིན་བཟའ་ཆས་འཚོལ་སྒྲུབ་སོགས་དངོས་ཡོད་འཚོ་བའི་དགོས་དབང་དང་། སི་ཚོགས་ཀི་ཐོན་སེད་གོང་དུ་འཕེལ་བས་མི་སེར་ཕན་ཚུན་གི་འབེལ་འདྲིས་ཆེ་རུ་ཕིན་ལ་སློ་སློར་ངོས་འཛིན་གི་མིང་རེ་བྱུང་པ་ཡིན། མིང་དེ་ནི་འདྲོད་རྒྱལ་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་པར་མིས་རང་བྱུང་ཁམས་ལ་བཟུང་པའི་འདུ་ཤེས་ཟབ་མློ་མཚོན་ཡོད།

དཔེར་ན་ཡོངས་གྲགས་ཀི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཡིག་ཚང་ཕལ་མོ་ཆེར་བྱུང་པའི་བོད་མིའུ་གདུང་དྲུག་སོགས་ཀི་རུས་ཆེན་ཁག་ནི་གདྲོལ་མའི་དད་མློས་དང་།

སྐབས་དེའི་རིག་གནས་ཀི་ངོས་འཛིན་ནམ། ཡང་ན་དེང་སྐབས་ཀི་རིག་གཞུང་ཞིབ་འཇུག་གི་ཁྱབ་ཁོངས་སུ་ངོས་འཛིན་བེད་
བཞིན་པའི་བླའི་དད་མོས་དང་འབེལ་བ་ཡོད། བླའི་དད་མོས་དེ་ནི་མིའི་རིགས་ཀིས་རང་བྱུང་ཁམས་ཀི་བ་དངོས་ཐ་དག་ལ་
ཤེས་རོགས་བེད་པའི་གོ་རིམ་ཁོད་བྱུང་པའི་གདོད་མའི་འདུ་ཤེས་འཛིན་སྟངས་ཁྱད་པར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ཏེ།

བླནི་གཉེན་ཉེ་དང་མེས་པློ། སྲུང་མ། རུས་རགས་བཅས་ཀི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅན

①ཡིན་ཞེས་འཛམ་གིང་ཤར་ནུབ་ཀི་རིག་པ་སྨྲ་བ་དག་གིས་
བཞེད་ཅིང་།

བླའི་དད་མོས་དང་དེ་འབེལ་གི་རིག་གནས་སྣང་ཚུལ་ནི་མིའི་རིགས་སིའི་རིག་གནས་ཁྱབ་ཁོངས་སུ་མཐོང་ཐུབ
པ་མ་ཟད། རིགས་རྒྱུད་སོ་སོའི་ཤེས་རིག་འཕེལ་བའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་སུ་ཐོག་མའི་མེས་པོ་དག་གིས་བླའི་དད་མོས་སམ་

dེ་འབེལ་གི་རིག་གནས་འདུ་ཤེས་ལ་བརེན་ནས་འཚོ་བའི་རྒྱུན་སིང་པ་ཡིན། ལྷག་ཏུ་

བློད་ལ་མཚོན་ནའང་མིའུ་གདུང་དྲུག་སོགས་ད་ལྟ་ངོས་

དུས་རིམ་འདིར་མིས་རང་

བྱུང་གི་གཟའ་སྐར་འཁློར་འགློས་ཀི

ནི་རྒྱུན་པར་སོག་ཆགས་ཀི་གཟུགས་སམ་ཁྱད་མཚར་

牟钟鉴《中国宗教通史》上卷【M】中国社会科学出版社, 2007 年 12 月第 1 版，第 23 页。
འབོང་བུ་ཚེ་རིང་རེ། ཆོས་ལུགས་དར་འཕེལ་བྱུང་བའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་སི་དོན། 【M】 བཟུང་། མི་རིགས་དཔེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་། 2010ལོ། ཤོག་ངོས 232


གཉིས་རུས་རྒྱུད་ཚོ་བའི་མིང་ནས་སེར་གི་མིང་དུ་འཕོ་འགྱུར་བྱུང་ཚུལ

དེ་ཡང་ས་དུས་སུའི་དགློས་དབང་གིས་མཉམ་དུ་ཐློན་སྐྱེད་བེད་པའི་རིགས་རྒྱུད་གཅིག་པའི་ནང་ཕན་ཚུན་འཐབ་འཛིང་དང་འཁྲུག་པ་མེད་ཕིར། ལྟ་ལྟ་བཀུར་བའི་བ་ཟོག་དེ་ཐུན་མོང་གི་མིང་དུ་བཀློལ་བ་ཡིན། བློ་ཟོག་མི་འད་བའི་ཚོགས་ཁག་ལ་འབོད་པའི་མིང་མི་འདྲ་བས་རུས་མི་གཅིག་པའི་འདུ་ཤེས་འཛིན་གིན་ཡོད། དེ་ནས་རིམ་བཞིན་སི་ཚོགས་ཐོན་སེད་གོང་དུ་འཕེལ་བ་དང་མི་སེར་གིས་ཐོན་སེད་བེད་འགོ་ཚུགས། དེར་བརེན་མི་སེར་སོ་སོར་དབང་པའི་མིང་གི་དགོས་པ་བྱུང་། རུས་རྒྱུད་དམ་ཚོགས་པའི་མིང་དེ་མི་སེར་གི་རུས་སུ་བཏགས་ཤིང་ཕིས་སུ་མིང་སྦར་བའི་སོལ་ཡང་བྱུང་། མིང་དང་རུས་གཉིས་གཅིག་ཏུ་སྦར་བའི་སོལ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་བློད་བཙན་པློའི་རྒྱལ་རབས་མ་འཇིག་པའི་བར་དུ་གནས་ཤིང་། དེའི་བར་ལ་བློད་མིས་གདུང་རུས་དེད་ནས་མིང་འདློགས་སོལ་ཡོད། བློད་སིལ་བར་ཐོར་རེས་ཡུལ་གྲུ་སློ་སློའི་ཡུལ་སློལ་གློམས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་མིང་འདློགས་ཚུལ་ཡང་སྣ་མང་ཕུན་སུམ་ཚོགས་པར་གྱུར། ལོང་རེའི་བློད་ལ་རིགས་རུས་ནན་ཏར་གཙིགས་ཆེ་བས་རུས་ཀི་བྱུང་བའང་ཤིན་ཏུ་གསལ་ཞིང་རུས་ཀི་ངོས་འཛིན་ནི་མིང་ལས་ལྷག དེ་ལྟར་རུས་ལ་མཚོན་ན། སིར་རུས་ཆེན་བཅློ་བརྒྱད་དུ་གགས་པ་བྱུང་ཞེས་བློད་ཀི་ཐློག་མའི་རིགས་རུས་མཆེད་ཁུངས་དང་རུས་ཀི་དབེ་བ་གསལ་ལ། རུས་ཆེན་དྲུག་དང་རུས་ཆེན་བཅོ་བརྒྱད་སོགས་ཀུན་ལ་བླ་རགས་དང་བླའི་མིང་གི་ངོས་འཛིན་བྱུང་ཡོད། འོན་ཀང་ཐུབ་པའི་བསྟན་པ་བོད་དུ་དར་བས་བོད་མིའི་རུས་མིང་གི་འདོགས་སྟངས་ལ་འཕོ་འགྱུར་ཆེན་པོ་བྱུང་ཡོད་དེ།

སར་གི་རུས་རགས་སམ་བླ་རགས་ཀི་མིང་དེ་ཆོས་མིང་གིས་ཚབ་བས་ཤིང་། ད་ཡོད་ཀི་ཆོས་འབྱུང་ལོ་རྒྱས་དང་གཏེར་མ།

གདན་རབས་དཀར་ཆག་སོགས་ཚད་ཐུབ་ཀི་དཔྱད་གཞི་ཁག་ཏུའང་མི་སྣ་གལ་ཆེན་དག་གི་མིང་ལ་རུས་ཆེན་ཁག་གི་མིང་སྦར་བ་ནི་རིམ་བཞིན་མི་སྣང་ངོ། །

བློད་མིའི་མིང་འདློགས་ལུགས་དུས་ནམ་ཞིག་ལ་བྱང་བ་མ་ངེས་མློད།

དབང་མཛད་བཅུ་གཉིས་དང་རྒྱལ་ཕན་སིལ་མའི་དུས་སུ་མིང་ཡློད་པ་གསལ་ཏེ།

མངའ་མཛད་བཅུ་གཉིས་ནི་མི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་པར་འབྱུང་པློ་ཡིན་ཞེས་ཆོས་འབྱུང་དག་ལ་གསལ་ཡང།

དློན་ལ་གདོད་མའི་དུས་ཀི་སྲུང་མའམ་བ་རུ་བཀུར་བ་དག་རེའི་མིང་དུ་ཐློགས་པ་ལ།

མིའི་མིང་ཡང་ལྷ་སིན་ནམ་བ་རུ་བཀུར་བ་དག་གི་མིང་ཟུར་ཆགས་ནས་བཏགས་པ་ཤེས།

དབང་མཛད་བཅུ་གཉིས་དང་རྒྱལ་ཕན་སིལ་མའི་

དུས་སུ་མིང་བྱུང་ཡློད་པ་ནི་གཉའ་ཁི་བཙན་པློའི་རིགས་རུས་མཆེད་ཁུངས་ལས་ཀང་ཅུང་ཙམ་རློགས་ནུས་ཏེ།

གཉའ་ཁི་བཙན་པློའི་མཚན་ལ་"འློ་ལྡེ་སྤུ་རྒྱལ"ཞེས་《བཀའ་ཆེན་བཀའ་ཁློལ་མ》རུབྱང་། "བྱུང་ཞེས་པའི་ཁྲོ་བ་འདིས།

གཙོ་བོ་འདི་ཁོ་ན་ཟན་དྲོད་མི་ཉིད་ཐུབ་པའི་ཕྲག་ལུགས་ལས་ཀང་ཅུང་ཙམ་རློགས་ནུས།

སྤོན་པ་འདི་བརྟན་འབྲིན་བཞི་རྒྱལ་ཀྱི་ཁྲག་ཡི་རྒྱལ་ཁྱོ་ལྡོ་དུས་ནམ་བ་བཙན་པློ་རིམ་བློན་ལ་སྐུ་གཤེན་རེ་ཡློད་ཅིང་།

གཉའ་ཁི་བཙན་པློ་སྐུ་འཁྲུངས་པའི་ཚེ་སྐུ་གཤེན་གིས་ཁྲུས་གསློལ་ཞིང་ཞང་སྐད་ཀི་མཚན་གསློལ་བ་ཡིན།

དེ་ལ་དགློས་པ་དང་ལློ་རྒྱུས་ཀི་རྒྱ་རྐྱེན་ངེས་ཅན་ཞིག་ཡློད་པས་ལེའུ་རེས་མར་ཞིབ་པར་དཔྱད་དློ།

དུས་རབས་བདུན་པ་ནས་དགུ་བར་བློད་བཙན་པློའི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་དར་རྒྱས་ཡང་རེར་སློན་ཞིང་།

ཆབ་སིད་དཔུང་སློབས་དང་རྒྱལ་ཁམས་རྒྱ་བསྐྱེད་པའི་གནས་ཚུལ་སོགས་ལ་གཞིགས་ཚེ་བན་གཡོག་སི་ཚོགས་ནས་བཀས་བཀློས་རྒྱུད་འཛིན་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་སི་ཚོགས་བར་བརྒལ་གི་དུས་རིམ་(དུང་དཀར་བློ་བཟང་འཕྲིན་ལས། 2000) 

དེ་མཚུངས་སུ་བློད་ཀི་བཙན་པློ་རིམ་བློན་དང་བློན་བཙུན་མློ་དག་གི་མཚན་ཁོད་དུ་འོ་དང་སྤུ།

བཙན། ཁི།སློགས་བྱུང་ཞིང་།

དེ་དག་གི་གློ་དློན་ཐད་མཁས་དབང་ནམ་མཁའི་ནློར་བུས་“གཉའ་ཁི་བཙན་པློའི་མཚན་གི་རྣམ་གངས་ཏེ་འློ་ལྡེ་སྤུ་རྒྱལ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རྒྱལ་ཕན་སིལ་
མའི་དུས་སུ་བློད་ཀི་བཙན་པློར་མ་བཀུར་བའི་སྐབས་ཀི་མཚན་ཡིན་པར་"གསུངས་ཤིང་།

dེ་ཡང་"འློ"ཞེས་པ་ནི་གནའ་དུས་སྤུ་བློད་ཀི་བཙན་པློ་དག་ལ་སས་འཁྲུངས་པའི་ཚེ་བཙན་པློའི་སྐུ་གཤེན་གིས་ལྷ་བསང་ཕུད་དེ་འློ་ཆབ་ཀིས་ཁྲུས་གསལ་ཞེས་བཙན་པློར་འློ་མས་ཁྲུས་གསློལ་བའི་ཆ་ནས་བཏགས་པ་དང་།

ལྡེ”ཞེས་པ་ཕི་ནས་བྱུང་བའི་སའི་ལྡེ་བརྒྱད་ཀི་མཚན་ཟུར་དུ་བཏགས་པ་མ་ཟད་བསན་བཅློས་དང་མཁས་པའི་མཚན་ལ་བཏགས་པའང་ཡློད།

ཁི”ནི་བཙན་པློ་ཕི་མ་དག་གི་མིང་གི་མགློ་དང་བར་དུ་བཅུག་པའང་མང་པློ་ཡློད་པའི་ཁར།

(Pharaoh)

① མཁས་དབང་ནམ་མཁའི་ནོར་བུའི་གསུང་འབུམ་པོད་གཉིས་པ། སྒྲུང་ལྡེའུ་བོན་གསུམ་གི་གཏམ།

② Research Materials from The Ye she De Project. TIBETAN HISTORY SERIES (Ancient Tibet).
སོགས་ལས་ཤར་ནུབ་མི་རིགས་ཀུན་གི་རིག་གཞུང་དུ་རྒྱལ་པོ་ལྷའི་འདུ་ཤེས་འཛིན་ཞིང་། མཚན་ལ་ངེ་ལྟར་དུ་འབོད་པ་
སོགས་ལས་ཁི་དང་ལྡེ་སོགས་ཀང་དེ་ལས་མ་འདས་སོ། །
གཉའ་ཁི་བཙན་པློའི་མིང་གི་མགློར་རུས་དངློས་སུ་མེད་ཀང
《ཆློས་འབྱུང་མཁས་པའི་དགའ་སློན》ལས་“ཐུགས་
རེས་ས་སེང་གཤེགས་ཏེ་མི་རེ་མཛད།
།འདི་ལ་བསྒྲགས་པ་བློན་ལུགས་ཞེས་གགས་ཀང་།
།ཕྱྭ་དང་གནམ་ལ་དགའ་ཞིང་བླུན་པ་
།བློད་ཡུལ་གནའ་མི་སྤྱི་མཐུན་གཟུང་ཕིར་བསན།
།”①
ཞཞེས་རུས་ནི་ཕྱྭ་ཡིན་པ་རློགས་
།བློན་ལུགས་ནི་བཙན་པོའི་མཚན་ལ་
།དེ་ལས་སྐྱེས་པ་མུག་ཁི་བཙན་པློ།
།དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ས་དིང་དིང་།
།སློ་ཐམ་ཐམ།
།དློག་མེར་མེར།
།གདགས་ལྷ་དཀར་མློ།
།སིབས་ལྷ་སློན་མློ་རྣམས་ཡུམ་ཡིན་པས་སློ་སློའི་མཚན་
།”②
ཞཞེས་མའི་མིང་མཚན་གི་ཐློག་མར་བྱུང་བ་ནི་སྤྱི་
ཚོགས་བལ་རིམ་གི་ཤུགས་རྐྱེན་ཏེ་མ་རྒྱུད་རུས་རྒྱུད་
གི་ཤུགས་རྐྱེན་ཅུང་ཙམ་སློར་བས་
།་རུ་ལས་སྐྱེས
ཀིས་བཙན་པློ་སྤུ་ལྡེ་གུང་རྒྱལ་ཁུ་བློར་བཀུར་བ
།དཔའ་བ།
རློད་པ་དང་དག་སེ་ཟིལ་གིས་གནློན་ནུས་པ
།ཁད་ཆློས་འཛོམས་པ་སེ།
རྒྱལ་པློར་བཙན་པློ་ཞེས་གསློལ་བ།
།བློན་མིང་ཁ་ཤས་ལ་སག་ཚབ་དང་
།ཁིགས་བཙན།
ཀླུ་གློང་།
སེང་མགློཁི།
བཞེར།
སློང་བཙན་སློགས་བྱུང
།
གཉའ་ཁི་བཙན་པློ་ནས་
བཟུང་བཙན་པློའི་མཚན་ལ་
ཏེ་རྒྱལ་པློ་མཐློ་སར་བཞུགས་
ནས
།བློན་འབངས་རྣམས་ལ་
བཀའ་སློལ་
།
།དཔའ་བའ།
དཔའ་བོ་གཙུག་ལག་ཕྲེང་བ། ཆོས་འབྱུང་མཁས་པའི་
དགའ་སྟོན། 【M】པེ་ཅིང་། མི་རིགས་དཔེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་། 2017ལོ། རོག་ངོས85
།
Research Materials from The Ye she De Project. TIBETAN HISTORY SERIES (Ancient Tibet). 【M】Dharma Publishing
1986, pp.146.
“ཁི”དང་“བཙན”སློགས་མིང་གི་ས་རེས་གསོལ་སྟངས་ཀི་གོ་རིམ་ལས་གལ་རིམ་གི་དབེ་བ་གསལ་ཞིང་།
“བཙན”ནི་རློལ་དུ་མི་བཏུབ་པའི་དྲུག་ཏེ།
བཙན་པློ་རིམ་བློན་མཐུ་ནིས་དང་སྐུ་རལ་ཆེ་བ།
དཔའ་བ་སློགས་མཚོན།
སློང་བཙན་སྒམ་པློའི་ས་རེས་ཀི་བློད་མིའི་མིང་འདློགས་སངས་ལ་འགྱུར་བ་ཅུང་ཙམ་བྱུང་ཡློད་དེ།
ཐུབ་བསྟན་དར་བས་དེ་སའི་བློན་བསན་གིས་བཞེངས་པའི་མིའི་འདུ་ཤེས་དང་བསམ་བློ་སློགས་ལ་འགྱུར་ལྡོག་ཆེན་པློ་འབྱུང་གློ་ཚུགས་ལྷག་ཏུ་བཙན་པློ་ཁི་སློང་ལྡེ་བཙུན་གི་དུས་སུ་སད་མི་བདུན་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་ཞིང་བློད་མིའི་མིང་ལ་ཆློས་མིང་འདྲོགས་གློ་ཚུགས་ཡིན་ནའང་ཐློག་མར་ལློ་ཙཱ་བ་དང་པཎ ིཏ།
དེ་ནས་རྒྱལ་པློའི་ཕློ་བང་ནང་ཁུལ་དུ་དར་ཞིང་ཕིས་སུ་བློད་ཡུལ་སྤྱི་ལ་སེལ།
དང་པོ་ཐུབ་བསྟན་དར་མ་ཐག་ཡིན་པས་བཙུན་པའམ་དགེ་བསྙེན་དག་མ་གཏློགས་ཆློས་མིང་སྤྱྲོད་པ་ཉུང་བར་གསལ།
རྒྱུ་མཚན་ནི་ཐུབ་བསྟན་དར་ནས་དུས་ཡུན་ངེས་ཅན་ཞིག་གི་རིང་རྒྱལ་པློའི་ཕློ་བང་དང་བློན་འཁློར་གཡལ་འགའ་ལས་དམངས་ཁློད་དུ་ཆེས་ཆེར་དར་མ་ནུས།
དམངས་ཁློད་དུ་སར་བཞིན་བློན་ལུགས་ཤུགས་ཆེ་བ་གསལ།
དེ་ལྟར་ཐུབ་བསྟན་བཙན་པློའི་ཕློ་བང་དུ་རྒྱལ་བློན་དག་གིས་སྦྱང་ཞིང།
ཆློས་ལ་ཉེས་པའི་བློན་དང་བློ་རྣློ་བའི་སློབ་གཉེར་བ་དག་གིས་ཁློང་ཅག་གི་མིང་ལ་ང་ཆློས་མིང་བཏགས།
ཐློན་མི་ར་སམ་བློ་ཊ་ཞེས་བཏགས་པ་ནི་བློད་མིའི་ལེགས་སྦྱར་གི་མིང་ཐློག་མ་ཡིན་ལ།
སད་མི་བདུན་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་བ་ནས་ལེགས་སྦྱར་གི་མིང་རྒྱ་ཁྱབ་ཏུ་དར།
ཡིན་ཡང་“བཙན་པློ་སློང་བཙན་སྒམ་པློ་ནས་བཟུང་”ཆོས་རྒྱལ”ཞེས་པའི་མིང་འདྲོགས་སློལ་བྱུང”①
པ་དང་། བཙན་པློའི་མཚན་ཟུར་ལ་ཆློས་མིང་བྱུང་བ་དཔེར་ན།
ཐུགས་སྒམ་པས། །མཚན་ཡང་སློང་བཙན་སྒམ་པློར་ཆགས་པར་གྱུར།

① སྐེས་བཙན་པོ་སྐྱེལ་མོ་ཡེ་འས་སུ་གུའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་བཞི་དེ་དུས་ཀི་བློན་གཤེན་ཆེ་གཙོ་ཕལ་མློ་ཆ་ཞང་ཞུང་ནས་བྱུང་བ་དག་ཡིན་པ་དང་། མ་ཟད་བློན་གི་སློན་པ་གཤེན་རབས་མི་བློ་ཆེ་སྐུ་འཁྲུངས་པའི་གནས་དང་། ལྟོང་གི་གདུལ་བ་ལ་བློན་བསན་ཅིང་བསན་པ་རེ་སུ་བཞག་པའི་ཡུལ་ཞང་ཞུང་ཕུགས་པ་སེ། བློན་གི་ཆེ་བ་དང་བསན་པའི་འབྱུང་ཁུངས་བསན་པའམ།

② མཁས་དབང་ནམ་མཁའི་ནློར་བུའི་གསུང་འབུམ་པོད་གཉིས་པ། སྒྲུང་ལྡེའུ་བོན་གསུམ་གི་གཏམ།

ལྟོང་གི་ཞེས་པ་ནི་བློད་སྐད་དུ་ལྷའམ་ལྷའི་ཐུགས་དང་། "མུ" སྐྱེས་པ་ཀུན་ཁབ་ཅེས་པའི་དློན་ཡིན། "དིང" སྐྱེས་པ་ཀློང་གི་དློན་དང་། "དར" སྐྱེས་པ་ལེགས། "ཡེ" སྐྱེས་པ་ཐློག་མའམ་གདློད་མའི་དློན། "སེང" སྐྱེས་པ་སེང་གེ "ཨ་ཤློ" སྐྱེས་པ་ནི་ངག "དེ་ཤློ" སྐྱེས་པ་བདེ་བ། "ཐི་ཤློ" སྐྱེས་པ་འཇིག་ཚོན། "གུ་རུམ་མས་གུ་ར" སྐྱེས་པ་ཡོན་ཏན། "འབང་ཞིའམ་བི་ཞལ" སྐྱེས་པ་འཇིག་ཚོན། "ཨི་ཤློའམ་ཨུན་ཤློ" སྐྱེས་པ་སྙན་གགས། "སློང" སྐྱེས་པ་ནི་ཐྲོགས་མེད། "ལྡེའམ་ལྡེའུ" སྐྱེས་པ་རིག་པའམ་མཁེན་པ་དང་། "མུ་ནེ" སྐྱེས་པ་ནམ་པའི་དཔའ་བོ་གཙུག་ལག་ཕྲེང་བ། ཆོས་འབྱུང་མཁས་པའི་དགའ་སྟོན།

【M】བོད་ཡིག་ཀྱི་ཐོན་མོང་དཔེ་ལས་བཟུང་དུ་2017གོ། རིང་ལོ། ཤོག་ངོས95
【M】བོད་ཡིག་ཀྱི་ཐོན་མོང་དཔེ་ལས་བཟུང་དུ་2015གོ། རིང་ལོ། ཤོག་ངོས68
མཁའ་ལྟ་བུ་སེ།

ཞེས་ཞང་སྐད་བཙན་པློའི་མཚན་ལ་བསན་པ་དེ་དག་ནི་རྒྱལ་པློ་སློ་སློའི་མཚན་གི་གློ་དློན་ཡིན་པ་རློགས་ཐུབ་།

དཔེར་ན་ཁི་བཙན་པོ་རིམ་ལས་ཆོས་རྒྱལ་མེས་དབློན་རྣམ་གསུམ་དང་སད་མི་བདུན།

ལློ་ཙཱ་བ་དང་ཆོས་ལ་ཉེས་པ་འགའ་ཤས་ལས་བློད་མི་ཕལ་ཆེ་བའི་མིང་ནི་བློན་ལུགས་ལྟར་བཏགས་ཡོད་།

དཔེར་ན་བཙན་པོ་རིམ་ལས་ཆོས་དང་ལེགས་སྦྱར་གི་མིང་འདྲོགས་འློན་ཀང་ཆེས་ཆེར་དར་མེད་དེ།

དཔེར་ན་བཙན་པོ་རིམ་ལས་ཆོས་དང་ལེགས་སྦྱར་གི་མིང་ཐློགས་པ་དཔེར་ན།

① མཁས་དབང་ནམ་མཁའི་ནོར་བུ། ཞང་བོད་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཏི་སེའི་འོད།

② འི་བོ་བོ་གཙུག་ལག་ཕྲེང་བ། ཆོས་འབྱུང་མཁས་པའི་དགའ་སྟོན།
ཏན་གཉིས་དང་། ལོ་ཙྰ་བ་སྐ་ཅོག་ཞིང་གསུམ་སོགས་ཀི་མཚན་ལས་བསློད་ནམས་དང་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀི་ཚོགས་གཉིས་དང་། ཤེས་རབ་ཀི་ཕ་རློལ་དུ་ཕིན་པ་དྲུག་སློགས་ཆོས་ཀི་དོན་མཚོན་པའི་མཚན་བཏགས་པ་ལས་བློད་མི་ར། ཁློས་མིང་འདློགས་སློལ་བྱུང་བ་གསལ་ལློ། །

གསུམ། མིའི་གཤིས་སྤྱོད་དང་དཔའ་བློའི་ཆེ་ཐབས་ལས་བཏགས་པའི་མིང་། ལོག་ཁི་བཙན་པློ་ནས་བཟུང་རྒྱལ་པློའི་མཚན་གི་མགློར་རུས་སྦྱོར་མཁས་མཛངས་ཅན་སྐྱེད་སིང་བེད་པར་སློབ་གསོའི་ནུས་པ་འདོན་ནུས་པས་ཡིན། བཙན་པློའི་དུས་ཀི་མཁས་མཛངས་ཅན་གི་བློན་གཙོ་གས་ལ་དཔེར་ན་མགར་སློང་བཙན་ཡུལ་སྲུང་། ཐོན་མི་སྣང། མང་ཞང་སྣང་། སྙགས་ཁི་བཟང་ཡང་སློན། བདའས་ཏ་ར་ཁློང་ལློད། སྦས་སྐྱེས་བཟང་སློང་བཙན། ལྕན་མི་ཆེན། རྒྱལ་བཙན་གཞེར་ལེགས་གཟིགས། རང་རེ་བློན་ཁེའུ་ཅུང་། ཚུན་འབྲོ་སྤྱན་རྒྱུན་གློང་སློགས་བློན་པློའི་མཚན་གི་མགློར་རུས་དང་དཔློན་གནས་ཡིག་ཚན་སློགས་སྦར་ཡོད་པ་གསལ་ལློ། །

མཁས་པའི་དགའ་སློན་སློགས་ལས་རྒྱལ་པློ་ཁི་སློང་ལྡེ་བཙན་གི་དུས་སུ་ཞང་བློན་དང་དབའས་ཀིས་ཕློ་བང་དུ་སིད་ཀི་གློ་གནས་གལ་ཆེན་ཟིན་ཡོད་དེ། མི་དཔའ་མཛངས་ཅན་སྐྱེད་སིང་བེད་པར་སློབ་གསོའི་ནུས་པ་འདོན་ནུས་པས་ཡིན། བཙན་པློའི་དུས་ཀི་མཁས་མཛངས་ཅན་གི་བློན་གཙོ་གས་ལ་དཔེར་ན་མགར་སློང་བཙན་ཡུལ་སྲུང་། ཐློན་མི་སྣང། འབྲལ་མི་ལུས་དང་མི་རྣམ་ཀིས་མཛངས་པའི་ལས་ལ་འབད་དོ། །
ཕྲད་པར་བཞིན་བོལ་ཀི་བསྒྲུབ་ཆོས་ལས་ཀུན་གི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ཀྱི་ཆུང་གུ་ཆུང་གི་བཤད་པོ་ཞིག་འཛིན་མཐོང་གི་ཆུང་གུ་འགྲོ་བོ་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་ཡོད་ཚོས་ཀྱིས་བཤད་པའི་བཤད་ལ་སོགས་མཐེར་བར་བྱུང་སྐོལ་མཐ་རོ།

དེ་ལ་བློན་ཆེན་གི་ཁྲོད་དུ་བློ་རིག་སྒྱུ་རལ་དང་དཔའ་སློབས་སློགས་ཡོད་པའང་མཚོན་ནོ།།

བཞི། བཙན་མློ་དང་བཙུན་མོའི་མིང་གི་ཁད་ཆློས།

བཞི་བཙན་པློའི་དུས་སུ་བཙན་པློའི་མཚན་ཟུར་དུ་ཡུམ་གི་མཚན་ལས་ཡི་གེ་གཅིག་བྱུང་བ་ནི་བཙན་མློས་བློད་ཀི་ཆབ་སིད་ཐད་གློ་གནས་གལ་ཆེན་ཟིན་པ་མཚོན་ཏེ།

དཔེར་ན་བློད་ཀི་བུད་མེད་སིད་སྐྱོང་ཐློག་མ་འབློ་བཟའ་ཁི་མ་ལློད་ལ་མཚོན་ན་ས་རེས་ཐེངས་གཉིས་ལ་སིད་བསྐྱངས་ཤིང་།

སྐབས་དེའི་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་བརན་འཇགས་དང་ཡུལ་ཁམས་བདེར་འགློད་ཐད་མཛད་རེས་ཆེ་བ་ཡིན།

དེ་ཡང་《ཆློས་འབྱུང་མཁས་པའི་དགའ་སྟོན》དུ་“འདི་ཡན་ཡུམ་རྣམས་ལྷ་མློ་ཀླུ་མློ་ཡིན།”བཙུན་མློའི་རེན་དློག་ལ་མི་འཚེར་ཞེས་སྤུར་མི་ཡློང་སྐད།

དེ་ཕིར་ལྷ་སས་ལྡེ་སས་ཅེས་པར་གགས།

“བགས་དང་གཉེན་བསེས་མན་ཆད་ལྡེ་སས་བཞག།

དེ་ཡི་དྲྭ་དུ་ལྷ་སས་བཙན་པློ་ཟེར།

ཁིས་ན་ཀང་དློན་ལ་ཀླུ་མོ་སློགས་མ་ཡིན་དེ་

དཔའ་བོ་གཙུག་ལག་ཕྲེང་བ། ཆོས་འབྱུང་མཁས་པའི་དགའ་སྟོན།

【M】པེ་ཅིང་། མི་རིགས་དཔེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་། 2017ལོ་ཤོག་ངོས90

1. ཡིན་པར་པོ་བོད་ཀྱི་དུས་སུ་བཙན་པོའི་དབང་བསྒྱུར་གལ་རིམ་སྤྱི་ཚོགས་སུ་རིགས་རུས་དེའི་ཁུངས་བཙུན་པ་མཚོན།
དབང་དག་གི་ཆོས་མིང་འདློགས་པའི་སློལ་བྱུང་། མིང་དེར་ལེགས་སྦྱར་བསྟོན་ཆེར་དར།

དབང་དག་གིས་ཆོས་དང་འབེལ་བའི་ལེགས་སྦྱར་གི་མིང་རེ་འདློགས་པ་ལ།

སྐབས་དེར་ལེགས་སྦྱར་གི་བཙུན་པ་དང་དགེ་བསྙེན་ལློ་ཙཱ་བ་

དག་གིས་ཆློས་དང་འབེལ་བའི་ལེགས་སྦྱར་གི་མིང་རེ་འདློགས་སློལ་ཆེར་མ་དར།

དུས་རབས་བདུན་པ་ནས་དགུ་པའི་བར་རྒྱལ་པློར་“བཙན”“ལྡེ”“ཁི”སློགས་ཀི་མཚན་གསློལ་བ་ལའང་གདྲལ་མའི་ལྷ་ཀླུ་གཉན་བཙན་ལ་བཀུར་བའི་འདུ་ཤེས་སེང་འབངས་ཀི་སེམས་ར་གཅིག་ཏུ་བསྡུ་བའི་ཆབ་སིད་ཀི་དགློས་པའང་རྒྱ་ཆེར་ལྡན།

བློན་པློའི་མཚན་གི་མགློ་རུས་དང་ཐློབ་སྦྱར་བ་ལའང་དེའི་རིགས་རུས་ཀིས་འབངས་དང་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ཀི་དློན་དུ་སློབས་ཤུགས་ཡློད་ཚད་འབུལ་ནུས་པ་མ་ཟད།

རང་གི་རིགས་རུས་ཀི་མེས་པློ་གློང་མ་ནས་བརྒྱུད་པའི་མཛད་རེས་སྲུང་བ་སློགས་ཀི་དགེ་མཚན་ལྡན།

བཙུན་མློའི་མཚན་གི་ནང་དུའང་བཙན།
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>གླུ་བསྒྲུ་</th>
<th>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</th>
<th>བཙན་པོ་</th>
<th>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</th>
<th>བཙན་པོ་</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>༡ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༢ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༣ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༤ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༥ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༦ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༧ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༨ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༩ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>༡༠ ཚུ་འཕོ་པ་བོད་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
<td>བསྟོན་པོ་དོན་ལ་བཤེར་བ་ཐོག་རིང་</td>
<td>བཙན་པོ་</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
[1] 牟钟鉴：《中国宗教通史》上卷，中国社会科学出版社，2007(12)

[2] བཞིན་ཞི་ི་ཚེ་རིང་རེ། སོ་ལུགས་དར་འཕེལ་བྱང་བའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་སི་དོན། མི་རིགས་དཔེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་། 2010


[4] མཁས་དབང་ནམ་མཁའི་ནོར་བུའི་གསུང་འབུམ་པཉིས་པ། སྒྲུང་ལྡེའུ་བོན་གསུམ་གི་གཏམ། ཟི་ལིང་། མཚོ་སོན་མི་རིགས་དཔེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་། 2015


[6] མཁས་དབང་ནམ་མཁའི་ནོར་བུའི་གསུང་འབུམ་པཉིས་པ། སྒྲུང་ལྡེའུ་བོན་གསུམ་གི་གཏམ། ཟི་ལིང་། མཚོ་སོན་མི་རིགས་དཔེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་། 2015

༄༅། །ཧོར་ཆོས་རྗེ་དང་མདོ་ཁམས་ཏྗེ་ཧོར་ཡུལ་གྱི་ཧོར་དགོན་བཅུ་གསུམ་གྱི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ལ་དཔྱད་པ།

སྒྲོལ་མ་ཆྒྲོས་སྐྱིད།

ནང་དགྲོན་པས། རྒྱལ་ཁཁ་སོགས་གཉིས་པ་ལྡན་དྲང་བུ་གནས་པའི་དྲུག་པའི་བོད་དང་དཔའ་ཐང་
དེ་བཅས་པའི་དེས་རབ་ས་སེམས་དཔའ་རྗེ་རོ་རིང་གུ་བསམ་ཤེས་ནས་བསྟན་དུ་བཞིན་
བརྡྲེན་དང་བོད་དང་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་བཞིན་ལས་ལ་བརྡེན་ནས་བྱུང་བ་ཞིག་ཡོན།

དེ་དེ་ནས་ཧོར་ཆོས་དགྲོན་བཅུ་གསུམ་གྐི་བགྲངས་ཚུལ་ལ་དཔྱད་ནས་བཞིན་བཏབ་བའི་དོན་
རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པ་ངག་དབང་བྒྲོ་བཟང་རྒྱ་མཚོའི་(1617-1682)སྒྲོབ་མ་ཧོར་ཆོས་རྡེ་
ངག་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱིན་ལས་ལ་བརྡེན་ནས་བྱུང་བ་ཞིག་ཡོན།

ཟིང་གོ།

ཧོར་དགྲོན་བཅུ་གསུམ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་མདྲང་ཁམས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་སྐྱིད་ལྡེ་རྒྱུས་སུ་གློ་གནས་གལ་ཆེན་ཟྐྱིན་
དྲུང་གྲོགས་ཀྭད་ཁུངས་གྲྭ་བའྔ་བའི་སྐྲག་ཆེད་དཀྲོན་པས་སྲོག་ནུས་བའི་དབང་གིས།

1. བར་དུ་ཧྒྲོར་དགྲོན་བཅུ་གསུམ་དང་རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པའྔ་བའི་འབྡེལ་བ།
2. བར་དུ་ཧྒྲོར་དགྲོན་བཅུ་གསུམ་སྐྲག་རྒྱུའི་རྐྱིག་དཔེས་སྐྲུན་ཁང་།
3. 1995 ཐོག་པ།
4. བར་དུ་ཧྒྲོར་རྒྱུའི་བྱུང་བར་འད།

234 页。 忆福斯・阿維高圖・速科達普 “康北五霍尔” “霍尔五地方官” “霍尔五土司” 林信华: 《淹没在藏文化汪洋中的康北霍尔部落》, 载《康定民族师专学报》, 2004(4), 第 21 页。
དྡེ་བྒྲོ་ལ་ཏྡེའྒྲོ་དང་ཀྡེ་བྒྲོ།

① བྡེ་བྒྲོ་ཞྡེས་འབྐྱི་སྒྲོལ་ཁ་ཤས་ཤྐྱིག་འདུག་ཀང་ཡྒྲོངས་ཁབ་ཏུ་ཏྡེ་བྒྲོ་ཞྡེས་འབྐྱི།

② དུང་དཀར་བྒྲོ་བཟང་འཕྐྱིན་ལས། 《དུང་དཀར་ཚིག་མཛོད།》ཀྲུང་གྒྲོའྐེ་བྒྲོད་རྐྱིག་པ་དཔྡེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་། 2002ལྡུ། ཤྒྲོག་གརངས 2140གསལ།
དགེ་ལུགས་པའི་དགྲོན་པ་འབྐྱི་ཆུའྐྱི་ཤར་ཕྲོགས་སུ་བསྡེད།

(1) བདུན་པའྐྱི་དུས་དཀྱིལ་བར་དགྲེ་ལུགས་པ་ད་རུང་ཆེར་དར་མྡེད།

(2) 1457) སྐྱི་ལྒྲོ་རྒྱལ་བ་བཅྲོད་ནམས་རྒྱ་མཚོ་(1543—1588) མཇུག་དང་དོན་པ་པོ་ཆེ་བ་རིན་དུ་ཆེ་བ་དང་དོན་པ་པོ་ཆེ་བ་རིན་དུ་ཆེ་བ་

[1] རྡེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་དང་ཁྒྲོང་གྐིེ་སྐུ་ཚེ་སྐུ་རྐྱིང་པོར་མ་བཞུགས་པས་ཁྒྲོང་གྐེེ་སྐུ་ཚ་རྫ་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེས་ལྡེགས་བསངས་བས་ཏྡེ་དར་སྡེལ་བཏང་།

[2] རྡེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་དང་ཁྒྲོང་གྐེེ་སྐུ་ཚེ་སྐུ་རྐྱིང་པོར་མ་བཞུགས་པས་ཁྒྲོང་གྐེེ་སྐུ་ཚ་རྫ་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེས་ལྡེགས་བསངས་བས་ཏྡེ་དར་སྡེལ་བཏང་།

[3] རྡེ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་དང་ཁྒྲོང་གྐེེ་སྐུ་ཚེ་སྐུ་རྐྱིང་པོར་མ་བཞུགས་པས་ཁྒྲོང་གྐེེ་སྐུ་ཚ་རྫ་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེས་ལྡེགས་བསངས་བས་ཏྡེ་དར་སྡེལ་བཏང་།
བསྐྱིད་དབང་བརྡེ་རྡེས་ཀྐི་དུས་དང་བསྟུན་ནས་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁག་ཁམས་ཁུལ་ལ་དེ་བཞིན་དར་རྒུད་རྡེས་མྒྲོས་བྱུང་ཡང་སྐྱི་བབ་ནས་བརགས་ན་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ས་མང་དར་ཞྐྱིང་ཁབ་པ་བྱུང་ཡྒྲོད་པ་ལས་གྲུབ་མཐའ་གཅྐྱིག་གྐིས་ས་ཁུལ་ཡིངས་ནས་བཟུང་ཁམས་ཁུལ་དུ་ཆྒྲོས་བརྒྱུད་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ས་མང་དར་ཞྐྱིང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་བར་གྐི་འགྲན་རྒྲོད་ཀང་ཆད།

康区的势力扩展及其寺院空间分布》

ཁམས་ཁུལ་གཅྐྱིག་གྱུར་བས།  སྐབས་དྡེ་དུས་གྲུབ་མཐའ་གཞན་པའྐྱི་དགྲོན་སྡེ་ཁག་རྣམས་དགེ་ལུགས་སུ་བསྒྱུར་པ་དང་རྒྱ་བརྒྱུད་དང་ས་ས་ཡིན་ལ་དགྲེ་ལུགས་པ་རྒྱ་ཆེར་སྡེལ་བར་ས་གནས་དཔྒྲོན བཅས་ཀྐོན་རྒྱབ་སྒྲོར་ཆད་པོང་མེད།

②

①

གྲོའྐི་བྒྲོད་རྐྱིག་པ་ཞྭི་ལྟ་དགེ་གནས་ཀྐོན་ཆྡྲོས་ལུགས་ལྒྲོ་རྒྱུས་ཞྭི་ལྟ་སྐྱི་གྲོའྐི་དང་། ཀྲུང་གྲོ་བྒྲོད་བརྒྱུད་ཉན་བྲེན་མཐོ་རྐྱིམ་སྒྲོབ་གྱིང་། ཟྐྱི་ཁྒྲོན་ཞྭི་དཀར་མཛེས་ཁུལ་ཆིས་ལུགས་ཅུད།

西藏大学学报》

VOL 1 | 92

Waxing Moon Journal of Tibetan and Himalayan Studies

Page 92

第 67 章 西藏大学学报

1995年 第 19 期 第 26-31 页。

2005年第 1 期 第 26-31 页。

① 冯智：《理塘寺早期政教史初探》，《西藏大学学报》，2005年第 期，第 26-31 页。
སྒྲོ་སྒྲོའི་ལྒྲོ་རྒྱུས་གསལ་བར་བཤད་པ་ནང་བྟེན་གསལ་བའྐྱི་མྡེ་ལྒྲོང

① ཆོང་གྲོང་གྲངས་ལས་ཡུལ་ཕྒྲོགས་འདྐྱིར་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁག་གྐི་དགྲོན་སྡེ་མང་ཉུང་ལྟར་ན་མང་ཤྒྲོས་ནྐྱི་རྐྱིང་མ་དང་།

② ཁས་སྦྱོང་བཀའ་བརྒྱུད། བྲོན་པྒྲོ། བཀའ་བརྒྱུད་བཅས་ཡིན།

③ ཁས་སྦྱོང་བཀའ་བརྒྱུད། བྲོན་པྒྲོ། བཀའ་བརྒྱུད་བཅས་ཡིན།  གནོད་ལྟོག་པ་དང་།

④ སྡེར་གཙུག་ནང་བྟེན་དཔའ་རྐྱིང་འཚོལ་བསྡུ་ཕྲོགས་སྐིག་ཁང་། གངས་ཅན་ཁད་ནྡོར་དཔའ་ཚོགས་ཐོག་དང་པོ།
དོན་དཔེ་དེ་ཐ་དཔེ་དེ་ག་བཅིད་པའི་ཁྲུང་ཞིང་དུ་ཐོབ་པའི་ཡིག་དང་།

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>བཟོད་</th>
<th>སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་</th>
<th>ཚགས་པོ་</th>
<th>བོད་ལོག</th>
<th>ཚིག་</th>
<th>ཡིག་</th>
<th>ཤིག་</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>སྒྲིག་</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>སྐམ་</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>སྤྲུལ</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>་ ་</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


dབཨ་ཤང་རེ་བཀུན་པོ་ཀུན་ རྒྱ་མཚན་ལ་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་བདེ་ཡང་ཁྲོང་


dཔན་བུ་བཀུར་རྡེ་ས་སྔོན་ས་པཎ་ གཅིག་བཞིར་ནས་བདེ་ཡང་ཁྲོང་


dབཅས་པ་བཀས་མངོན། དྡེ་ནས་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར།


dབུད་མཁའ་ཁག་གྐིི་དགོན་པའི་གྲུངས་ཚད།


dམ་དཔོང་དང་བཅས་པ་བཀས་མངོན། དེ་ནས་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར།


dབཤེས་པས་པ་ལ་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར།


dཔཱ་ཤིན་ཐོག་པ་ལ་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར།


dབོད་ལོག་ལ་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར།


dབཨ་ཤང་རེ་བཀུན་པོ་ཀུན་ རྒྱ་མཚན་ལ་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་བདེ་ཡང་ཁྲོང་


dཔན་བུ་བཀུར་རྡེ་ས་སྔོན་ས་པཎ་ གཅིག་བཞིར་ནས་བདེ་ཡང་ཁྲོང་


dབཅས་པ་བཀས་མངོན། དྡེ་ནས་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར།


dབཤེས་པས་པ་ལ་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར།


dཔཱ་ཤིན་ཐོག་པ་ལ་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར།


dབོད་ལོག་ལ་格尔ོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཏེ་ཧྲོར་
Waxing Moon Journal of Tibetan and Himalayan Studies

VOL 1 | 95

Elliot Sperling

Waxing Moon Journal of Tibetan and Himalayan Studies

VOL 1 | 95

Elliot Sperling

Waxing Moon Journal of Tibetan and Himalayan Studies

VOL 1 | 95

Elliot Sperling

Waxing Moon Journal of Tibetan and Himalayan Studies

VOL 1 | 95

Elliot Sperling
ཧྲོར་དུ་བྲོན་དེས་ཀང་བསྡེལ་བས།

ཆད་དབང་དུ་བསྡུས་ཏྡེ། ས་ཁུལ་འདྐྱིའྐྱི་ྟེྒྲོད་སད་བར་གསུམ་དང་རྫ་ཁྒྲོག་མན་ཆད། མགྲོ་ལྒྲོག་ལྕགས་མྒྲོ་ཚང་ཚུན་ཆད་དབང་
དུ་བསྡུས།

ཆད་དབང་དུ་བསྡུས་རྡེས་རའུ་ཝ་ཞབས་ཤྒྲོག་གཉྐྱིས་དང་ལྕགས་ཀང་ཤྒྲོག་གཉྐྱིས་བཅས་བཞྐྱི་པྒྲོ་རྒྱ་གྱི་སྡེང་གྡེའྐྱི་མངའ་འྒྲོག་ཡྐྱིན་པ་ལ་དམག་དངས་ཏྡེ་རྡེ་ཞྐྱིག་མ་ཐུབ་ྟེྡེ།

ཆོང་པ་མང་པྒྲོ་

③ 1644 བོད་ཡིག
① 1746 བོད་ཡིག
② 1995 བོད་ཡིག
④ 1685 བོད་ཡིག
⑤ 1668 བོད་ཡིག
བྲང་ བརྒྱད་འདྡེབས་བྐྱིས སྒྲོམ་པ་བཞྡེས་པར་གསལ་ཏེ། 1668ལྟར་བཀྲ་ཤིས་དར་རྒྱས་དགྲོན་གྐིི་བྱུང་རབས་གསལ་བར་ྟེྡོན་པའྐྱི་སང་བྡེད་སྒྲོན་མྡེ

དུ་བཀྲོད་པ་ལྟར་ན་ལྕགས་ཡགྲོས་སྐིི་ལྒྲོ་

སྐྱི་ལྒྲོ་1668ལྷན་འབྲུག་པའི་ལོ་རོ། ། སོ་དོན་པའི་མཐོ་སོ། དགུ་དང་། མཐུན་པའི་བོད་ཅན་པའི་ཁོ་་ནས་འབྲུག་པ་། །

① ཟླ་དྲན་མ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ལོ་རོ། ། སོ་དོན་པའི་བོད་ཅན་པའི་ཁོ་་ནས་འབྲུག་པ་། །

② ཟླ་དྲན་མ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ལོ་རོ། ། སོ་དོན་པའི་བོད་ཅན་པའི་ཁོ་་ནས་འབྲུག་པ་། །

③ ཟླ་དྲན་མ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ལོ་རོ། ། སོ་དོན་པའི་བོད་ཅན་པའི་ཁོ་་ནས་འབྲུག་པ་། །

④ ཟླ་དྲན་མ་བརྒྱད་པའི་ལོ་རོ། ། སོ་དོན་པའི་བོད་ཅན་པའི་ཁོ་་ནས་འབྲུག་པ་། །
སྡེལ་སྐྱི་ལྒྲོ་

རྡེ་རབ་འབམ་ངག་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོགས་འཇམ་དཔལ་ནྐྱི་དྡྲོན་དུ་རྫ་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་ཡིན་ཏྡེ།

གྲོང་མ་རོ་མཁྱེན་རྣམ་ཐར་མདྡོར་བསྡུས་འཛམ་བུའྐྱི་གསྡེར་གོ་སྙྡེ་མ་

རྡེའྐིབ་སྐུ་ཕྡེང་རྐྱིམ་བྒྲོན་གིས་གདན་ས་བཟུང་བ་ལས་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེར་ཡང་སྐྱིད་བྲོན་མྱི་འདུག

དམ་བཅའ་ཕུལ་ཏྡེ་སྐིལ་ལྒྲོ་

ངྲེས་བཟུང་ཞྐྱིང་རྫ་དགྲོན་གསར་གིས་གསྡེར་ཁྱི་ལ་མངའ་གསྒྲོལ། ཕྱིས་སུ་སྐུ་ཚ་རྫ་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེས་གདན་རབས་འཛིན་ཞྐྱིང་རྫ་ཆྒྲོས

གསུམ་རྐྱིམ་བཞྡེངས་གྲུབ་བྱུང་བའྒྲོ།།

ས་ཚིགས་གལ་ཆྡེན་རྣམས་ལ་དགྲོན་སྡེ་རྡེ་འདྡེབས་དགྲོས་ཞྡེས་རྐྱིང་མའྐྱི་བ་ཆྡེན་རྫྡིགས་ཆྡེན་པདྨ་རྐྱིག་འཛིན་སྒྲོགས་དང་།

②

①

དབངས་ཅན་སྙེམས་པའྐྱི་ལང་ཚོས་བརམས།

དབངས་ཅན་སྙེམས་པའྐྱི་ལང་ཚོས་བརམས།

ཤྒྲོག་གྲངས་

ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་སྐུ་འཕྡེང་གྒྲོང་མ་རོ་མཁྱེན་རྣུམ་ཐར་མདྡོར་བསྡུས་འཛམ་བུའྐྱི་གསྡེར་གོ་སྙེ་མ་

རྡེའི་སྐུ་ཕྡེང་གསུམ་པ་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེའི་ཕ་ཡུལ་གི་ྟེྡོད་སད་ལ་དགྲོན་པ་འགའ་ཐོབས་ཤྐྱིག་ཅྡེས་བཀའ་

ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་ངག་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ལའང་རྒྱལ་བ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ཆོས་བྒྲོའྐི་མདྲང་དུ་

མ་ལྟ་བུའྐྱི་དགྡེ་ལྡན་པ་ཡུན་རྐྱིང་གནས་ཆད་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེའི་ཕ་ཡུལ་གི་ྟེྡོད་སད་ལ་དགྲོན་པ་འགའ་ཐོབས་ཤྐྱིག་ཅྡེས་བཀའ་

ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་ངག་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ལའང་རྒྱལ་བ་ཙོང་ཁ་པ་ཆོས་བྒྲོའྐི་མདྲང་དུ་

མ་ལྟ་བུའྐྱི་དགྡེ་ལྡན་པ་ཡུན་རྐྱིང་གནས་ཆད་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེའི་ཕ་ཡུལ་གི་ྟེྡོད་སད་ལ་དགྲོན་པ་འགའ་ཐོབས་ཤྐྱིག་ཅྡེས་བཀའ་

ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་དུ་ཕྲུལ་བཏགས་པ་དབངས་ཅན་སྙེམས་པའྐྱི་ལང་ཚོའི་རྒྲོགས་བརྒྲོད་མདྡོར་ཙམ་བཤད་པ་དྭངས་ཤྡེལ་སྒྲོ་མྒྲོ།

དེ་བས་

དེ་བས་

དྡེ་ནས་སྐུ་ཕྡེང་གཉིས་པ་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་སྐལ་བཟང་མཐུ་

སྐུ་ཕྡེང་གསུམ་པ་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་བྒྲོ་བཟང་བྟེན་

ཁྲོང་ཉིད་ཀྐི་མཚན་གཞན་ལ་དབངས་ཅན་

ཁྲོང་ཉིད་རབ་བྱུང་བཅུ་གཅྐིག་པའྐི་ས་

བོད་ཀྱི་དབང་སྐྱིིན་ལླ་བཙོ་

བོད་ཀྱི་དབང་སྐྱིིན་ལླ་བཙོ་

དྱུན་དབུས་པའི་ཐོབ་ཆེན་པོ་

②

འདྲི་སེམ་སི། 1849དྲུག་སྤྲད་དུ་འགྲོ་བོ་བཙོ་བོ་

《ཧྲི་ཆེན་པོ་སྔོ་བོས་ཀ་།

1 བོད་ཀྱི་དབང་སྐྱིིན་ལླ་བཙོ་བོ་

2 བོད་ཀྱི་དབང་སྐྱིིན་ལླ་བཙོ་བོ་
ཨུར་ཐོད་ལུགས་ལུགས་བྱུང་རྒྱས་དགྲོན་།

1. རྫ་དགྲོན་གསར་དགྲོན་།
2. རྫ་བསམ་གྲུབ་དགྲོན་།
3. རྫ་བསམ་གྲུབ་དགྲོན་།
4. བག་ལྕྒྲོག་དགྲོན་།

① མི་དོན་དང་ཕོ་བོ མི་སྲུང་བཤད་ཀྱིས་ཐེག་སྤྱིཝ། འགྲོ་བོ་ཁྲི་དབང་བརྙན་པ་བཤད་ཀྱིས། 《ཧྲོར་ཆོས་རྡེ་སྐུ་འཕྲིན་གྲང་མ་རོ་ཚྨས་ཀྤོད་པའི་ལོ་དྲུང་བུ་གསུམ་ལས་ཞྡེས་གསལ།། དོན་ཚན་སྤྲོད་སེམས་པའི་ལང་ཚོས་བརྒྱད་པའོ།། 《康北“霍尔”及霍尔十三座寺院》}

② བརྒྱུད་ཐོག་《康巴史话》, རྒྱལ་མི་མོ་སྐྱེ་ལྟ་དབྱངས་, 2014, གཞན་150 ལྷ་。
སྐྱོང་མ་ལྡན་རིམ་པོ་སྐྱེ་བཞིང་གསུམ་རྒྱུ་ལྷ་དང་བཞི་ལོག རྡོ་རྗེ་སྤྱོད་པ་བཅོས་ལས།

ལྟོག་ཆོས་རུ་སྐུ་འཕྲོང་།
དགྲོན་སྡེ་དྡེ་དག་ལས་ཁང་དམར་དགྲོན་དང་བྡེ་རྐྱི་དགྲོན་ཟྒྲོང་སྐྲོར་དགྲོན་དང་ཉ་འགྡེ་དགྲོན་བཅས་ཧྒྲོར་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་གྐི་གྲས་སུ་ཚུད་མྐྱིན་ལ་བཤད་ཚུལ་མྐྱི་འད་ཞྐྱིང་། དྡེ་དག་ལས་ལྷག་པར་དུ་ྟེྒྲོང་སྐྲོར་དགྲོན་ནྐྱི་སྐྱི་ལྒྲོ་1474ལྡོར་ཞབས་དྲུང་ཟླ་བ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་གྐིས་བཞྡེངས་ཤྐྱིང་ཞབས་དྲུང་སྐུ་ཕྡེང་རྐྱིམ་བྒྲོན་གྐིས་བདག་གྐིར་མཛད་མྒྲོད། ①ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་དང་འབྡེལ་བ་གང་འད་ཡྒྲོད་པའྐྱི་སྐྲོར་གྐི་ཡྐྱིག་ཆ་ལག་སྒྲོན་མ་བྱུང་ཞྐྱིང་། ལམ་བག་སྐལ་བཟང་རྣམ་རྒྱལ་གྐིས་ཀང་ྟེྒྲོང་སྐྲོར་དགྲོན་དྡེ་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་གྐི་ཁྒྲོངས་སུ་བགྲང་མྡེད་དྡེ་དྡེའྐྱི་བཞྡེངས་མཁན་ཡང་ཟླ་བ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་ཡྐྱིན་པ་གསལ་པྒྲོ་གསུངས་འདུག འྒྲོན་ཀང་དགའ་ལྡན་ཁྐྱི་ཟུར་བམས་པ་ཆྒྲོས་གྲགས་ཀྐིས་མཛད་པའྐྱི་ཁང་སར་སབས་མགྲོན་བྲོ་བཟང་ཚུལ་ཁྐྱིམས་ཀྐི་རྣམ་ཐར་ལས་ྟེྒྲོང་སྐྲོར་དགྲོན་འདྐྱི་ནྐྱི་ཁང་སར་སབས་མགྲོན་དང་ཆྒྲོས་འབྡེལ་མང་ཤྒྲོས་ཀྐི་དགྲོན་སྡེ་ཞྐྱིག་ཡྐྱིན་པ་གསལ། ②དྡེ་མྐྱིན་ཉ་འགྡེ་དགྲོན་པ་ནྐྱི་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེའྐྱི་ཚ་བྒྲོ་རྫ་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེས་བཞྡེངས་པ་ཡྐྱིག་ཆ་ཕལ་མྒྲོ་ཆད་བས་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་ངག་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ཀྐིས་རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པའྐི་དྲུང་ནས་དམ་བཅའ་མཛད་དྡེ་མདྲོ་ཁམས་ཏྡེ་ཧྒྲོར་ཡུལ་དུ་ཆྐྱིབས་བསྒྱུར་མཛད། ཁྲོང་ཉྐྱིད་སྐྱི་ལྒྲོ་1662ལྡོར་ཡུལ་དུ་ལྒྲོག་ནས་ཧྒྲོར་དགྲོན་བཅུ་གསུམ་བཞྡེངས་འགྒྲོ་བརམས་པ་ཡྐྱིན་ཏྡེ་དྡེ་དུས་ཁྒྲོ་བྒྲོ་དགུང་ལྒྲོ་ང་གསུམ་ཡྐྱིན་ཞྐྱིང་སྐྱི་ལྒྲོ་1685ལྡོར་ྟེྡེ་དགུང་ལྒྲོ་དྒྲོན་དགུར་གཤྡེགས་པས། དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་བཞྡེངས་པའྐྱི་སྐབས་①《ྟེྒྲོང་སྐྲོར་ཟླ་བ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་སྐུ་ཕྡེང་རྐྱིམ་བྒྲོན་གྐི་རྣམ་ཐར།》ཀྲུང་གྒྲོའྐྱི་བྒྲོད་རྐྱིག་པ་དཔྡེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་།2005ལྒས་ཤྒྲོག་གྲངས་15ལར་གསལ། ②དགའ་ལྡན་ཁྐི་ཟུར་བམས་པ་ཆྒྲོས་གྲགས་ཀྐིས་མཛད།《ཁང་གསར་སབས་མགྲོན་བྲོ་བཟང་ཚུལ་ཁྐྱིམས་ཀྐི་རྣམ་ཐར་དད་པའྐྱི་པདྨྒྲོ་བཞད་པའྐྱི་ཉྐྱིན་བྡེད》འབས་སྤུངས་བྒྲོ་གསལ་གསལ་གསལ་གྐི་དཔྡེ་སྐྲུན་ཁང་།2003ལྒས
ཡུལ་དྡེའྐྱི་ཁུལ་གྐི་རྐྱིང་མ་དང་བཀའ་བརྒྱུད། བྒྲོན་པྒྲོ་སྒྲོགས་ཀྐིིི་དགྒྲོན་གནས་མྐྱི་ཉུང་བ་ཞྐྱིག་དགྡེ་ལུགས་པའྐྱི་གྲུབ་མཐར་བསྒྱུར།

ཕྲོགས་གཞན་ཞྐྱིག་ནས་རབ་བྱུང་བཅུ་གཅྐྱིག་པའྐྱི་ས་ཡྒྲོས་སྐྱི་ལྒྲོ་1639ལྒྱི་ལྒྲོར། གཙང་པ་སྡེ་སྐྱིད་དང་བྒྲོན་གྐིི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ལ་ཞྡེན་པའྐིི་བྡེ་རྐྱིི་རྒྱལ་པྒྲོ་དྒྲོན་ཡྒྲོད་རྡྲ་རྡེ་བཀྒྲོངས་ཤྐྱིང་གུ་ཤྐྱི་ཧན་གྐྱིས་སྡེ་དགྡེ འདན་གྐྱིིང་ཚང་། དཀར་མཛེས་སྒྲོགས་ཀྐིི་ས་ཁུལ་མང་པྒྲོ་བཙན་བཟུང་བས་ནས་དྡེར་ཡུལ་དཔྒྲོན་བསྐྲོ་བཞག་བས་ཏྡེ་ལྒྲོ་ཁལ་བངས་ཏྡེ། ལྒྲོ་གཅྐྱིིག་ཙམ་ལ་ཏྡེ་ཧྒྲོར་ས་ཆར་དགྡེ་ལུགས་པའྐྱི་དགྲོན་པ་རྒྱ་བསྡེད་བས། ལྐྱིི་ཐང་དགྲོན་པ་ནྐྱིི་ཁམས་དཀར་མཛེས་ཁུལ་གྐིི་དགྲོན་པ་དང་པྒྲོ་ཡཐྱིིན་ཞྐྱིང་དྡེ་ནྐྱིི་རྒྱལ་དབང་སྐུ་ཕྡེང་གསུམ་པ་བསྒྲོད་ནམས་རྒྱ་མཚོས་བཞྡེངས་པར་བཤད་དྡེ། རྒྱལ་དབང་གསུམ་པའྐྱི་དུས་སྐབས་ནས་བཟུང་དར་བའྐྱི་དགྲོ་ལུགས་པ་ཡུལ་འདྐྱིར་དར་འགྒྲོ་ཚུགས་ཤྐྱིིང་རྐྱིམ་བཞྐྱིན་འཕྡེལ་རྒྱས་བྱུང་། འྒྲོན་ཀང་རྒྱ་ཆྡེའྐྱི་འཕྡེལ་རྒྱས་ཆྡེན་པྒྲོ་བྱུང་བ་ནྐྱིི་གུ་ཤྐྱིི་བྟེན་འཛིན་ཆྒྲོས་རྒྱལ་གྐིི་དུས་རྒྱལ་པྒྲོ་བཀྒྲོངས་རྡེསབྟེན་འཛིན་ཆྒྲོས་རྒྱལ་མདྲོ་ཁམས་སྒང་དྲུག་མཐའ་དག་དབང་བསྡུས ①

རྡེས་ཡཐྱིིན་ལ་ཁྒྲོང་གྐིིས་ཁམས་ཕྲོགས་སུ་རང་གྐིི་ྟེྡྲོབས་ཤུགས་ཀྐིི་དབང་ས་བརན་གཏྒྲོང་ཆེད་དགྲོ་ལུགས་པའྐྱི་ྟེྡྲོབས་ཤུགས་སྡེལ་བར་རྒྱབ་སྒྲོར་དང་རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པའྐྱི་སྲུང་སྒྲོབ་འྒྲོག་བཞྡེངས་པ་ཡཐྱིིན་ཞྐྱིང་། དགྲོན་པ་དྡེ་དག་དངྡེས་སུ་གསར་བཞྡེངས་བས་པ་ཉུང་ལ་སྔར་ཡྒྲོད་ཀྐིི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་གཞན་གྐིི་དགྲོན་པ་དགྲོ་ལུགས་པར་བསྒྱུར་པའམ་སྔར་ཡྒྲོད་ཀྐིི་དགྲོ་ལུགས་དགྲོན་པ་སྔར་བས་རྒྱ་བསྡེད་དྡེ་ཧྒྲོར་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་ཞྡེས་པ་འདྐྱི་

dེ་བས་ཧྒྲོར་དགྲོན་དངོས་དགྲོན་སྐུ་ཕྡེང་ལྔ་པ་བྒྲོ་བཟང་ཡི་སྒྲོག་པྒྲོའྐྱི་ཧྒྲོ་ཤྒྲོད་སྡེ་བའྐིི་རྒྱབ་སྒྲོར་པ་དང་རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པའྐིི་སྲུང་སྒྲོབ་འྒྲོག་བཞྡེངས་པ་ཡཐྱིིན་ཞྐྱིང་།

(1) རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པ། །《 རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པ་ངག་དབང་བྒྲོ་བཟང་རྒྱ་མཚོའྐིི་རང་རྣམ་དུ་ཀྱིི་གྒྲོས་བཟང་། 》 བྲང་ལྟོས་དངོས་པོ་དཔོན་པོ་དུ་བྱུང་བཁུལ། 1989ལྟོས་12པོ་ཆེ་བུ་གཞི། བོད་ཁུལ་1998ལྟོས་བུ་གཞི།
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>འབྲོག་པ།</th>
<th>བཞེན་ཡུལ།</th>
<th>རྫེངས་དུས།</th>
<th>རྫེངས་མཁན།</th>
<th>ལུགས་པ།</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. དཀར་མཛེས་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>དཀར་མཛེས།</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (ཀ་བཞིན)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. རྫ་དགྲོན་གསར།</td>
<td>སྡེ་དགྲོན་པྲིག་མྱི་གསལ།</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. བསམ་གྲུབ་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>དཀར་མཛེས་ཅྲ་ཁྲོག</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. བག་ལྕྲོགས་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>བག་འགྲོ།</td>
<td>1410-1474</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. རི་གནང་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>དཀར་མཛེས་ཅྲ་ཁྲོག</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. བྱང་བཙང་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>དཀར་མཛེས།</td>
<td>1147-1207</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (ཀ་བཞིན)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ལྗོ་ཤི་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>ལྣ་པོ།</td>
<td>755-780</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. བཞེན་བྱུར་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>ལྣ་པོ།</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. ལྣ་པོད་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>ལྣ་པོ།</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. རྗེ་ཤི་མཉམ་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>རྣོ།</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. རིི་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>དཀར་མཛེས་ཅྲ་ཁྲོག</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. རླེ་རྒྱིད་དགྲོན།</td>
<td>དཀར་མཛེས།</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>རྒྱ་བསྡེད (བཞེངས)</td>
<td>ལགྲོས།</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

① 《དགའ་ལྡན་ཆོས་འབྱུང་བུརྱ་མོ་བོག་བོརྲོ་》 རུ་བག་ཀྒྲོག་དགྲོན་ནྐྱི་ཚེམས་དགྲོན་བ་མ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་བཀ་ཤྐྱིས་པས་བཏབ་ཅྡེས་’དྐྱི་དང་བག་ལྕྲོགས་དགྲོན་གཉིས་གཅྐྱིག་ཡྐྱིན་མྐྱིན་ཞྐྱིབ་ཏུ་དཔྱད་པ་དགྲོས་འདུག་སྡེ་སྐྱིད་སངས་རྒྱས་རྒྱ་མཚོས་བརམས། 《དགའ་ལྡན་ཆོས་འབྱུང་བུརྱ་མོ་བོག་བོརྲོ་》 རུ་བག་ཀྒྲོག་དགྲོན་ནྐྱི་ཚེམས་དགྲོན་བ་མ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་བཀ་ཤི་སྐྱིད་སངས་རྒྱས་རྒྱ་མཚོས་བརམས། 1987 ཆེས་ཤེས་302 གསལ།

② 《དགའ་ལྡན་ཆོས་འབྱུང་བུརྱ་མོ་བོག་བོརྲོ་》 རུ་བག་ཀྒྲོག་དགྲོན་ནྐྱི་ཚེམས་དགྲོན་བ་མ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་བཀ་ཤི་སྐྱིད་སངས་རྒྱས་རྒྱ་མཚོས་བརམས། 《དགའ་ལྡན་ཆོས་འབྱུང་བུརྱ་མོ་བོག་བོརྲོ་》 རུ་བག་ཀྒྲོག་དགྲོན་ནྐྱི་ཚེམས་དགྲོན་བ་མ་རྒྱལ་མཚན་བཀ་ཤི་སྐྱིད་སངས་རྒྱས་རྒྱ་མཚོས་བརམས། 1987 ཆེས་ཤེས་305 གསལ།
13. ཨྲ་བོ་ཆུས་འཕྲོ་བ།  འབྲུག་པཛོས་བློ་བོ།  1474  བྲག་ཡུག  འཕྲོོ་བོ་(བོད་ཡིག)  བཟོད་ཡུག།

14. བོད་ཡིག་[1]  འབྲོ་བོ།  རྗེ་གཞན།  བོད་ཡིག་ལུགས།  བཟོད་ཡུག  བཟོད་ཡུག།

གཤེགས་ཀྱི་སྟེ་ཁུང་བུ་སྟེ་བོད་དེ་ལས་ཐུབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་ཕྱིར་བྱས་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཀྱི་སྔོན་མོ་དེ་བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ནི་བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིག་གི་འཕྲིོའི་ལྷ་སྐོར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན།

དེ་བོད་དེ་ལས་ཐུབ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་ཕྱིར་བྱས་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཀྱི་སྔོན་མོ་དེ་བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ནི་བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིག་གི་འཕྲིོའི་ལྷ་སྐོར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན།

1. 《གཏོང་བུ་ཆེན་མཆོན་བོད་ཡིག་ལྷག་པ་ོང་ཉིང་》 ནོ་བོད་དོན་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་ཕྱིར་བྱས་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ནི་བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིག་གི་འཕྲིོའི་ལྷ་སྐོར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན།

2. 《སྐྱེས་པའི་བོད་དྭངས་དཔེ་བོད་དོན་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་ཕྱིར་བྱས་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིག་གི་འཕྲིོའི་ལྷ་སྐོར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན།》 བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ལ་ཕྱིར་བྱས་བྱེད་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིག་གི་འཕྲིོའི་ལྷ་སྐོར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན། 2000ལ བཟོད་ཡུག བཟོད་ཡུག.
སྒྲོབ་ཡྡེ་ཤྡེས་བ་མས་ཀམ་རྡེ་དགྲོན་དུ་རྡེའྐྱི་ཆྒྲོས་ཚོགས་བཙུགས ① སེམས་དྲེ་བཞིན་ལས་འབོད་ཀྱིས་ལས་ཀུན་སོགས་པ་པོ་རིག་པའི་གཞོན་
དེ་མི་དེངུན་བུ་འཇོག་པ་དང་དགོངས་པ་དང་། བཀྲ་ཤིས་བའི་ཞེས་བས་དེ་མི་གསུང་
ང་། ལོ་དོན་ཐོན་མོངས་དེ་བས་གཉིས་པའི་ཞེས་་དེ་དེའང་ནང་གྐིང་ཤིང་། མི་དེ་བས་བྱོན་
པོ་བཞིན་ལས་ཞེས་སོ།

ཞྡེས་བྐྱིས་ཡྒྲོད་པར་གཞྐྱིགས་ན་གམ་ཚེ་དགྒྲོན་པའྐྱི་མ་གཞྭ་
ན་སྒ་ཚེ་དགྲོན་ཡིན་ཧྒྲོར་ཚང་ལ་དབང་བར་གསལ་ཐུབ་མྒྲོད།

ཀམ་རྡེ་དགྲོན་ཞྡེས་པ་དྡེའང་དྡེང་གྐིི་དཀར་མཛེས་དགྲོན་
དང་ས་གདངས་འད་བས་ཡིན་ཤས་ཆེ་ྟེའྕ་།

《བཀའ་གདམས་གསར་རྐྱིང་གྐི་ཆྒྲོས་འབྱུང་ཡྐྱིད་ཀྐི་མཛེས་རྒྱན》

འྐྕ་ལྒྲོ་ཕུ་ཡུ་དཔྒྲོན་སྒྲོགས་གསར་འབྒྲོར་རྣམས་ལ་མཇལ་ཁ་གནང་

② སེམས་དྲེ་བཞིན་ལས་འབོད་ཀྱིས་ལས་ཀུན་སོགས་པ་ལས་ཀུན་སོགས་
སྐུལ་གྱིས་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་མ་སྱིན་དུ་དམ་པའི་ཐོན་མོངས་
དེ་བས་གཉིས་པའི་ཞེས་་དེ་དེའང་ནང་གྐིང་ཤིང་། མི་དེ་བས་བྱོན་

2001ལྒྲོ། ཤྒྲོག་གྲངས་172-173པོ་སྐྱེད།

③ རྐྱེན་ཡོངས་འཛན་ལེགས་དབང་། དབང་པོ་ཙུམ་ལྡེབ་ཀྱི་ཞུང་བཤད་ཙུམ་ལྡེབ་
ཆེ་སྣ་ཆེ་ཤིང་། འྦ་ཚེ་སྣ་ཆེ་ཤིང་། འྦ་ཚེ་སྣ་ཆེ་ཤིང་། འྦ་ཚེ་སྣ་ཆེ་ཤིང་།

12016ལྒྲོ། ཤྒྲོག་གྲངས་219པོ་སྐྱེད།

12016ལྒྲོ། ཤྒྲོག་གྲངས་103པོ་སྐྱེད།
མཁྲིའ་མཐུན་པ་འདུག་མྒྲོད། ①
dགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་བཞེངས་པའྐྱི་སྐར་འཛིན་གྱི་ཚུལ་དུ་དཀར་མཛེས་དགྲོན་བཞེངས་པར་བཤད་པ་དང་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་དབུས་ནས་ཕ་ཡུལ་དུ་ཕྡེབས་དུས་སྡེ་དགྡེ་དང་དཀར་མཛེས་ཀྐི་མཚམས་སུ་དགྲོན་གསར་དགྲོན་བཞེངས་ཤྐྱིང་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་དགྲོན་དྡེའྐྱི་གདན་རབས་དང་པྒྲོར་གྱུར་ཅྐྱིང་། དྡེ་ནས་བཟུང་ཁམས་བང་དུ་དགྡེ་ལུགས་པའྐྱི་ཆྒྲོས་བརྒྱུད་དར་ཞྐྱིང་། ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེའྐྱི་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་བཞེངས་པ་དྡེས་ཕྒྲོགས་གཅྐྱིག་ནས་དགྡེ་ལུགས་པའྐྱི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁམས་ཁུལ་དུ་དར་སྡེལ་ཆྡེར་ཡྒྲོང་བར་ནུས་པ་ཆྡེན་པྒྲོ་ཐྒྲོན་པར་ཐྡེ་ཚོམ་ཅྐྱི་ཡང་འཛིན་མྐྱི་དགྲོས་ཏྡེ། གང་དྡེའྐྱི་ཡ་གལ་དཀར་མཛེས་དགྲོན་དང་དར་རྒྱས་དགྲོན། བག་འགྒྲོ་དགྲོན་བཅས་ནྐྱི་དྡེང་སང་ཡང་ཁམས་ཀྐི་དགྲོན་པ་ཆྡེ་གྲས་ཡྐྱིན་ཞྐྱིང་དགྲོན་པ་འདྐྱི་དག་ལ་གྲྭ་བཙུན་མང་ལ། འདྐྱི་དག་གྐི་སྒྲོབ་གཉིས་ལམ་ལྡན་ཀྐོ་སྡེ་འབས་དགྡེ་གསུམ་ནང་བཞྐྱིན་སྡེལ་ཞྐྱིང་། དགའ་ལྡན་ཁྐྱི་ཟུར་བམས་པ་ཆྡོན་གྲགས་དང་ཁང་སར་སབས་མགྲོན་བློ་བཟང་ཚུལ་ཁྐྱིམས། ལམ་བག་སྐལ་བཟང་རྣམ་རྒྱལ། བག་དཀར་བྲོ་བཟང་དཔལ་ལྡན་བྟེན་འཛིན་སྨན་གྲགས་སྒྲོགས་ཀྐི་མཁས་ཆེན་མང་པྒྲོ་ཞྐིག་དགྲོན་པ་འདྐྱི་དག་ལ་དངྒྲོས་སུ་ཞབས་ཀྐིས་བཅགས་མྒྲོང་། དགྲོགས་གཞན་ནས་བཤད་ན། དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་ནྐྱི་ཡུལ་གྐི་ྟེྡེང་ནས་དཀར་མཛེས་དང་སྡེ་དགྡེ བག་འགྒྲོ་རའུ་བཅས་ཕྒྲོགས་ཆེ་བཞྐྱི་ལ་ཁབ་ཡྒྲོད་དྡེ། ཁམས་ཕྒྲོགས་ཀྐི་ཡུལ་གྲུ་སྒྲོ་སྒྲོ་གྒང་བུ་གཅྐྱིག་ཏུ་བསྡུས་ནས་གཞྐྱི་གཅྐྱིག་ཏུ་གྲུབ་པ་ལ་ནུས་པ་བསམ་གྐིས་མྐྱི་ཁབ་པ་ཐྒྲོན་ཡྒྲོད་པས། ཧྒྲོར་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་ཐྒྲོག་མར་ཇྐྱི་ལྟར་བྱུང་བ་དང་། ཁད་པར་དུ་བར་དུ་ཇྐྱི་ལྟར་འཕྡེལ་བའྐྱི་ལྡྭ་རྒྱུས་ལ་དཔྱད་

① དགྲོན་པ་དག་བཞེངས་པའྐྱི་ལྒྲོ་ཚོད་ལ་བལྟས་ན་བཞེངས་པའྐྱི་སྔ་ཕྐྱིའྐྱི་གྒྲོ་རྐྱིམ་ཅྐྱི་ཡྐྱིན་ཐད་ལ་ད་དུང་ཁ་ཚོན་གཅྲོད་དཀའ། དྡེང་སང་དགྲོན་འདྐྱིའྐྱི་རྡེན་གཙོ་ཡྐྱིན་པའྐྱི་དཔལ་ལྡན་ལྷ་མྒྲོའྐྱི་ཞལ་ཐང་ནྐྱི་རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པའྐྱི་ཤངས་ཁག་གྐིས་བཞེངས་པར་གྲགས་ཤྐྱིང་སྐབས་དྡེ་དུས་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་ན་ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་རབ་ཏུ་དགྲོགས་ཅན་དུ་དགྲོན་འདྐྱི་གནང་བར་གྲགས།
གསུམ་དག་པའྐྱི་མྐྱིག་གྐིས་ཕྐྱིར་བལྟ་བྡེད་དུས། རྒྱུར་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་བྱུང་བ་ལ་བརྡེན་ནས་དགྡེ་ལུགས་པའྐྱི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁམས་ཕྲོགས་སུ་ཤུགས་ཆེར་དར་བ་དང་སྦྲགས། དགྡེ་ལུགས་པའྐྱི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་འདྱི་ཡུལ་ཕྲོགས་འདྐྱིར་ཆྡེས་སྔ་བྒྲོ་ཞྐྱིག་ནས་གནས་པའྐྱི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་གཞན་དང་མཉམ་དུ་གནས་ཤྐྱིང་རྐྱིམ་པར་འཕྡེལ་བ་ལ་དངྒྲོས་ཤུགས་གང་ཅྐྱིའྐྱི་སྒྲོས་ནུས་པ་ངྡེས་ཅན་ཁྲོན་ཡྒྲོད་པ་ལ་གདྲོན་མྐྱི་ཟའྒྲོ། །

ཧྒྲོར་ཆྒྲོས་རྡེ་ངག་དབང་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ཀྐྱིས་ཧྒྲོར་བྱི་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་བཞྡེངས་པ་ནས་ཆབ་སྐྱིད་ཀྐི་འགྱུར་བ་གསར་

ལྒྲོ་རྒྱུས་ཀྐི་འཕྡེལ་རྐྱིམ་ཁྒྲོད་དུ་ཁམས་ཏྡེ་ཧྒྲོར་ས་ཆར་ཆྒྲོས་བརྒྱུད་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁག་ལ་འཕྡེལ་འགྐཾར་ཅྐི་རྐྱིགས་བྱུང་ཡྒྲོད་མྒྲོད། རྒྱལ་དབང་མཆོག་གྐི་རང་ལུགས་འཛིན་པའྐི་ཐུགས་སས་རྐྱིམ་བྒྲོན་རྣམས་ཀྐིས་ཁམས་ཕྲོགས་ནས་དགྲོན་པ་བཞྡེངས་ཤྐྱིང་ཆྒྲོས་བརྒྱུད་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁག་ལ་འཕྡེལ་སྨིན་ཅྐི་རྐྱིགས་བྱུང་ལེགས་ཤེས་ཅན་

ལྟོན་མཆོག་གྐི་ཚང་ཤིག་། དཀར་པོས་ས་ཁུལ་ཁྒྲོ་ན་ལ་མཚོན་ན། དཀར་པོས་གྲོ་ཆུ་ཕ་རྒྲོལ་ལ་ས་ས་པའྐྱི་གདྲོང་ཐྒྱོག་དགྲོན་ཆགས་ཡྔོད་ཅྐྱིང་། རྐྱིས་ཚང་དགྲོན་གྲྭ་དང་ས་སའི་ཁ་ནྒྲོན་དགྲོན་གནས། གསྡེར་ཁར་གང་ནག་དགྲོན། ཉག་བག་དགྲོན། བྡེ་རུ་དགྲོན། གུ་ལུང་དགྲོན་བཅས་ས་དགྲེབ་རྐྱིང་གྐི་དགྲོན་ཕྲོགས་གཅྐིག་ཏུ་གནས། ཁམས་ཕྲོགས་སུ་གྲུབ་མཐའ་རྐྱིས་མྡེད་ཀྐི་རང་ལུགས་འཛིན་པའྐི་ཐུགས་སས་རྐྱིམ་བྒྲོན་རྣམས་ཀྐིས་ཁམས་ཕྲོགས་ནས་དགྲོན་པ་བཞྡེངས་ཤྐྱིང་ཆྒྲོས་བརྒྱུད་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁག་ཐུན་མྒྲོང་དུ་སྡེལ་བ་ཡང་འབྡེལ་བ་ངྡེས་ཅན་གྲུབ་པ་ནྐི་རྒྲོམ་འདྐྱི་བྐྱིས་ནས་མཇུག་རྫྲོགས་ལ་ཉྡེ་བའྐྱི་དུས་ལ་རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་ཤར་བའྐྱི་གྒྲོ་བ་འད་མྒྲོ་ཞྐྱིག་ཀང་ཡྐྱིན་། རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་བ་མཆོག་གྐི་རང་ལུགས་འཛིན་པའྐི་ཐུགས་སས་རྐྱིམ་བྒྲོན་རྣམས་ཀྐིས་ཁམས་ཕྲོགས་ནས་དགྲོན་པ་བཞྡེངས་ཤྐྱིང་ཆྒྲོས་བརྒྱུད་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ཁག་ལ་འཕྡེལ་སྨིན་ཅི་རྐྱིགས་བྱུང་ལེགས་ཤེས་ཅན་
པར་ཞིག་བསྡེབས་པ་དང་བསྟུན་ལྡྭ་རྒྱུས་ཀྐྱི་གྲོ་སྐབས་གསར་པ་ཞིག་བསྐྲུན་པར་འདྲོད། རྒྱོར་དགྲོན་སྡེ་བཅུ་གསུམ་བཞྡེངས་པ་ནས་ད་ལྟ་ལ་ཐུག་གྐི་བར་དུ་ཁམས་ཏྡེ་ཧྒྲོར་ཡུལ་གྐི་ལྡྭ་རྒྱུས་དང་། ཆབ་སྐྱིད། ཆོས་ལུགས། རྐྱིག་གནས་བཅས་ཕྲོགས་ཡིང་སྐུལ་འདྡེད་ཀྐི་ནུས་པ་ཆེར་ཐྒྲོན་པ་དང་ཆབས་ཅྐྱིག ལྟ་གྲུབ་ཀྐི་ཕྲོགས་ནས་སྐོལ་པའྐྱི་རང་འབས་ཐུན་མྒྲོང་མ་ཡོན་པ་ཞིག་ནྐྱི་གྲང་དུ་སྒྲོང་བ་བཞིན་རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པ་དང་པཎ་ཆེན་བྲོ་བཟང་ཆོས་རྒྱན་ལས་བརྒྱུད་པའྐྱི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་རྐྱིས་མྡེད་ཀྐི་བསམ་བྲོ་དྡེ་དགྲོན་པ་དང་ཆབས་ཅྐྱིག་ཁམས་ཕྲོགས་སུ་མཆད་པ་མ་ཟད། དྡེ་གནའ་དུས་ཀྐི་སྒྲོལ་བཟང་དང་གཞི་གཅྐིག་ཏུ་བསྒྲོས་པར་གྱུར་པས་ན། འདྐྱི་ནྐིམས་ཀྐི་ཕྲོགས་ལ་རྡེས་སྒྲོར་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ས་མང་དར་ཞྭང་གྲུབ་མཐའ་རྐྱིས་མྡེད་ཀྐི་ལྟ་བའྐྱི་དྲོད་པཎ་འཆང་བའྐྱི་སྡེས་ཆེན་དམ་པ་སྐར་ཚོགས་བཞིན་བྲོན་པའྐི་རྒྱ་དུས་ཀྐི་ས་བྲོན་ལ་ཅྭམ་འི་ཕྱིར་མྗོ་པོ།

[1] རྡོ་རྗེ་སྨོན་པོའི་དོན་དབང་། བཀྲ་ཤིས་ལ་བཟླ་བའི་བཟང་པོར་ལྷ་ལ་ཐུབ་བཤད་སྐྱེ་ཐོན་ལྔ་བྲང་མཐོང་ 2010ལྷ

[2] དབང་ཆེན་བཙོན་པའི་དབང་། བིན་བོ་བཟང་པོར་དབང་བཟང་པོ་ཆེན་པོའི་དབང་བཟང་པོ་བཞིན་དཔེར་བྱིན། 2001ལྷ

[3] དབང་མཚན་པའི་དབང་། བོད་ཁྲུལ་བཟང་པོ་ལྟོ་འཁོར་་དབང་བཟང་པོ་བཞིན་དཔེར་བྱིན། 2016ལྷ

[4] རྫ་ཐོབ་དང་ལྷོ་བོ་དཔལ་དབང་། རྡོ་འཕེན་དྭེ་བོད་ཁྲུལ་ལྟོ་འཁོར་་དབང་བཟང་པོ་བཞིན་དཔེར་བྱིན། བཞེག་བཞིན།

TBRC:W22125

[5] རྫ་ཐོབ་དང་ལྷོ་བོ་དཔལ་དབང་། རྡོ་འཕེན་དྭེ་བོད་ཁྲུལ་ལྟོ་འཁོར་་དབང་བཟང་པོ་བཞིན་དཔེར་བྱིན། བཞེག་བཞིན།

[6] བླང་བཟང་དཔལ་ལྷོ་བོ་དཔལ་དབང་། རྡོ་འཕེན་དྭེ་བོད་ཁྲུལ་ལྟོ་འཁོར་་དབང་བཟང་པོ་བཞིན། བཞེག་བཞིན།

1995ལྷ
[7] རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པ་ངག་དབང་བྒྲོ་བཟང་རྒྱ་མཚོ། རྒྱལ་དབང་ལྔ་པ་ངག་དབང་བྒྲོ་བཟང་རྒྱ་མཚོའྐྱི་རང་རྣམ་དུ་ཀྱི་ལྐོས་བཟང་། 1989年

[8] ལྡེབས་རིགས་ཀླིང་གི་ཟོས་པོ་སྡེ་ཚོང་དབང་ནག་མིན་ཚོགས་འབྲེལ་བརྒྱད། དགའ་ལྡན་ཆོས་འབྱུང་བུལྟ་འབྲས་པ། 1987年


甘丹才旺白桑布收复阿里与所立“经幡杆”的象征符号及蕴意

伍金加参, 西藏大学

引言

17 世纪末, 甘丹才旺白桑布（དགའ་ལྡན་ཚེ་དབང་དཔལ་བཟང་པོ）前去收复阿里三围，并征服拉达克，试图重新建构阿里社会秩序，以维护甘丹颇章政权。另外，甘丹才旺的远征西藏西部，改变了拉达克的历史地位，使其受到甘丹颇章政权方面强有力的控制，还进一步拉近了卫藏地方政府与阿里基层政权的关系。自此开始，西藏各方势力可以直接通过阿里“四宗六本”（རོང་བཞི་དཔོན་དྲུག）基层政权进行来往，这种局面在 20 世纪初期及对以后的甘丹颇章政权发挥了重要的历史作用。


甘丹才旺前的阿里地方历史地域概述

内容批注：相关经幡杆（བྱུང་རྒྱུན་）研究在根敦群培的《白史》中记载述道: “藏族挨家挨户的房顶上竖起挂着经幡的长矛是藏族特有的习俗。最初为战场出征的象征，逐渐演变为宗教的象征涵义，上部接壤为印度为好，还是下部接壤汉地的所有藏家，都延续着房顶上挂经幡的习俗。详细记载在根敦群培著，《白史》（藏文），北京：民族出版社，2002 年 7 月，第 18-19 页。”
据相关史书记载，阿里王吉德尼玛贡有三子，长子白日巴贡，二子扎西贡，三子德祖贡。三个儿子年长后，为了避免重蹈王室相残的悲剧，吉德尼玛贡把整个阿里分为三个行政区域分给三子，并形成三个地方割据势力。具体区域和边界等据《拉达克王统记》记载：“长子白吉贡统辖阿里玛域，二子扎西贡所属领地为普兰、古格、亚孜等；三子德祖贡则占据了桑嘎、比地、比角等地”。如上所述，阿里三围的行政模式形成，后世才出现了“阿里三围”的说法。只有客观认识甘丹才旺自桑布之前阿里三围的历史地理概念，才能进一步探讨17世纪末的阿里地方历史背景及其演变过程，并以地方社会秩序建构加以研究。因此，笔者就此列举一二进行说明，但不易一一赘述。

17世纪的阿里历史背景

17世纪甘丹颇章政权时期，因教派之争，拉达克王森格朗杰进取犯古格，占据阿里普兰、扎达、日土等地。五世达赖喇嘛和达赖汗派甘丹才旺率领以蒙古骑兵为主力的蒙藏联军，经过三年的激战，终于收服古格，攻破拉达克国，迫使其签订协议，拉达克所占领的古格、日土、普兰等地收归甘丹颇章政权管辖。1686年，蒙古将领甘丹才旺在阿里建立噶本政府，设立了包括普兰、日土宗等在内的“四宗六本”，即阿里地区有四宗六本，最高地方官员即噶尔本必须由地方政府委派，由于阿里地处边境，战略地位十分重要，所以其官员的品第相当高，为外台吉四品顶戴嘉奖后不久，甘丹才旺前往自己拼死搏斗、功成名就的阿里，当了阿里历史上的第一任噶尔本，“噶尔”

---

2周伟洲：《唐代吐蕃与近代西藏论稿》，北京：中国藏学出版社，2006年，第152页。
3《拉达克史》（藏文），西藏人民出版社，2001年，第23页。
4在珍贵的藏文古籍《拉喇嘛沃传记》记载：“菩提祖师拉喇嘛沃就出生在‘阿里三围’：亚泽、普兰和古格中部。”另外，“吉德尼玛贡不仅有其极显赫的吐鲁番后裔之荣耀，而且他本人智勇双全，德高望重，很快受到当地人他的拥戴和尊敬。并且，在此地政事等各方面打下了十分牢固的基础，也很快与老友有了联系。故其弟的两名忠臣按他们原先的协议，把各自的女儿送往噶尔冻做为其妃子。于是，焦日列扎勒的女儿焦日萨氏先后生了个儿子，他们就是阿里历史上有名的‘阿里三围’之长子吉日格郎杰，次子吉日贡觉，幼子吉日嘉央。吉德尼玛贡生前为了避免重蹈其祖先之覆辙，为了不使他的三个儿子争夺其位而自相残杀，便把阿里分成三个势力范围，让个儿子各掌其政。长子吉日巴贡统领南自芒玉、帮库那赞，东自日土、色卡廓，北自色卡工布、西自日瓦马布、弥杰帕彭雅德、朵普巴钦等地；次子吉日贡觉统辖普兰、古格、亚泽等范围。由幼子吉日嘉央统辖桑嘎、比地、比角等范围，至此阿里历史上第一次形成了三个较大的势力范围，藏族历史上有名的‘阿里三围’亦由此而扬名。” 详见：古格·次仁加布编著：《阿里史话》，西藏人民出版社，2003年3月，第35-36页。
亦即军营。因为在拉藏战争期间，这里是甘丹才旺大将统率的蒙藏军队的驻扎营地，故得此名，当甘丹才旺大将再次返回阿里后，原军营驻地成为阿里地方政府的行政机构驻地，“噶本”（སར་དཔོན）便是这个地方级行政机构的首领名称，阿里历史上曾有过五十余名噶尔本，均由噶厦政府直接派遣，刚开始一次一名俗官，后来一次两名，一僧一俗。首府设在“噶达克”（སར་ཐོག རོང་），是阿里的政治、经济、宗教和军事的中心。下属机构有四个宗（རོང་），分别为普兰达瓦、杂布让、日土。有六个本（དཔོན），分别为曲木帝、朗如、邦巴佐措、萨让。邦巴本又称邦巴罗强，其头领称噶伦，此官，相当于在改则的外四品官。“宗本”（སར་དཔོན རོང་དཔོན）是七品级的流官，直接从拉萨的甘丹颇章地方政府的一百七十五名僧官和一百七十五名俗官中委派，一般对政府立功不者，派到边远偏僻地，带有一定的惩罚性。可本（དཔོན）一级的均系世袭官，是在此次战争中立功最多的当地人，他们都持有政府的令文，有很多特权，带有一定的军官性质，在举行一年一度的噶尔恰钦盛会时，按战功大小排位就坐。

1788 年，尼泊尔以噶夏增加边界商贸税收为由，派兵侵占吉隆、聂拉木、宗喀、札下和普兰等地，大肆抢劫。1792年，清乾隆五十七年，清朝派兵收复所失领地，在《西藏志》中记载：“颇罗鼐长子朱尔玛特策登驻防于‘阿里噶尔栋’。1841 年，道格拉王室森巴人派倭色尔为将，率森巴人、拉达克人和巴尔蒂斯坦人组成的联军，以朝拜神山圣湖为名，分三路侵入阿里。先后攻占日土、札达、噶尔昆沙、普兰等地方。清中央政府和西藏地方政府获悉后，派代本笔喜等率军赴阿里，经一年多战争，彻底消灭入侵之敌，收复阿里。”这一点西方藏学家伯戴克先生中论述：“前藏、后藏、康区和阿里是四个具有悠久历史的大地区。前两个不是行政单位，而只是地理上和民族上的名称；地区长官（第巴）直属于西藏政府。阿里具有特殊的地位。这个大地区是后来(1684 年)并入西藏的，仍被认为享有特殊地位的地区。但阿里地区的行政和西藏其它地区仍然大有区別。在这四个地区不设两名宗本，而只有一名宗本管理军政事务。在四个宗本之上，有两个噶尔本。因此，阿里是唯一保留自己
特点的较大的地区。” 9 国内外资料显示，阿里边境稳定后，构建社会秩序制度，设置了以阿里三围噶尔本9名、宗本四名、本六名构成的基层行政体制。这里的“四宗”分别为：在吉德尼玛衮来到阿里后最早行使管理职能的普兰地方设立的普兰宗；在原象雄八大城池之一的达卡城设立的达卡宗；在阿里古格王宫所在地札布让城建立的札布让宗；在原象雄四宗之一日土宗设立的日土宗。以上四宗县令悉由西藏地方政府直接委派。而“六本”为：1、萨让本，为六本之首，管理邓巴部落的土地、庶民事宜，在现札达县境内；2、“佐佐本”，管理米色尔（现门市镇）三部落的土地、庶民事宜，在现噶尔县境内。3、“曲本”，管理曲底四部落，在现札达县境内。4、“纳木如本”，统辖其四部落的“本”，管理土地、庶民事宜，在现噶尔县境内。5、“仲巴本”（亦称博翁巴），管理仲巴三部落的“本”，在现噶尔县境内。6“朵盖齐本”，为朵盖齐的僧俗五部落的“本”，也是日土县自卫武装首领。后来还有改则本及其庶民。

象征甘丹才旺历史功绩的经幡杆

国内外学者对相关阿里和拉萨两地树立的两处经幡杆进行过概述，对此，阿里著名藏学家古格·次仁加布在《阿里文明史》里写到：“甘丹才旺收复历史的是非凡功绩，故西藏地方政府特此为他在大昭寺北面竖立经幡杆，号称为甘丹经幡杆”10 与此同时，据笔者在阿里实地考察时，当地人对此经幡杆有着诉说不完的故事，以及对此经幡杆的历史来源持着共同的观点。对此笔者访谈了阿里岗底斯藏医学院，学校坐落于阿里神山冈仁波齐附近。并从事多年阿里政协古籍整理和主编阿里藏医院《岗底斯》期刊的普布加参先生，他讲述道：关于神山冈仁波齐转经道上“瑟雄”（གསེར་གཞོང་）经幡，据说是甘丹颇章政权初期，甘丹才旺英勇善战收复阿里三围而立下的经幡杆，

8 (意) 伯戴克 (周秋有译): 《十八世纪前期的中原和西藏》, 拉萨: 西藏人民出版社, 1987 年 8 月, 第一版, 第 296 页。
9 古格·次仁加布: 《阿里文明史》（藏文）, 西藏人民出版社, 2006 年 12 月, 第 67 页。另外，冈日瓦·曲英多吉: 《雪域西部阿里廓松早期史》（藏文），拉萨：西藏人民出版社，1996 年第 1 版，第 97 页。
10 古格·次仁加布: 《阿里文明史》（藏文），西藏人民出版社，2006 年 12 月，第 69-70 页。另外，笔者在实地采访时民间广为流传的历史传说和早期阿里学者阐述的内容极为相似。原文:

(མདོར་ན་དགའ་ལྡན་ཚེ་དབང་གིས་གཡུལ་ཐོག་མཛད་རེས་བླ་ན་མེད་པ་བཞག་པ་དང་སྦྲགས། རྒྱལ་ཁའི་བ་དན་མཐོན་པོར་བསེངས་ནས་ལྷ་ལྡན་དུ་ཕིར་ལོག་བེད་སྐབས། བསྟན་གནས་སིད་གཞུང་གིས་ཁོང་ལ་གཟེངས་བསོད་བ་དགའི་ཚུལ་དུ་བར་སྐོར་བང་ཆུབ་བོན་ལམ་གི་ཤར་དུ་། ཁོང་གཡུལ་ལས་རྣམ་པར་རྒྱལ་བའི་དན་རྟེན་དུ་དགའ་ལྡན་དར་ཆེན་བཙུགས་པ།)}
此后每年藏历四月十五日在此举行隆重的更换经幡杆仪式，我也自小目睹了三十多个春秋。另外，笔者在拉萨有幸拜访了主编《原西藏地方政府公文用语选编》的冷文·白玛格桑先生，他讲述：“马年转山是藏历四月十五日，基恰噶尔本和阿里各宗宗本、个僧院的主管人、地方头人、卫藏和康区以及印度教的朝圣者都相聚在神山的转经路上进行竖立经幡杆仪式”10。这口述资料和文史资料阐明了竖立经幡杆仪式的庄严性，以及它所定期举行时噶尔本必须出席的重要环节。这些不仅仅是传统文化的一部分，更是体现甘丹颇章政权下阿里噶尔本的权力象征。此外，维也纳的巴菲陲利·凯特瓦记述：“17 世纪甘丹才旺白桑布在拉达克出征后获胜，并竖立了两处经幡杆：一在拉萨，另一在岗仁波。两处处于高大而统称为巨大的经幡。”11

但是以上论述较为笼统，并没有针对两处经幡杆的象征意义进行研究。根敦群培在《白史》中记述道“藏族一般民众，各家门上竖旗矛，此亦是藏族特有的习俗。最初为军户之标志象征，逐渐演变为法规，上部与印度杂居之藏族，下至汉族杂居之藏族，任何一户，都延续着房顶上亦皆有竖立旗帜的习俗”14。比如，在拉萨大昭寺东南方向竖立的经幡杆，统称为“夏嘉仁经幡杆”(ཤར་སྐྱ་རེངས་དར་ཆེན)15。该经幡杆认为是 15 世纪时期，为纪念宗喀巴大师圆满举办“传昭大法会”而立，这和笔者所阐述的拉萨所树立的经幡杆相互对应，而且具有象征历史人物和事件的共同体。虽然目前很难从物化资料里搜集到有关大经幡杆的记录，而且从文告资料上很难断定这种经幡杆的具体年代，但是根据田野调查来看，甘丹才旺时期竖立的两处大经幡杆不仅具有象征历史的重要意义，而且与藏族的传统宗教文化息息相关。

11 普布加参，男，藏族，阿里普兰人，1979，采访时间：2019 年 8 月 8 日，采访地点：阿里岗底斯藏医学院。
13 根敦群培著，法尊法师译：《白史》，中国藏学出版社，2012 年 7 月，第 11 页。
相关。同时，在一些早期的西方学者的绘画和藏族传统的壁画上有着相关经幡杆子的象征寓意。故此，借用藏学家图齐先生在《西藏的画卷》中的一句话：“对于佛教图案任何形象都是象征性的。我们应将这种图像诠释成，如同一部用神秘符号写成的书，惟有已接受其奥义者方可解读。”来解读该壁画再合适不过了。藏传佛教象征符号不仅形式繁杂多样，内容深奥难懂，涉及范围之广，包括社会生活到思想意识的方方面面。随着社会的不断发展和人们思想意识的不断变化，使得象征符号所呈现的寓意，也随之变得更加丰富多彩，更具特征性。意大利藏学家图齐说：“西藏文化是宗教文化，西藏艺术也以同样的方式包容了独有的宗教内容。通过符号象征，它表达了复杂的直观直觉。”因此，通过对布达拉宫和大昭寺的壁画实地考察，笔者认为，文献资料和绘画实践虽然解析了有关经幡杆子的由来，但都未能对其象征符号进行深入的探究。经幡杆子不仅是普通的象征物，且是值得研究的历史性的象征物。探讨经幡杆子的普遍性知识层面，要从个案分析的角度来试着解读此图蕴涵的特殊历史大背景及其所象征的符号意义。因为“这种绘画是对藏族灵魂、宗教生活及其历史全貌的一种展示。”

众所周知，布达拉宫和大昭寺始建于7世纪松赞干布时期，起初宫殿和佛殿的规模不大。后来，于17世纪五世达赖喇嘛时期重建。就在重建之时壁画情景中的大昭寺背后绘有经幡杆，况且相关研究人员断定该壁画的年代是17世纪即甘丹才旺复阿里的时间。由此可见，该壁画所描绘的经幡杆子的则是文中所述的拉萨竖帜的经幡杆。因此，初步推断，这与蒙古将领甘丹才旺有着密切的历史渊源和文化关系。同时，

---

17 强桑：《藏传佛教象征符号研究》，西藏大学硕士研究生学位论文，2011年，第6页。参见：
“藏传佛教象征文化应该属于藏族传统文化体系五大明之一工巧明当中。工巧明分为身、语、意三大系统。藏传佛教象征文化跟所有的身、语、意三大系统都有着至关重要的联系，因此象征文化在藏传佛教和藏族文化领域中占有非常重要的席之地。藏传佛教象征符号按照其意义、形状、色彩、数字、结构、加持等作为定义的基础，有着特殊的理解和独到的解释。”
18 (意大利) 图齐等，向红笳译：《喜马拉雅的人与神》，北京：中国藏学出版社，2012，第314页。详见（意大利）吉塞佩·图齐：《西藏画卷》导言部分。
19 (意大利) 图齐等，向红笳译：《喜马拉雅的人与神》，北京：中国藏学出版社，2012，第313页。详见（意大利）吉塞佩·图齐：《西藏画卷》导言部分。详见：当我们仔细观看一件又一件作品时，我们能从他们展示的肖像中看到他们的文化及民族精神的历史。这个民族长久以来一直生活在宗教的统治下，现在依然如此。因此，这种绘画是对藏族灵魂、宗教生活及其历史全貌的一种展示。出于这一原因，如果我们没能使这些肖像在它们所处的环境中形象化的话，就不可能透彻地理解其含义。”
想要重构历史原貌，这确实很难，我们只能通过传统的文献资料、壁画题记和现代的文化人类学等方法进行探索性地研究与观察，并努力解读它所蕴含的文化符号渊源及其象征意义。

结语

17 世纪左右竖立经幡杆等同于早期藏族历史上的立碑及其盟誓文化的功能和象征意义，并体现出战争中的历史背景及其事件。据研究盟誓在阿里的社会生活和政治运行中占据特殊重要的地位。作为阿里社会一种颇为悠久的文化习规，盟誓在观念和法律两个层面受到格外的信重。尚且处于或继续处于初始形态的盟誓，在历史传说和档案资料之中屡屡得见，体现出调解社会关系、稳定社会秩序的重要机能。伴随着地方政权的稳固和政治的统合，盟誓逐步具备了比较完整的制度内涵，在某种意义上成为甘丹颇章地方政权的构成要素。本文在总结以往国内外研究成果的基础上，以期从文献研究跃进到实地研究，从局部研究过渡到整体研究。通过详细整理与经幡杆有关的藏汉英史料，包括地方档案资料、历史文献和传统藏文史籍，并以同期的英汉史料作为补充和呼应，力图较为系统展现阿里地方历史背景，以及蕴含其中的只有通过史实解说方能澄清的文化象征意义。研究探讨阿里社会秩序建构，对了解西藏西部边疆的历史发展、社会经济生活及其文化习俗有着重要的意义。

笔者对国内外相关文献资料和民间传说等进行梳理，尽量阐释了与甘丹才旺白桑布相关的独特的经幡杆子所折射出的时代背景、民族文化和象征意义，也即一种特殊的边疆历史、社会形态以及与甘丹才旺白桑布相关的阿里地区的文化特征。本文通过初步的实地调研并作了可行性的对比研究，笔者认为，在特殊历史文化环境下产生的经幡杆子不仅赋有一定的宗教文化意义，其自身也具有独特的历史象征意义。正是出于如上理由，本文在结构上将整体研究与个案研究相结合，将原始材料统合在整体性的框架之下，以求为还原阿里和拉萨经幡杆的历史全貌奠定基础。

参考文献

[1] 图齐著，李有义、邓锐龄译：《西藏中世纪史》【M】，中国社会科学院民族研究所，1980年7月，第160页。

[2] 毕达克著，沈卫荣译：《拉达克王国史 (950—1842)》【M】，上海古籍出版社，第72页。
[3] 罗布特·维塔利译著：古格阿旺扎巴《阿里王统记》【M】，1990 年。


[6] 冈日瓦·曲英多吉：《阿里文明史》(藏文)【M】，拉萨：西藏人民出版社，1996 年第 1 版，第 97 页。


[8] 齐光，17 世纪后半期青海和硕特蒙古对阿里、拉达克的征服【J】，中国藏学，2014 年 3 期，第 150 页。

[9] 黄博，《四宗六本：甘丹颇章时期西藏阿里基层政权初探》【J】，中国藏学，2016 年第 2 期。


Book Review by Xiaobai Hu, Nanjing University

Frontier Tibet is one of the newest additions to Amsterdam University Press’s Asian Borderlands Series. Supported by the European Research Council-funded project “Territories, Communities, and Exchanges in the Sino-Tibetan Kham Borderlands,” this edited volume presents cutting-edge scholarship in the field of Kham studies and can be understood as a follow up to the project’s previous publications, such as the Cross-Currents special issue, “Frontier Tibet: Trade and Boundaries of Authority in Kham.”

Stéphane Gros, the editor of Frontier Tibet, states that the publication’s goal is to foster an “understanding of the Sino-Tibetan borderlands in their historical, geographical, and multi-ethnic complexities, and in a relational sense of boundaries of identity re-construction between neighboring Tibetans and Chinese” (9).

The fourteen articles in Frontier Tibet are categorized into three groups. Part One—“Borders Inside Out”—includes three pieces that challenge the trend of naturalizing Kham as a spatial, cultural, or geopolitical unit. Instead of continuing to situate Kham in binaries such as core/periphery and Sino/Tibetan, Stéphane Gros’s “Frontier (of) Experience” proposes a focus on Kham’s relative location and multifaceted internal composition. The author uses the metaphor of the Möbius strip and its two-sidedness to suggest that a topological perspective best captures the malleability of Kham, of which the geopolitical dynamics, social constructs, and cultural characteristics are constantly produced in a relational manner. Revisiting existing frameworks, Katie Buffetrille further questions the scholarly tradition of identifying Kham and Amdo as “Tibetan Borderlands.” Drawing examples from the revitalization of Buddhism, participation in politics, and cultural revival in Kham, Buffetrille claims that what we see in contemporary Kham and Amdo is “a process whose dynamics no longer radiate from the center to the periphery but, on the contrary, from the periphery to the center” (87). The third piece in this section is a case study that examines the tension between the physical and conceptual boundaries of Gyelthang in southern Kham. Author Eric Morgan takes an ontological approach to scrutinize how the locals conceptualize Gyelthang in relation to Kham, eastern Tibet, and the Tibetan world in general, arguing that for locals Gyelthang is primarily

an idea of place that is vague in definition and meaning while its physical territory is of less importance.

Part Two—“Modes of Expansion and Forms of Control”—contains five articles concerning how different social groups adopt various modes of expansion to achieve, maintain, and consolidate on-the-ground authority in Kham. John Bray’s piece focuses on the operations of the Missions Étrangères de Paris in late 19th and early 20th century Kham. According to Bray, on the one hand, the missionaries were outsiders who took advantage of the Qing and Lhasa authorities’ fear of Europeans’ power to infiltrate the regional trade networks; but on the other hand, they also secured the livelihood of their local followers and thus gradually integrated into the fabric of local society. Patterson Giersch also frames commercial activities in Kham in a transnational context. He argues that the establishment of powerful trade institutions introduced Kham’s highland products to the booming global market, and it was the unstable geopolitical situation of the region in the early 20th century that allowed space for new commercial entities to rise and, ultimately, disempower local non-Han communities, creating economic inequality across ethnic lines.

The other three pieces in Part Two shed light on the role agriculture played in 20th century Kham. Scott Relyea’s article examines how the early 20th century Chinese authorities used settler farmers to extend state control to the borderland regions. Providing detailed accounts of how the Sichuanese farmers settled down in an unfamiliar environment, Relyea situates the borderland settlement project in the empire-to-nation-state transition, during which a global trend of linking territory claims with assertions of sovereignty emerged. Similarly focused on connections between agriculture and the nation-state, Mark Frank’s “Wheat Dreams” locates the Chinese state’s agricultural expansion in a different context in which food was closely associated with nationalism. By investigating two scientific endeavors of Republican China’s Bureau of Agricultural Improvement in Kham from 1937 to 1949, Frank argues that experiments using wheat and a sedentary mode of yak production to replace highland barley and nomadic yak production were both conducted in light of the state’s discourse on improvement in which wheat and sedentism were seen as more positive indicators of national strength than barley and nomadism. Gillian Tan extends the discussion on the agriculture-pastoralism binary into the post-1949 context. She claims that the binary was created by the state with the goal of characterizing sedentism as superior and civilized. Yet in practice, the ideal types based on the opposition between mumin (牧民) and nongmin (农民) became quite vague as animal husbandry in eastern Kham was often combined with a wide array of activities, including agriculture. The article thus joins Relyea and Frank in pointing out the modernist
ideology associated with the promotion of agriculture in 20th century China’s Kham borderland.

The third section—“Strategic Belongings”—shifts attention to the on-the-ground repercussions of various modes of expansion in Kham. Four of the six articles in this section center on individual figures to highlight their agency in shifting geopolitical dynamics. In the first piece, Lucia Galli focuses on Khatag Dzamyag, a merchant who wrote a travel journal documenting the tumult of mid–20th century Kham. Following the journal’s detailed accounts, Galli traces how the economic interests of Khampa merchants intertwined with local religious and political powers and eventually contributed to the emergence of a proto-identitarian awareness among the Khampas. Fabienne Jagou relies on Academia Sinica’s archives to reveal how the Trokyap king responded to the dispute between Sichuan and Xikang over his kingdom’s territory. Taking pragmatic concerns such as taxes and corvée labor into consideration and ignoring relatively abstract ideas such as nationalism and ethnic equality, the Trokyap king was able to influence the Republican government’s decision on border demarcation. Yudru Tsomu examines the rise of Jagö Topden, a political strongman in early 20th century Dergé. Unlike traditional Kham rulers such as Gönpo Namgyel who benefited from Kham’s distance from powerful political and religious centers, Jagö Topden and other open-minded Khampa elites acquired legitimacy and authority not from hereditary status, but from their savvy participation in regional geopolitics and ability to keep up with the times as modern and progressive rulers. Paying attention to another capable figurehead, Dáša Pejchar Mortensen studies the colorful life experiences of Wangchuk Tempa as a monk, bandit, anti-Communist rebel, and eventually a party official in the 1950s. The author argues that by studying powerful individuals like Wangchuk Tempa, who was able to transform outside powers into local authority, we can revisit concepts such as collaboration and complicate the notion of the “Chinese state” in rural ethnic minority areas.

The other two articles in this section revolve around place-making. Maria Turek’s work on kingship construction among Yushu Tibetans since 1951 provides a good example of the tension between official and local history writing. Although the Nangchen kings wielded little political authority historically, contemporary Nangchen historians deliberately highlight the kings’ power and hegemony in order to promote the consolidation of local identity which, in turn, helps justify the claim for regional autonomy. In her article “Yachen as Process,” Yasmin Cho focuses on female Buddhist practitioners. The author investigates the encampment of Yachen Gar to understand how nuns across Kham relied on architectural freedom and material maneuverability to shape their Buddhist space when faced with an
unstable political environment. The collection concludes with Carole McGranahan’s discussion of Chinese settler colonialism in contemporary Tibet. Claiming that questions about frontiers, empire, and sovereignty are keys to understand Kham, McGranahan proposes treating Communist China as an empire and thus conceptualizing its relationship with Kham in a colonial context. Drawing on observations of recent events and changes in Kham, the author comments that peripheral people “have created new practices to re-center what has been lost” (529).

Taken together, the articles in this collection indicate three trends in Kham studies. The first is glocalization. The contributors tend to situate historical events in Kham in a trans-national context and hence mapping local history onto global events. John Bray’s piece demonstrates how European colonial powers infiltrated the deep mountains of Kham and even reshaped local social structures, the religious landscape, and inter-community relationships. Patterson Giersch and Lucia Galli’s articles chart the process of how traders and trade institutions took advantage of shifting geopolitics in South and Southeast Asia to build trans-national links that knitted Kham into a worldwide commercial network. While previous paradigms mainly show how China got access to the global market via coastal areas, especially the treaty ports, this volume reminds us of the importance of the overlooked western China-South Asian channel. In this regard, Kham is not only a Sino-Tibetan contact zone, but also a nexus of cross-continental competition. The idea of treating Kham as a contentious zone for global power dynamics is also shown in the “Chronology of Major Events” section of the book, in which Kham history is juxtaposed with events of global significance.

The second trend highlighted in this volume is the comparative potential of Kham studies. Many themes discussed in Frontier Tibet are key issues across the discipline, and Kham’s ethnic, religious, and environmental characteristics can provide insights and promote dialogue beyond Kham studies. For example, several pieces in the volume consider borderland agricultural development, but Kham was not the only region during the late Qing where the empire promoted settler migration for wasteland reclamation and land usage conversion. To what extent was the situation in Kham different from Mongolia, Manchuria, or Taiwan? Did the empire modify imperial policies because of Kham’s ethnic features, inhospitable climate, and rich religious atmosphere? Comparing various local ramifications could deepen our understandings of the Qing’s imperial expansion and borderland governmentality. Moreover, Mark Frank’s piece points out that many foreign agricultural specialists, especially those from Japan, were invited to Kham to oversee borderland productivity improvement. Considering the fact that Japan was dispatching many
agricultural technicians to Hokkaido for natural resource exploitation at the same time, the cross-regional connections could even open up possibilities for comparative studies in the history of science.

The third trend I see in this volume is that the level of scholarly engagement with the discipline of frontier studies is deeper than ever before. This development is exemplified by Stéphane Gros’ theoretical discussion aimed at promoting “Kham” to a Zomia-like paradigm. Claiming that existing notions such as ‘middle ground’ and ‘matrix’ are not sufficient to explain the particularities of Kham and that it should be understood as a process but not a place, Gros identifies Kham as having a topological character “in which [it] appears neither simply distant nor proximate and neither outside nor inside” (41). This approach, in which categories in the frontier are, by nature, relational—featuring relativity and interchangeability—allows us to understand frontier regions from a different perspective by rendering externally imposed binaries such as core/periphery, collaboration/resistance, and Sino/Tibetan meaningless in the context of the frontier. In this regard, “Kham” as process could indeed encourage frontier scholars to perceive frontier social relations and power dynamics from a different dimension as “we are faced with the shaping of a topology of belonging whereby the merging between the internal and the external creates possibilities for emerging social forms and events” (70).

To nitpick, scholars who are interested in pre-modern Kham history may not be satisfied with the chronological scope of the volume. Nearly all of the pieces are about post-19th century Kham, while events that happened prior are, at best, mentioned as historical background. Understandably, this is due to the scholars’ personal research interests as well as the limited availability of source materials, but pre-modern Kham history could in fact further complicate the picture. In terms of the trans-regionality of Kham, the Mongols in 17th century Kham played important roles in establishing the power dynamics that, to a great extent, contributed to the region’s complex ethnic composition. In a similar regard, the religious competition between Bönpo followers and Tibetan Buddhist practitioners, as well as among various Tibetan Buddhist schools, since the 15th century are also worthy of our attention as such internal diversity not only laid the foundation for the region’s religious landscape but also pushes us to further grapple with Kham’s heterogeneity. Adding more historical dimensions to the picture could help to answer what exactly Kham, as an analytical unit, encompasses.

*Frontier Tibet: Patterns of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands* is certain to be a captivating read for scholars of Kham history. Those who are interested in Amdo as well as other Tibetan peripheries are
also likely to be inspired by the various modes of expansion and bottom-up approaches. I would further recommend the theoretical pieces in the volume for inclusion in any syllabus on frontier studies. *Frontier Tibet* is positioned to become a model for the field, and I look forward to seeing what this scholarly community produces in the future.

Reviewed by Elizabeth Reynolds, Washington University in St. Louis

Benno Weiner’s The Chinese Revolution on the Tibetan Frontier opens in 1958 on the eve of the Amdo Rebellion, an earth-shattering event in Sino-Tibetan history. Heralded by Chinese sources as a moment of historical rupture, whereby the Amdo Tibetans cast off their feudal, backward past and joined the modern socialist nation-state of China, the rebellion’s swift and violent pacification in fact witnessed the imprisonment, displacement, and death of over one hundred thousand people. Amdo is the northeastern region of cultural Tibet that encompasses current day Qinghai and portions of Gansu and Sichuan provinces. Prior to the arrival of the Communists, Amdo was a decentralized space, governed largely by local headmen and religious hierarchs, “operating within an integrated, syncretic, often conflict-ridden, but mutually authenticating web of personal and institutional relationships” (26). This is what the Communists encountered upon their arrival on the Tibetan Plateau. Weiner’s story, however, is not about the arrival of the Communists nor the building of the Communist state on the Tibetan Plateau, but instead about the CCP’s attempt at nation building in the region during the 1950s.

The CCP’s nation-building project was bestowed upon the United Front (tongzi zhanxian), which forms the core of Weiner’s study. The United Front is broadly defined as a bureaucratic network and theoretical platform for creating allies out of non-Party and non-proletarian elements. It was institutionalized in the form of the United Front Work Department whose job it was to promote this cooperative principle on the frontiers. While the United Front immediately brings to mind the alliance between the CCP and the KMT against the Japanese, the story that Weiner covers gives an entirely different meaning to what the United Front meant for the PRC after its establishment in 1949. A surprisingly understudied institution and ideology, the United Front, in Weiner’s own words, was not a “cynical ruse” meant to placate the Tibetans as others have argued before, but a platform that should be studied and understood on its own terms and by its own logic. Faced with the difficulties of convincing the ethnic minorities in Amdo of their socialist subjecthood, the CCP adopted the United Front to “‘gradually,’ ‘voluntarily,’ and ‘organically’ bridge the gap between the empire and nation” (4). The primary objective of the United Front in the Amdo grasslands was therefore of persuasion rather than compulsion.
The United Front was essentially the Communist and socialist answer not only to Western forms of nation building, but also to long-standing Han forms of exploitation. The CCP recognized that beyond the all-encompassing rubric of class exploitation, there also existed nationalities exploitation, and that there were deep antipathies between nationalities. This alienation among the nationalities, according to the CCP, was caused by the existence of “great Han-chauvinism,” which had over the long term impeded the growth of subjugated minority peoples (16). By this logic, intra-ethnic conflict was also a function of Han chauvinism, and the goal of the United Front was to eradicate it under the rubric of a new socialist nation. If carefully and conscientiously implemented, the United Front ideology would gradually foster both mass consciousness and patriotic consciousness, eliminating the exploitation of the nationalities (181). Weiner’s contextualization of the United Front in Tibet demonstrates our blind spots in conceptualizing the early PRC period and the ethnic frontiers.

The Chinese Revolution on the Tibetan Frontier centers around the Zeku (Tib. rtse khok) grasslands, a nomadic pastoral region with an altitude over 3,500 meters and lying roughly 250 km south of Xining, the provincial capital of Qinghai Province. Chapters One and Two are devoted to the CCP’s reliance on the Qing and Republican-era tactics in the transition from empire to nation-state in Amdo. These “subimperial” tactics, a term coined by Uradyin Bulag, describes the use of former imperial modes of rule as a means to establish nationalism, such as courting the local headmen and lamas into the party apparatus despite their “feudal” nature. While the purely imperial tactics did not foster a notion of nationhood, the CCP realized that employing subimperial tactics was a necessary step in the creation of national consciousness among the Tibetans in Amdo. While these earlier chapters provide the necessary background, it is in Chapter Three that we begin to witness the everyday dealings of the CCP in Zeku.

Chapters Three to Six constitute the heart of the book and contain Weiner’s invaluable contribution to the study of the CCP in Tibet. Here, he introduces the readers to the contents of the rare and now exceedingly difficult-to-access Zeku archives that show how the CCP officials brought their high modernist agenda to local Amdo Tibetans, and the immediate conflicts that emerged. This agenda and the scripted nature of the United Front is perfectly encapsulated in the naming of Zeku County in Chinese. Despite the CCP’s insistence on “meaningful” democratic engagement, not even the county name was up for genuine discussion (71). The name Zeku, “ze” from Mao Zedong and “ku” from treasure house (baoku), i.e. “Mao Zedong’s Treasure House” was decided before the democratic meeting of the Party and the county headmen (71). This dynamic is neatly contained
within the phrase “masters of their own home, under the leadership of the Party,” which also serves as the title of Chapter Three. This inherent contradiction, Weiner shows, generated the main tension underlying CCP efforts in Amdo. Despite the CCP's desire for meaningful participation from the Tibetans (mostly headmen and lamas participating under varying degrees of volunteering and paid work) and making the Tibetans the “masters of their own home”, the latter’s choices and opinions were not given genuine value, as captured in the caveat “under the leadership of the party.” The critical point that Weiner makes, however, is that instead of disregarding the notion of autonomy as an empty promise to veil the true desire to dominate and control in 1950s Amdo, “nationality autonomy was considered the key mechanism by which non-Han people would be both administrable and psychologically integrated into the new state and nation” (66-67). This “minoritization” of the Tibetans within a new nation, ridding them of their intra-ethnic conflict, and bringing meaningful change with the minorities’ input was an intrinsic part of the “high modernist” ideology espoused by the United Front. As Weiner describes, 1956 is what marked the turning point, prior to the Amdo Rebellion. With the coming of the “High Tide,” a crack in the United Front ideology crystallized for all Tibetans to see.

Chapter Six chronicles the initial crack in the United Front’s high modernist ideological practice, when the High Tide of Socialist Transformation (1955-1956) sought to rapidly establish agricultural and pastoral cooperatives. With the High Tide push to collectivization, the former logic of attacking Han-chauvinism was discarded, and instead attacking local nationalism came to the fore. This is what initially and prematurely laid bare the final agenda, the inherent contradictions between the United Front policies and socialism. Here Weiner explains, the “revolutionary impatience” was released and the rhetoric used to describe the Tibetan elites shifted from being “co-victims of nationality exploitation” to being the exploiting class (124). From this point on, Weiner shows the slow but steady build to the 1958 Amdo Rebellion. With the High Tide, the tone and terminology subtly but significantly shifted among the party cadres. The High Tide unveiled the contradictions between the United Front ideology and the operating mechanisms (one could say the final goal) of the Communist Party (145).

Despite a short respite in revolutionary fervor following the High Tide, by 1958 the Great Leap Forward began, and with it came the rapid failure of United Front ideology. While there is no evidence to suggest that party or military leaders purposely stoked the flames of rebellion in order to manufacture an excuse to rid the plateau of the old elite, once the uprising began, the party saw it as a “fortunate event,” allowing them to finally take forceful action against the old
“feudal” class. What followed was, according to the CCP, “a life-or-death class struggle” (172), in the form of the Amdo Rebellion. Weiner devotes the eighth and final chapter to the rebellion itself, providing one of the first histories of the rebellion in the English language. It is in this chapter that we witness how the United Front pragmatism finally lost to the revolutionary impatience of the CCP, as the rapid establishment of communes was followed by rebellion and brutal suppression in 1958. Here the fear and frustrations of the Tibetan people finally come to the forefront and all the horror as well as structure of the rebellion is laid out before us.

*The Chinese Revolution on the Tibetan Frontier* revolves around the rise and fall of the United Front, but it is not exclusively an institutional and intellectual history of the CCP in Amdo. While Weiner’s major contribution lies in his clear presentation of the little known (and even less understood) role of the United Front in early-CCP frontier policies, his ability to present this study while never diving into a “state-led” narrative is one of the most impressive aspects of his work. At no point does one lose sight of the tension underlying the CCP’s endeavor, and Weiner convinces us to take seriously the United Front’s directive and mission while not making invisible the very people this affects. Weiner’s work is a superb example of reading against the grain in the archives—a necessary tactic in Tibetan history and one well practiced in histories of Native Americans. And despite a near complete lack of sources directly stating the local Tibetans’ position (apart from their chronic practice of showing up late or not at all), we still feel their confusion and are sucked down into the chaos and fear as the narratives reaches a climax in the Amdo Rebellion.

Weiner openly heads off the immediate questions of most critical readers with a “Note on Sources” at the outset of the book. His sources constitute nearly twenty-five hundred folios from the Zeku County Communist Party Committee Archives and the Zeku County People’s Government Archives covering 1953 to 1960, the majority of which were generated at the district and county levels and sent upwards through the prefectural and provincial levels, while the remaining documents were those received from the higher authorities (xv). In summarizing the limitations of his sources, he explains the lack of Tibetan local accounts and the political sensitivity of conducting interviews. This preface is referenced periodically throughout the book. Even so, the only major problem that I, as a reader, felt difficult to see past is that of translation practices. Even a small amount of information regarding how specific terminology was translated and understood by Tibetans in the Amdo language would have gone a long way in helping the readers understand the limitations of the United Front’s “high modernist ideology.” Possible tactics to overcome the dearth of sources could have been contemporary local accounts or
memoirs, published interviews, or CCP pamphlets translated into Tibetan. While the difficulties of this type of research are clear, a couple of examples would have aided the readers’ ability to fully comprehend the vast ideological canyon separating the Tibetans and the Communists of the early 1950s. This would have further helped the readers’ understanding of, for example, Chapter Four where we start to see the party plan unraveling under the apparent miscommunication or misunderstanding of what the local people are supposed to do. Weiner himself is indeed aware of this problem (118, 122), and I second the question he raises: why were translation issues left so unremarked in the Zeku archives?

Apart from translation issues, Weiner’s narrative left me wondering what was different about the United Front in Tibet. Was the United Front operated across the borderlands in the same way? Or was there something distinct about Amdo? Additionally, I was surprised to see that Weiner did not engage with the historiography on colonialism in narrating the history of the United Front. Weiner’s argument about the United Front as an alternative to Western capitalist exploitation is well put. Its purpose was to disrupt the Western model by promoting a socialist alternative and encouraging national liberation based on equality. And, in the face of the absence of a proletariat (like in Amdo), the United Front’s objective was to be the progressive, unifying force meant to bring unity to a socialist nation (17). Ostensibly, the United Front was there to transform, not to occupy. Yet, despite all of this, the United Front did set the stage for settler colonialism in the following decades. What then is the conceptual overlap between “transformation” and “colonialism”?

My final comment about the book concerns the overarching theme of transition from empire to nation-state. The use of subimperial tactics as an explanatory device for this transition period is convincing, but Weiner takes the analysis a step further by noting that the nation-state’s use of these subimperial tactics signaled the death of empire at the hands of the nation-state. The key issue, however, is that the use of these subimperial tactics did not create a nation. What we are then left with is a historical anomaly, whereby the transition from an empire to nation-state in fact never took place in Amdo. How much further, then, can we push the notion of this transition from empire to nation-state when that transition did not fully transpire?

Overall, The Chinese Revolution on the Tibetan Frontier represents a substantial contribution to Tibetan studies, Amdo studies, and the history of the early PRC. Weiner demonstrates through his history of the United Front that there was a whole world the CCP could not see through the high modernist ideology they strived for. Over the
following sixty years, the United Front would be dismantled and reassembled time and again under different directives. Far from a defunct historical entity, the United Front continues to be relevant in the Communist propaganda machine today, sponsoring Confucius Institutes and the “co-opting of overseas Chinese willing to quietly promote CCP interests” (17). While an argument for the earnestness of the Communist cadres and the United Front ideology in the early PRC is not necessarily new, Weiner’s work represents the most in-depth lens into the minds and workings of these officials on the Tibetan frontier. Understanding the ideology of the United Front and the CCP while never losing sight of the deep-seated tensions and horrors of the 1958 Amdo Rebellion is the most important contribution of Weiner’s book. It should be a required reading for anyone seeking to understand the history of the CCP in China’s borderlands.

Review by Yuyuan (Victoria) Liu, Columbia University

At an exhibition of 20th century Chinese photography at the National Art Museum of China, I encountered a collection of photography of Tibet and Tibetan people, taken by multiple Han Chinese photographers. As a researcher of 20th century photography of Tibet, I have read about some of the photographers featured in this exhibition who took photos in Tibet and Tibetan regions throughout the 20th century under a variety of possible motivations such as documentary, journalism or propaganda photography. But it’s the first time that I’ve see in person a sizable collection of existing original photographs, shot and processed by the photographers themselves regarding Tibet-related themes.

This exhibition The Story of Light and Shadow: 20th Century Chinese Photography from Huang Jianpeng’s Collection opened in December 2019 and is the very first exhibition dedicated to a private collection of Chinese photography at the National Art Museum of China. It covers extensively the development of Chinese photography of the 20th century with a special focus on its multiple stages ranging from its early sprouting to the artists’ awakening to creative consciousness.

Over the past few decades since 1992, Huang Jianpeng has been collecting works of photography and has grown an interest in Tibet-related themes captured by photographers in and out of Tibet, including Tibetan aristocrat Jigme Taring (active since the 1920s), Japanese Traveler Aoki Bunkyo (active 1913-1916) and Han Chinese travelers and journalists such as Zhuang Xueben (active 1930s-1940s), Lan Zhigui (active 1950s-1970s) and Liu Lijia (active 1970s). These photographs supplement the currently known works of early Tibetan photographers such as the Tsarong family and the tenth Demo Rinpoche, and British photographs from 1920 to 1950 at the Pitt Rivers Museum at Oxford.

There are many elisions in the history of photography in Tibet and the scholarship on photography in Tibet is still at a stage of infancy. As it is rather difficult to paint a comprehensive picture of the apparatus of image-making in Tibet during the early 20th century, some of the possible frameworks we could borrow from are the study of 20th century photography in India and West Africa. When putting together a visual history of India, Nathaniel Gaskell and Diva Gujral defined that “from the start ‘Indian photography’ has also meant the photography of India by outsiders, framing a sustained and often
fraught dialogue between the country and the rest of the world”¹ and called attention to photography’s double-sided relationship with colonialism. In Giulia Paoletti and Yaëlle Biro’s work on photography in West Africa, the two authors looked at a variety of media on which photographs are printed, and managed to argue that although it was the western photographers who had introduced photography, they did not always have full monopoly over photographic technology and local photographers have also subsequently formed their own “distinctive and spectacular photographic vernacular.” As Paoletti and Biro proposed, “how do we reconcile interpretations and uses of photography particularly in the colonial context, where it served both as a tool of surveillance and a means of emancipation?”² Thus in a Tibetan context, how do we understand photography as a foreign technology and the relationship between the represented Tibet and its influx of outsiders and photographers?

Perhaps through a close reading of Zhuang Xueben’s photographs, we may gain some insight about the photographic experience during the republican era and complicate the issue of vision mediated between the self and other in portrait photography. Born in Shanghai in 1909 and started learning photography since 1928, Zhuang grew to be one of the most prominent pioneers of visual anthropology and photographic art in China. This exhibition contains the most comprehensive private collection of Zhuang Xueben’s works.

In a frame, there neatly organized nine photographs of 6x6cm and 6x4.5cm by Zhuang Xueben. Though small in size and slightly worn, these photographs that survived till today did not lose much detail in their only existing original points. Zhuang has captured moments of Cham (Tibetan ritual dance). The ritual performance was photographed from multiple angles, including close-ups of masked figures and an aerial view of the spectacle that showcases the venue and its gathering of audiences.

Photography as a medium has its own specificity. As Susan Sontag argued, “To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed” and “a photograph can [only] be treated as a narrowly selective transparency.” While the mechanism of camera devices is designed to truthfully reflect the likeness and existence of the subject behind its lens, it also grants the photographer an ability to control, manipulate and even produce perceptions that are beyond what our eyes perceive. In the case of portrait photography, it is further complicated as Richard Avedon said, “A portrait is not a likeness. The moment an emotion or fact is transformed into a photograph it is no longer a fact but an opinion. There is no such thing as inaccuracy in a photograph. All photographs are accurate. None of them is the truth.”

When Paul Bowman summarized Rey Chow’s work on film (including photography) and modernity, he pointed out the importance of “facing” in all cultural encounters as a starting point. Such act of

---

“facing” fundamentally pervades any form of contact (which means both real-life and metaphorical engagement) and in the context of portraiture, “facing” especially indicates an exchange of gaze and a process of imaging when a face is being seen and looked at. “Even when photographers are most concerned with mirroring reality, they are still haunted by tacit imperatives of taste and conscience.” Thus, photographic portraits, individual or group, personal or social, artistic or commercial, showcase a favored choice of identity representation and a singular or collaborated effort of projection from the figure and the photographer. Furthermore, as Bowman elaborated, the participants in these cultural encounters “represent themselves and their others to themselves; they ‘look’ and ‘contemplate’ the other in ways that always entail both imaging and imagining.”

Among the Tibet-related photographs in this exhibition, which occupy around one fourth of the total images exhibited, many of them are close-up portrait depictions of Tibetan people. In one enlarged portrait, a Tibetan youth looks directly into the camera with slightly narrowed eyes as if he was squinting under the glaring sun. Zhuang’s portraits reveal an attempt at humanist photography where the figure is ennobled with a sense of dignity. The young boy is in relatively calm and unhurried posture – his facial expressions relaxed and his gaze gentle and yet attracting attention. Through controlling the subject distance from the camera, Zhuang heightens the sense of spatiality between figure and ground and manages to create portraits that have unique visual tensions. At the same time, Zhuang seems to eliminate the interpretations of the photographed subject from both himself and the exterior, bringing the viewers into the inner psyche of the photographed. These visual techniques in Zhuang’s close-up portraits manage to render an atmosphere of visual power and empathy that is beyond space-time and cultural boundaries. Such visuality is closely associated with Zhuang’s close interaction and living experience with the local residents. Zhuang usually would give printed images to the photographed figures as gifts. His way of scheduling photoshoots is also very localized – the chief of one region would send a letter to the chief of the next region with photographs attached and Zhuang would then continue his expedition to the next region.

However, Zhuang's photographs are by no means examples of absolute neutrality—due to the specificity of photography and the intrinsic aporia of gaze within portraiture. Other than the multiple approaches through which people attempt to analyze Zhuang's works—speaking highly of his humanist qualities and skills as a visual anthropologist, how do we contextualize and investigate Zhuang's photography, his motivations of traveling to western China and the implications of his expeditions to the borderlands?
In an era of great uncertainty about the nation’s future, Zhuang Xueben was deeply captivated by the newly introduced photographic technology. From 1931 to 1934, Zhuang served as a clerk at Nanjing International Savings Society and Nanjing Datong Real Estate Company, became friends with a staff at a nearby photo studio, and thus gained knowledge and experiences of photo taking and processing. From 1934 to 1942, Zhuang spent almost ten years at borderland regions of western China taking photographs, especially portraiture in multiple areas where Tibetans reside.

Zhuang’s photographs had been selected by publications such as Liang You pictorials and Science Magazine. In September 1940, Zhuang as photographer and writer, published a special edition of Liang You dedicated to Xikang called Xin Xikang Zhuanhao. Liang You, through its incorporation of diverse images and bilingual format, is an embodiment of the magazine’s cosmopolitan visuality and international vision and has been deemed as a “visual emporium” for its creation of information and commercial value via visual exchanges. It has been argued by Susan Sontag that to photograph “means putting oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge—and, therefore, like power.” Such visual culture is partly associated with the concept of aesthetic modernity and the thirst for knowledge radiated from urban centers in China. As Menglan Chen also argued, Zhuang is using photographic technology to “produce visual knowledge” about this country and that photography becomes “a tool for the production and transmission of knowledge.”

---

7 Exhibition Catalogue, Reviewing the Masterworks: A Selection of Ethnic Tibetan Related Photographic Artworks by Master Photographer Lan Zhigui and Zhuang Xueben (Nanjing Museum), 8-11.
Furthermore, publications such as Liang You and Kodak Magazine encouraged young generations to venture and document the society. As Yajun Mo pointed out, Zhuang’s first long-distance travel was part of a trip in 1930 with “National Hiking Group” (guanguo buxing tuan) where a group of young people from Guangzhou toured around the Republic of China on foot, in seek of a new sense of nationhood.11 Thus Zhuang’s exploration of ethnicity along the borderlands overlaps with the making of a nation at the time. Zhuang applied photography to capture the other while visualizing a utopian nationhood with “imagined community” of ethnic groups along the Xikang borderlands. Furthermore, Xikang to some extent served as an “ethnolaboratory” and was “one of the most written-about and photographed places in wartime China.”12 Ethnologists at Academia Sinica taught Zhuang Xueben body measuring skills and provided him with equipment for future measurement of minority people on his trips. Presumably because he was partly in charge of the physical measurements of ethnic population, the front and profile portraits Zhuang took have distinctively ethnographic characteristics. In this particular issue of Xin Xikang Zhuanhao, there also included many maps and ethnographic portraits of ethnic groups along the Xikang border and even a reproduction of a thangka of Palden Lhamo, a wrathful protective goddess of Tibetan Buddhism.

12 Ibid, 122.
However, although embodying ethnographic qualities, Zhuang’s works render the self-and-other relationship differently and do not appeal to magazines at the expense of portraying the ethnic groups as savage. Instead, his relatively “removed” and documentary photographic language and reductionist manner when approaching the self in the photography might have complied with the urge for modern aesthetics in its contemporary visual sphere. Given Zhuang’s agency and deep involvement with the local people, it would be rather problematic if we categorize Zhuang’s photographs as propaganda photography. As Holmes-Tagchungdarpa furthered this argument, Zhuang’s work provides a local perspective of the borderlands.  

With only textual biography and ethnography mission of Zhuang in mind, one might relate Zhuang Xueben with American photographer Edward Curtis and be reminded of Curtis’s photographs of North American Indians. But Zhuang’s approach is considerably different from Curtis’s where the subjects are rather visibly romanticized. Through more than forty thousand photographs, Curtis attempted to provide a comprehensive survey of all existing native American tribes. Critics have pointed out that his photographs belong to “the pictorial tradition of photography” and are too romanticized.

and picturesque to be used for anthropological purposes. While Curtis was concerned with staging in a way that utmost preserves what is vanishing, Zhuang aimed to reflect the living conditions of diverse groups along the frontiers and thus contained much information about agricultural production, animal husbandry and economy of western China during the 1930s. As a figure representative of the intellectual and documentary photography in that particular era, Zhuang was bound to act as multiple different agents and is an embodiment of complex, overlapping and if not yet incongruous motivations—a complication of his own independent perspectives and professional responsibilities under the larger contextual influence from the society and its aspirations. One then cannot help but question, what exactly were the assigned missions and Zhuang’s own aspirations?

It is beyond the scope of this article to conclusively answer this question. However, as represented by the example of Zhuang Xueben’s photographs, the images produced during the early 20th century in Tibet are coded with layered agencies and complex motivations. At an era when we are immersed in the excess of visual information, through the lens of these Han Chinese photographers, we have to some extent gained the prism through which we can imagine Tibet in the eyes of early generation camera-owners. These early images from the twentieth century present to us the aesthetic and social significance of Tibetan visual materials. The private collection of Huang Jianpeng also revealed photographs that are other than early expedition photographs from the west such as collections at the Pitt Rivers Museum at Oxford. These photographs not only preserve the photographic methods that are met with international technological standards, but also showcase the complex motivations of photographers from the last century. Such a collection paves ways for future visual studies of contemporary Tibet and is of profound significance to Tibetan visual culture, film and photography.

---

Ala Changso (nga yi chang gsol rogs), directed by Sonthar Gyal. Premiered at Shanghai International Film Festival, 2018.

Reviewed by Palden Gyal, Columbia University

Often a personal crisis has the power of changing one's purpose in life. It can prompt earnest reflection on life, a reexamination of the past and a discovery of path forward. Ala Changso, directed by Sonthar Gyal, tells a story where a tragedy initiates the divulgence of a number of secrets that impugn confidence and trust in interpersonal relationships. While Ala Changso's narrative centers on a long-distance pilgrimage to Lhasa from Gyalrong, the eastern fringe of the Tibetan plateau, a psychological drama unfolds of guilt, jealousy, and remorse, relating universal themes of unfulfilled dreams and promises.

In Tibetan Buddhism one of the most physically taxing spiritual practices is the prostration pilgrimage which takes months if not years to complete. Sonthar Gyal returns to the theme of pilgrimage in Ala Changso (2018), which he explored in his debut feature film The Sun Beaten Path (Dbus lam gyi nyi ma, 2010). It follows the prostration path of Dolma (Nyima Sungsung), a remarried widow, who upon discovering that she is afflicted with an unnamed but fatal illness, resolves to undertake a pilgrimage to Lhasa. That is a promise she made to her late husband. Menaced by the same illness that claimed his life, Dolma is convinced that it is her karma. In a solemn moment of retrospection, she persuades herself that the cause of her ailment is her unfulfilled promise to take her husband's ashes to the sacred city. Ala Changso offers a biting commentary on how the notion of karmic justice proscribes deeply held values of social and family relationships in a Buddhist society. Concealing her health condition to her current husband, Dorje (Yungdrung Gyal), Dolma decides to set out on a prostration pilgrimage to Lhasa. After the two girls accompanying her desert, Dolma is joined by Dorje and her son from her previous marriage, Norbu (Sechok Gyal).

Lhasa is to Tibetan Buddhists what Jerusalem is to the Jews and Mecca to the Muslims, and pilgrimage to the holy city is a common practice for all Tibetans across the Tibetan plateau and beyond. But the fact that this story takes place in Gyalrong is noteworthy for several reasons. First, Sonthar Gyal subtly calls attention to the linguistic landscape of Tibet, the diversity of Tibetan languages beyond the simple classification of the three regional dialects. A non-Tibetan observer might not appreciate the variety of Tibetic languages that feature in Ala Changso, from Gyalrongkay to Drogkay and Khamkay. Despite his self-confessed inaptitude at speaking other dialects, Dorje manages to hold basic conversations with Tibetans from across the
plateau whom they encounter in passing. Secondly, the fact that Ganden Monastery is their final site of pilgrimage and the destination for the remains of Norbu’s father is notable. Gyalrong, ostensibly a stronghold of Bon religion, has historically supplied a disproportionate number of Ganden abbots, and Buddhist scholars hailed from the region for centuries. Therefore, Ganden Monastery, one of three seat monasteries of the Geluk tradition, occupies a special position in the minds of Tibetan Buddhists from the region. Such snippets of historical memory serve as important nodes in both imagined and real institutional networks that connected Tibetan communities across the plateau in the absence of an all-encompassing political state.

Sonthar Gyal’s approach in Ala Changso is highly anthropocentric with little attention to the aesthetics of the settings and shifting scenes of the natural environment. The only exception is a long take of the Potala Palace at the end. The camera focuses on the characters who appear plain and unadorned, striving to portray realistic images of the characters. Notable in Ala Changso is the absence of a single protagonist. The would-be protagonist retires halfway through the film leaving a mild sense of shock and suspense. Dolma’s death unveils a secret that momentarily blinds the otherwise very patient and considerate Dorje by jealousy. Norbu, the sulky son, suffers from maladjustment after his mother left him with his grandparents for the second marriage. He seems to be unperturbed by the death of his mother yet he remains resolute on continuing the pilgrimage, refusing to take off the backpack that contains his father’s ashes. The bereaved Norbu copes with the loss of his mother by embracing and befriending an orphaned foal. The parallelism between the orphaned foal and Norbu is compelling but the symbolism is at times a little overdramatized. The foal accompanies Norbu and Dorje all the way to Lhasa. “Ala Changso” is the title of a song that means “please drink up this cup of good wine,” and the song underlines a high point in the narrative, a rare moment and an occasion of reunion and reconciliation. Norbu is finally accepted as a member of Dolma’s second family and he is no longer an alienated child seeking refuge at his grandparents’ home.

*Script:* Tashi Dawa, Sonthar Gyal.
*Photography:* Wang Weihua.
*Editing:* Tsering Wangshuk, Sangdak Kyab.
*Cast:* Yungdrung Gyal (Dorje), Nyima Sungsung (Drolma), Sechok Gyal (Norbu), Jinpa (Dandar), Liao Xi (hospital doctor).
Decolonial/Anti-Racist interventions in Tibetan/Buddhist Studies – AAR Roundtable, Colorado 2019

Natalie Avalos, Matthew King, Nancy G. Lin, Dawa Lokyitsang, Karin Meyers, Annabella Pitkin, Sangseraima Ujeed, Riga Shakya

This roundtable session held at the 2019 meeting of the American Association of Religious Studies explores how decolonial analytics and praxis can be applied productively in Tibetan/Buddhist Studies. As scholars, it is critical for us to consider how the racialized perceptions of non-Western religious traditions and peoples are tethered to their continued structural dispossession. A decolonizing intervention here means making the material hierarchies among peoples and their knowledge systems legible but also interrogating the politics of knowledge production in light of these overlapping colonial histories. Our discussion explicitly explores how our choices as scholars have effects in the real world, including how we represent Tibet and the Himalayas/Buddhism in our publications and teaching, the current inequalities of access to academic capital for Tibetan and nonwhite students/scholars, etc. We draw from Indigenous Studies approaches that center Indigenous knowledges and voices, given the history of their marginalization and ask how can we better center Tibetan/Himalayan voices/epistemologies in the study of Tibetan Buddhism.

Settler Colonialism and Tibet

Natalie Avalos, University of Colorado, Boulder

Settler colonialism is a kind of colonialism that seeks to eliminate Indigenous inhabitants (through genocide or ethnocide) and replace them with settlers, who seize lands and resources (Wolfe 2006). Settler colonialism is a structure that endures over time by continually reinscribing ideologies and legal structures that naturalize Indigenous dispossession, for instance, using race as a grammar to encode asymmetrical relations with subjugated peoples. Since Tibet’s 1959 invasion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), over 130,000 Tibetans now live in diaspora as landless refugees abroad. An estimated 7.5 million Chinese settlers live alongside 6 million Tibetans within the borders of Tibet. While settler colonial theory developed in European descended contexts, such as the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, these projects need not be predicated on white supremacy in order to operationalize the grammar of racialization for
the same ends. White supremacist settler colonial projects have instead created a template of modern imperial power that understands civilizing discourses as a means to an end, namely the appropriations of lands. Like U.S. forms of settler aggression, the PRC racialized and criminalized Tibetan lifeways, centrally religious traditions, to justify and naturalize Tibetan dispossession. Although PRC discourses claim their annexation of Tibet was a benevolent act of development and even a response to outside imperial threats by the U.S., we could better understand this annexation as a direct mapping of a settler colonial template of power. Framing Tibet’s geopolitical reality as Chinese settler colonialism visibilizes the operations of power at work to keep it subjugated and re-signifies this reality to the greater world.

If You Meet Buddhology on the Road, Kill It!

Matthew King, University of California, Riverside

A unique product of colonial relations and forms of power, Buddhist Studies is positioned to not just follow but lead collaborative efforts to think about what Alejandro Vallega calls the “radical exteriority” of the human sciences. Intending to commit “acts of epistemic disobedience,” as Walter Mignolo puts it, that “de-link” epistemologies from colonial hierarchies of knowledge, Buddhist Studies scholars are well positioned to chart the otherwise of enduring universals associated with secular humanism, liberal models of human agency, pluralist representations of race, religion, and the national subject, and unilineal models of static History—all fundamental to models in the humanities and social sciences and all tied inextricably to colonial regimes of truth. Few, if any, of the objects, analytics, and topographies of knowledge currently associated with Buddhist Studies could withstand a rigorous decolonial unlinking. Abandoning claims to a unique (i.e. transcultural and transhistorical) object, “Buddhism,” the ruins of Buddhist Studies ought instead to lead the humanities and social sciences in disaggregating and thinking radically outside that fundamental binary that birthed its problematic terms: West/nonWest. Such a decolonized Buddhist Studies, if it still chose to bear that name, would therefore shift its analysis to the production of disparate categories of people (etc.) through the representational strategies of political discipline: moving beyond a critique of representations of “Buddhist” life as such, or of its supposed inaccuracies, or of the “real” relationship of text and context, to what Ann Laura Stoler artfully describes as “the changing force fields in which these models were produced… from the high gloss print of history writ-large to the space of its production.” Without this fundamental, almost geologic, unlinking, how will the doing of Buddhist Studies (or any other humanist endeavor) ever do
more than reproduce the modernist staging of the West as site and source of universal knowledge and History, even if under a proudly raised decolonial flag?

WORKS CITED


What language we dare learn and speak: decolonizing the study of Tibetan poetry

Nancy G. Lin, University of California, Berkeley

More than thirty years ago bell hooks wrote of how language is a place of struggle, a site of both oppression and liberative potential. Following her work, I seek to create space for studying snyan ngag, the classical tradition of Tibetan poetry, bellettristic prose, and poetics, as a decolonial endeavor. In my remarks I noted the neglect of snyan ngag in western language scholarship, as well as expressions of distaste colleagues have shared with me: that it is contrived, artificial, baroque, pedantic. Repurposing Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory of taste, I sketched how Romantic and Transcendentalist movements shaped highbrow tastes in English poetry. Their valorization of subjectivity, naturalness, and freedom from formal verse conventions became hallmarks of authentic poetry that continue to carry weight today. Concomitantly, they shaped western notions that authentic religion is rooted in personal, direct encounters with the divine or with true reality. It is therefore no surprise that western scholars have favored Tibetan poetry that seemingly accords with these aesthetics and values, including songs of Mi la ras pa and the Sixth Dalai Lama, to the exclusion of snyan ngag. In place of such fraught value judgments, I provided an example of

how snyan ngag suggests its own capacity for transformation. A verse by Zhu Chen Tshul khrims rin chen (1697–1774) praises the goddess Dbyangs can ma for leading sentient beings to omniscient buddhahood through poetry and song. Here wisdom and eloquence are intertwined by the intricately crafted fusion of style and content. By attending to Tibetan sources such as these, we can question biased tastes, assumptions, and values, while furthering our understanding of key Tibetan/Buddhist epistemologies.

WORKS CITED


Decolonizing “responsibility” in Tibetan and Buddhist Studies: A Structurally Decolonizing Praxis

Dawa Lokyitsang, University of Colorado, Boulder

What does it mean to be a responsible scholar attuned to decolonization as a method? As Mohawk anthropologist Dr. Audra Simpson has pointed out, it’s important not to fall into the delegitimizing trap of justifying Native scholarship on the basis of identity politics and justice alone. This matters, but a deeper reason relates to the way in which Simpson engaged the distinction between resistance and refusal, which has to do with distinction between event and structure. This cuts to the heart of the question. Scholars are encouraged to do the right thing through the logic of ethics, but this presumes we all need encouragement to do this. Some of us don’t. We are already doing it. However, like refusal, obligation, necessity, and every day realities are the non-episodic qualities that structure the daily lives of Indigenous peoples, researchers or otherwise. By naming refusal, Simpson has not presented a new fashionable anthropological turn (Simpson 2014). While her conceptualization is novel and valuable, the reality of refusal is something that Indigenous peoples have experienced throughout the history of colonization. If colonization was an event, then as Simpson points out, resistance would be enough. It’s not. As Patrick Wolf notes, colonization was and remains structural (1999). Therefore, modes of decolonization must too be structural. If we truly want to decolonize, we must reimagine legacies of episodic conceptualization as structural—moving away from the resisting colonial encounters by
ethical outsiders, toward the refusal of colonial structures by obligated stake holders, for whom non-obligatory ethics loses all meaning.

For research to be considered truly decolonial, it must, argues Linda Tuhiwai Smith, prioritize Indigenous voices, histories, epistemologies, and their struggles against settler colonialism (1999: 129). I invite researchers to consider a structurally decolonizing praxis. This would not only involve theories and methods generated by community members with whom you work, it would also employ the genealogy of works produced by other Indigenous scholars dealing with this very issue.

WORKS CITED


Decolonizing Dependent Arising

Karin Meyers, Rangjung Yeshe Institute

In modern Buddhist studies the categories of "religion" and "philosophy" follow a colonial logic that advances Euro-American cultural hegemony while delegitimating other perspectives and experiences. Aspects of traditional Buddhist worldviews that do not conform to modern naturalism, rationalism or materialist science are cast off as "religion," as topics that might be of some historical or cultural interest but not worthy of serious philosophical or existential consideration. In regard to dependent arising, this enables interpreters to elevate aspects of the doctrine compatible with modern (and colonial) perspectives as having some purchase on reality, while dismissing associated ideas concerning karma and rebirth, cosmology, magic or soteriology. A similar pattern applies to Buddhist devotion and ritual. What would happen if instead of dismissing these ideas and practices we took them as potent challenges to the assumptions, values and ways of life that inform the modern academy?
Our climate and ecological crisis demands that we take such challenges seriously. This crisis exposes a catastrophic failure of the modern episteme, as well as the destructiveness of the colonial mindset that informs the ways of knowing and being reproduced in the academy. While modern science and technology may be critical to avert further ecological destruction, in order to deploy this knowledge wisely and repair our relationship to the more-than-human-world, it may also be critical to learn from indigenous communities whose ecological knowledge and relationships have been disrupted by colonialism.

Dependent arising is relevant to this work. Although some modern interpretations of the doctrine are highly ecological, they tend to be naturalistic. By contrast, traditional interpretations accommodate a diversity of worlds and a rich ecology of seen and unseen other-than-human relatives, which better support contact, care and responsibility for these relatives. In other words, a decolonized dependent arising provides a potent philosophical framework for repairing our world(s).

Knowledge and Power: Centering Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhist Epistemic Authority

Annabella Pitkin, Lehigh University

Discourses of rationality, secularism, and modernity that emerged within European and North American colonial projects often caricature Tibetan and Himalayan intellectual and religious life, either as anti-modern, trapped in magic and superstition, or as expressing an ideal “rational religion,” whose insights mirror those of the natural sciences, but only when “irrational” elements like devotion, ritual, or yogic power have been edited out (Lopez 1998). In this sense, Religion Studies discourses surrounding secularism and rationality position Tibetan thinkers and knowledge systems within exigencies of “epistemic rather than religious conversion” (Mignolo 2012). Lama Jabb has highlighted the epistemic and material erasures that both result from and enable “the scholarly preoccupation and public fascination in the West with Tibetan Buddhism” (2015). Definitions of the legitimate subjects of scholarly inquiry affect who can do scholarship, and what research is funded or published. The stakes of knowledge production are not simply epistemic; they are territorial, pragmatic, economic, and professional. A decolonizing approach must therefore center Tibetan and Himalayan epistemic authority as a part of centering sovereignties of Tibetan and Himalayan social, political and religious power.

Tibetan and Himalayan accounts of yogic power, teacher-student lineage connections, and guru-disciple devotion, articulated in genres
like rnam thar, gsol 'debs, ger phreng, and chos 'byung, are often targets for colonizing and Orientalizing projections. My presentation asked what forms of power Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhist authors exercise when they recount, interpret, or even strategically conceal histories, memories, and vocabularies of yogic power, devotional practice, and teacher-student lineage connection? How do accounts of power and devotion - as practices of recollection, identity and moral personhood - directly intersect with assertions of both territorial and intellectual sovereignty? And in what ways can devotion and accounts of yogic power function most fully as forms of refusal?

23 and Me: Tibetan Buddhist Reflections on its “DNA”

Sangseraima Ujeed, University of Michigan

Tibetans, Mongolians, Nepalese, and Bhutanese identify as “family” in a shared “Wider Tibetan Buddhist Sphere”. Despite the “Tibetan-ness” ascribed by Western Academia, Tibetan Buddhism was not a unilateral transference of a tradition. Rather, it was subject to cross-assimilations over time, in the development of which different ethnicities played a formative hand. The very “Tibetanness” of “Tibetan Buddhism” needs decolonizing, itself a terminology created by the 20th century Eurocentric quest to isolate/define the “other”.

My research focuses on the Tibeto-Mongolian aspect of the Wider Tibetan Buddhist Sphere. Throughout history, thousands of Mongolian monk-scholars travelled to Tibet to study Buddhism. They had Tibetan names, composed in Tibetan and often never returned to their homelands. The inter-transmission of Buddhist knowledge owed to the cultural and religious exchanges through generations of master-disciple relationships, transmission lineages, reincarnation, and travel, contributed to a cosmopolitan and geographically expansive tradition. These individuals did not see Tibetan Buddhism as the intellectual and cultural heritage of another. The very term nang sog “Inner Mongol” originally meant “Mongols who were insiders [of the Buddhist tradition]”. Only by reading the works of Tibetan Buddhists from different ethnic backgrounds together as part of a larger whole, can we gain true understanding of the tradition.

Compared to mature fields such as Classics, Theology, or Philosophy, Religious Studies is a rebellious teenager, Buddhist studies a toddler, and Tibetan Buddhist studies an infant –yet to discover and define their identity. “Tibetan Buddhism” as one of the most popular forms of Buddhism being studied and practiced globally today, still remains
a partial vision. According to Nye, “decolonization is a process, that works in many different ways... that aims to create large-scale transformation of all levels of the academy” (Nye 2019:25). Here, the insider and outsider must work together, and through collaboration between all those who have stakes in the tradition; western, traditional, and indigenous scholars, we can broaden our understanding of the “Tibetan” Buddhist world.

WORKS CITED


On Vulgar Critique

Riga Shakya, Columbia University

My remarks are drawn from a forthcoming article of mine tentatively entitled “The Place of Orientalism in Tibetan Studies” which examines how Chinese and Tibetan intellectuals inside and outside the PRC engage with Saidian colonial discourse analysis. I share examples of colonial discourse analysis in the work of feted New Left literary critic Wang Hui, and more recently in the work of scholars of Tibetan Buddhism in China.1 These scholars directly invoke Said’s Orientalism in a critique of Tibet scholarship in the west. Put briefly my argument is that their critique is vulgar. By which, I point both to a totalizing scope and blindness to Tibetan traditions and cultures as hermeneutic, and a crude reading of power/knowledge that unknowingly (or knowingly) lends itself to the linear narrative of national history. Yet rather than an accusation that Chinese scholars ‘vulgarize’ Said, it is Said’s argument in Orientalism itself that remains vulgar. His problematic critique becomes nothing less than a function of the very discursive formation he purported to critique reinforcing its formation and reasserting its power while so brilliantly exposing it. We might locate the problem in Said’s reading of power/knowledge, the place of individual agency in the formation of power discourses. By failing to make the liberal subject and its

sovereignty the locus and focus of a restructuring critique, a failure that Islamic legal scholar Wael B. Hallaq has claimed exonerates Orientalism as a “symptom, rather than the cause or chief culprit, of a psychoepistemic disorder plaguing modern forms of knowledge to the core”.\footnote{Wael B. Hallaq, \textit{Restating Orientalism: A Critique of Modern Knowledge}, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).} This pervasive logic does not depart from the parameters of stilted colonial discourse analysis, and their critique of the West is vulgar precisely because their approach searches for, to use Foucauldian terms, “immediate struggles” that look not for the “chief enemy” but for “immediate enemies”. The preoccupation with Orientalism in both the academy (not limited to China) and popular parlance (activists and community organizers) has occluded the richness of Tibetan historical and literary cultures as a critical hermeneutical resource. Decolonial thought, which seeks to delink from western epistemology in the form of the rhetoric of modernity, necessarily mandates the engagement of Tibetan ways of thinking as hermeneutic in an act of ‘epistemic disobedience’.

WORKS CITED


Nyema Droma in Conversation

Yuyuan (Victoria) Liu, Columbia University

Nyema Droma is a photographer and curator born and based in Lhasa. Nyema received her BA in Fashion Photography and Styling from the London College of Fashion. She is best known for Performing Tibetan Identities, a portrait series of ‘new’ generation of global Tibetans, which was exhibited at the Pitt Rivers Museum in 2018. Nyema’s artwork features on cover of the inaugural issue of Waxing Moon and here she shares her most recent projects, future plans and her reflections on her multiple roles in the world of Tibetan visual culture.

You started fashion photography in university and your early work largely consisted of fashion shoots of Tibetan subjects. How did your early experiences influence your current approach to photography? What inspired your transition to becoming a contemporary photographer?

My early experiences in fashion photography in London have had a great influence on my current work. Working in the fashion industry definitely inspired me in different ways to establish my own brand Hima Alaya. Being exposed to different people from diverse backgrounds in the industry has also taught me how to cooperate with my team members today. As a contemporary Tibetan photographer, I create works that explore issues like cultural identities, self-representation, globalization and social status that play out in contemporary Lhasa. I enjoy being able to present different ideas and concepts through photographs while adding fashion elements and artistic aesthetics to the photographs. Photography has served as a bridge for me to learn more about people and their stories and histories. My camera is a medium through which I express my feelings, thoughts and questions to the audience.

Could you tell us a bit about your exhibition Performing Tibetan Identities at the Pitt Rivers Museum in 2018 and your personal experience of interviewing your subjects for the exhibition?

The exhibition “Performing Tibetan Identities” was a photo series project that includes 30 young Tibetans from diverse backgrounds, class, profession and political status. In 2015 at an exhibition in London, I met Clare Harris who was then the curator at the museum. After many meetings with her at Oxford, I was offered an artist residency at the Pitt Rivers Museum, and we came up with the
“Performing Tibetan Identities.” As a Tibetan who grew up in a very diverse culture, I often have many questions about my own identity, and sometimes have trouble balancing my cultural identity and modern identity in contemporary society. On many occasions I feel that I am only performing my Tibetan identity, such as when I put on traditional dress in front of the camera. Like I said earlier, my camera is a medium through which I ask questions and learn about stories. This is why I want to interview different people and investigate their answers towards my questions.

Nyema Droma’s Self-Portrait from *Performing Tibetan Identities* project

**Could you tell us about your recent clothing collection for monks and nuns?**

Our new collection 'Lhaksum' (lhag bsam) is a monastic clothing series specially designed for the lifestyles of the modern sangha from the perspective of fabric and function, and made from the sincere wish to repay their purity of their faith. This series was something I have been wanting to work on since 2016 while I was studying and teaching in
Dromaling Monastery in Yushu. After spending most of my time with monks and nuns that year and getting to know their living environments and daily lifestyle, I wanted to make something that's suitable and functional for them.

You also curate exhibitions, host art festivals and photography competitions. How do you negotiate your multiple roles as a photographer, designer, curator and business owner?

From my experiences as an artist, I had many opportunities to get to know many other interesting roles in the art industry. I love to explore new things and challenges and it is fascinating to see how people react and feel when they come to exhibitions or events we host in Lhasa. I have always aspired to do things that are meaningful and inspiring for my community, promoting an artistic atmosphere in Lhasa and portraying a modern Tibetan image to a wider and more international audience.

What’s next?

I plan to finish my master’s degree and expand my brand to an international market. At the same time, I hope to curate events and exhibitions in Lhasa that are centered on social values. For my MA research, I want to work on helping local Tibetan artists connect with global communities so that they can reach broader audiences and their work can be subject to more diverse interpretations. I also want to collaborate with artists from other backgrounds to create more Tibetan and Himalayan culture-based artworks. I think these works could stimulate new conversations among Tibetan artists and their audiences.
as they see ideas, expressions, visions and interpretations surrounding Himalayan culture from the west.

You have designed the cover of our first issue. What were your creative ideas?

This cover was shot in 2018 during my visit to Tashi Choede monastery in Gonkar county, Lhoka (also known as Gongkar Chö Monastery). Although many wall paintings at the monastery were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, the site has some of its original traces preserved. It is always fascinating for me to see traditional artworks in monasteries and to appreciate them in my own way.

Which artists and photographers inspire you the most?

I really admire the early generation of Tibetan contemporary artists, such as Gonkar Gyatso, Nortse and Gade. I think these artists create works that truly reflect their communities and comment on their social reality. They are artists who are very expressive and socially aware.
The Necktie

Tsering Döndrup, translated by Chris Peacock

Some say this thing called the necktie evolved from the scarves worn by cart drivers in Europe, while some sources claim that it was first introduced to France by a group of Croatian mercenaries. Regardless of its lowly origins, and regardless of the amount of acclaim or contempt it may have garnered, it’s fair to say that in the modern era this thin strip of soft, brilliant cloth has added a magnificent splash of color to men’s otherwise drab outfits, like wild flowers blooming on the grasslands. But from its first arrival in Tsezhung through to the present day, the necktie has a history of no more than twenty years. I can personally attest to this piece of history, because it was none other than I who first brought the necktie to the region of Tsezhung.

It was a summer some ten-plus years ago, the kind so beautiful it can’t help but bring tears to your eyes. I had just graduated from a university off in the east of China and had returned to my homeland, the grasslands of Tsezhung. At the time, I basically had nothing to my name other than a cheap Western suit with a colorful silk tie, a box of literary texts that would soon prove to be completely useless, a few short poems I had published in some magazines, and a delightful, utterly ridiculous sounding nickname — “The Poet.” Nevertheless, I was feeling bright and cheery, because I would soon be bringing in a monthly salary.

I was assigned to a department that had no connection whatsoever to my major of language and literature. The head of the department was a harsh but fair (something I was to learn later) man in his mid-40s. The first time I went to meet him I was terrified, and I thought he was, too, because his eyes went round as plates and he sat there pointing at my chest for what felt like an age, unable to utter a word. I realized that he was even trembling a little.

“Take... take that thing off your neck!” After a long pause, he added: “What the hell!”

I finally realized that he was talking about my tie. Just you think about it for a second — how could a young man with a glorious title like “The Poet” bow down to some country bumpkin, even if it meaning losing his job? Needless to say, my magnificent necktie was going nowhere.
Later on, every time he complained about my tie, I recited that great Chekhov quote to myself in my head: “Everything about a person should be first-rate: his thoughts, his clothes, his…”

Following the example set by me, the number of people wearing Western suits and ties in Tsezhung grew and grew.

Around here, however, there’s a still big mix of men who’ve cut off their traditional braids and men who haven’t, and for a time people didn’t know quite how to treat this foreign import. Some people tied their ties onto the collar of a tracksuit jacket then put a Mao suit on over the top. Some people donned their Western suits and their ties and then topped it off with a green army cap. Some people wrapped their ties around their necks and tied a knot so tight they almost choked to death. Even the lama Alak Drong, whose fame spread far and wide, adopted a yellow tie which he wore beneath a string of ivory prayer beads, then completed his look with a dark brown leather jacket. I thought it looked completely absurd, but the local sycophants all said that the “style of the reverend lama’s garments is rich with ethnic characteristics!”, which pleased Alak Drong no end. I have no doubt that if the Buddha had stuck around for 2,500 years to witness our modern age and see the state of his disciple, he’d be absolutely aghast.

What surprised me was that my boss finally started wearing a tie. He didn’t really know how to tie it properly, but from a distance, at least, he looked a lot more impressive. What surprised me even more was that one time I happened to come across him sleeping shirtless but with the tie still on. When I asked him what was going on, he replied quite candidly that someone had helped him tie a good knot and if he undid it he wouldn’t be able to tie it again. “Ah kha, heaven really knows how to play with people,” I thought to myself.

Now it’s some ten years later, and I was never able to carve out a career for myself as a poet, but I have become a junior manager at the office – I’ve turned into what I used to think of as a “country bumpkin.” Whether it’s because I’m too busy or because I’m getting on in years I don’t know, but either way I’ve been paying less and less attention to my appearance in recent years. Much to my surprise, I actually ended up getting in trouble again because of this. Yesterday morning when I first got into the office, that harsh but fair boss of mine sized me up and said, “The higher ups are coming to do an inspection today, surely you didn’t forget? What sort of way is this to show your respect, not even wearing a tie? What the hell!”
Works Cited

An Amcho’s Recitation

Pema Bhum, translated by Tenzin Dickie

In 1970 when I got into Malho Trik National Teacher’s College, there were about sixty students in my class. To separate us into two sections - an Upper and a Lower Section - the school tested our Tibetan language and mathematics. I found the math test easy because it only tested addition and subtraction, multiplication and division. But I had trouble with the Tibetan test. There was only one part to the Tibetan test and that was a dictation, a dictation of Lin Biao’s introduction to the Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong. Now Quotations from Chairman Mao was a book that we carried on our persons at all times no matter what we were doing. We needed to study the Little Red Book at least once every day and I could even recite many of the passages from the book word for word. But I had never read the introduction to it. During the test as soon as I heard the word ‘introduction’, I became totally confused. I still remember writing down ‘Introduction.’ The teacher began: “Comrade Mao Zedong is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era,” and I tried my best to write down the words as I heard them.

The results were posted the next day. I had made it to the Upper Section. At the time I could hardly believe that I had made the Upper Section when I couldn’t even spell the word ‘introduction’ properly. Now when I think back on this incident, of course it makes sense. All the students who sat that test were around thirteen or fourteen. It was just as we were learning to read some Tibetan that the Cultural Revolution began and put a stop to our education. Many of us who were taking that test could hardly get any words down on paper, let alone spell the words correctly. The ones who could scrawl down some words must have made the Lower Section.

A few days after this test, we began our classes. But we had no textbooks for any of our classes. All the compositions of the great Tibetan scholars had been classified as ‘poison.’ Even the Tibetan language textbooks compiled under Chinese government supervision before 1966 could not be used. So, the text that we used for our Tibetan language class was again “Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong.” After some time, the campaign to study Mao’s Three Great Essays was launched; these essays were titled Serve the People; Yugong Moves the Mountain; and In Memory of Norman Bethune. So, we had to study these essays for a while in our Tibetan language class. As soon as this campaign was over, the campaign to study Chairman Mao’s Five Essays on Philosophy swept the country. The essays were as follows:
On Practice; On Contradictions; On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People; Speech at the Chinese Communist Party’s National Conference on Propaganda Works; and Where do Correct Ideas Come From? The school began using these essays as our textbook for the class. The school had three different grades at the time, but students in all three grades used the same textbook. The first essay On Practice was the text that we had to study and our teacher was to be Mr. Dorje Tsering. It was Mr. Doring who taught us Tibetan for the first time.

My memories of that first day he came to teach our class are as clear and vivid as if it were yesterday. When he stepped inside the classroom, we collectively sucked in our breath and stopped breathing, so awed and intimidated were we by his fame and his majesty. We all sat up straight in our chairs, stared at his face and waited breathlessly for his first words to us. Mr. Doring came in, put Chairman Mao’s Five Essays on Philosophy down on the desk, looked at each of us and said,

“It smells of shit in here. Open the windows.”

Not sure what he meant, some of us looked at each other. Some of us kept staring at him, waiting for him to say more.

“Did you all hear me? Open the windows,” repeated Mr. Doring. The students who sat near the windows opened the windows.

“If you must smoke, go and smoke in the toilets, inhaling the smell of piss and shit as you do so. Cigarette smoke in the classroom stings my nose and mouth, and I can barely read a book in here.”

Then we understood that he meant the smell of “shit” to mean the smell of cigarettes. As it were, students weren’t allowed to smoke at school. The other teachers, when they found us smoking, punished us by giving us a long lecture. Of course, the teachers had gotten used to giving this lecture and the students had gotten used to hearing this lecture. Mr. Doring’s way of scolding the students who smoked was so novel that it confused us at first. Our class had a few students who smoked, and these students used to smoke in the class between breaks.

Now Mr. Doring called out some names and had these students read out a few lines from On Practice. One or two of them, thinking that a quick reading would impress the teacher, read hastily, tripping over the words and mispronouncing others in their nervousness. If it were another teacher, they would have stopped the student, made the correction and given a scolding all in one go, but not Mr. Doring. He listened to all the students one by one without stopping them, as if they were giving some great reading.
Then he asked, “Do you guys know what an amcho is?”

Maybe the other students didn’t know what an amcho was. They just looked at each other and no one said anything. I knew that an amcho was a monk who went to people’s houses to read scripture, but was that the answer Mr. Doring was looking for? I wasn’t sure, so I kept quiet.

No one gave an answer. Mr. Doring said, “An amcho is a monk who reads scripture in people’s houses.”

I felt very sorry that I had not given the answer when I had it.

Mr. Doring continued, “When the amcho read a scripture at people’s houses, it is not necessary for the host to hear and comprehend the words. Often it is not even necessary for the amcho himself to hear and comprehend what he is reading. In fact, the faster an amcho reads, the more skilled he is considered to be.”

Now we understood what he was saying, which was that we read like amchos.

Next, Mr. Doring wanted to give us a dictation. He told us to mark the words we didn’t understand. After he finished dictating, he wanted us to tell him all the words we didn’t know.

As he was dictating, he read very slowly. His voice wasn’t very loud but he spoke each word very clearly, as if he wanted us to hear that this was the way to read and not the way of the amcho. As he read, his voice sounded dewy and full-throated, as if a lump of saliva had lodged in his throat. I kept wondering why he wouldn’t just swallow the saliva and then read.

After Mr. Doring finished reading several passages, just as we wanted, we gave him some words that we didn’t know like ‘explanation’ and ‘retinue.’

Then he said, “These are the only words that you don’t know?” Nobody answered him and the classroom went very quiet. “There are more words I don’t know in this essay than you guys,” said Mr. Doring. “Who can explain these terms to me?”

He listed a bunch of revolutionary terms such as society, economy, class, production etc. We came across these terms at least once every day, either in our books or in our lives but there was not a single one of us who could explain what they meant. We sat there dumb and silent.
Works Cited
